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Abstract
Online Social Networks (OSNs) are computer-based technologies that enable users
to create content, share information, and establish social relationships in online
platforms. The advent of OSNs have dramatically revolutionized the way we access the
news, share opinion, make business and politics. Although the wide adoption of OSNs
brought several positive effects, the combination of its technological and social aspects
hides harmful effects for both the individual users and the entire society. Among the
potential risks analyzed in the literature (e.g., security, health, etc.), in this thesis, we
analyze the perils related to the privacy leakage and the manipulation of opinions
in OSNs. In particular, we investigate the factors driving these perils, with the final
objective of raising users’ awareness of the risks behind their online activities. We show
how, for both the privacy and manipulation perils, social connections play a central
role in fostering and exacerbating such issues. In fact, social connections among
OSN users result in a network structure, which enables the spreading of information,
behaviors, and opinions across the OSN population through online interactions.
Along this research direction, we first explore to what extent an individual’s privacy
can be violated by leveraging information provided by other users in the OSN. In
particular, we examine the problem of location privacy by developing methods to
assess users’ privacy risks and strategies to control the public exposure of their data.
Then, we explore the privacy peril by considering the diffusion of behaviors and
opinions in OSNs. In fact, social interactions can substantially affect the extent to
which a behavior, an opinion, or a product is adopted by OSN users. This concept
is a social phenomenon referred to as social influence. According to this concept,
we investigate whether social influence modeling (i.e., learning influence strengths
among subjects) can be used to accurately predict users’ future activity and, in turn,
violate their privacy. We present different approaches to model social influence and
we show how such models can be employed to violate users’ privacy.
Online interactions and social influence play also a crucial role in the manipulation of
v
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peoples’ belief and opinion. Manipulation campaigns have raised particular concerns
in the political context. Bots (i.e., software-controlled accounts) and trolls (i.e., state-
sponsored human operators) are the main actors responsible for these campaigns. In
this thesis, we analyze the activity of such malicious actors to enhance and enable
countermeasures for their detection. More specifically, we first uncover the strate-
gies employed by bots to avoid detection and manipulate human users. Then, we
present an approach for detecting trolls’ activity in OSNs that accurately identifies
troll accounts and unveils their distinguishing behavior with respect to regular users.
The results presented in this thesis confirm the privacy and manipulation risks in
OSNs: On one hand, we prove that users’ privacy is not under individual control
as public information can be efficiently used to predict their behavior, and in turn,
violate their privacy. On the other hand, we show that malicious actors have become
increasingly sophisticated to escape detection and manipulate human users. However,
the majority of OSN users are not conscious or underestimate the potential risks
behind their online activity. Towards raising users’ awareness of such perils and to
mitigate this set of open problems, we propose an awareness service, based on a
mobile application, to timely communicate users their current risks in OSNs. For this
purpose, we deploy a framework to collect users’ data in a privacy-preserving way and
provide them feedback about their privacy and manipulation risks in real-time.
Keywords: Online Social Network (OSN), Privacy, Social influence, OSN manipulation.
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Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
The advances of mobile and wireless technologies have given birth to a new era of
human communication, where traditional contacts has been replaced by mobile and
wireless encounters [112]. More recently, with the growing accessibility of the Internet,
we have assisted to the rise of Online Social Networks (OSNs). In 1997, a generic OSN
was defined as set of people or organization connected through a computer network
[98]. Since then, OSNs have gained tremendous popularity worldwide. Thanks to
the emergence of mobile device (e.g., smartphone) technology, this rise has sped
up exponentially. Just as an example, as of July 2019, Twitter and Facebook count
around 330 and 2,414 million active users, respectively1, and Wechat, the Chinese
OSN, reached over 1.5 billion mobile subscription2.
Nowadays, OSNs do not only indicate a mere virtual connection among individuals.
They represent the most relevant and influential combination of technological and
1https://www.statista.com/
2http://wearesocial.cn/digital-2019-china/
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social paradigms. From the technical side, OSNs are interactive computer-mediated
technologies that facilitate the creation and sharing of information, ideas, interests,
and other forms of (personal) expression with virtual friends and online communities.
The quantity and quality of data that users share in OSNs have a tremendous economic
impact, which also determines the market value of an OSN. In fact, the availability
of large amounts of data allows OSN providers to offer services that are increasingly-
tailored towards the particular characteristics of each user. From the social side, OSNs
are social structures resulting from a set of social actors, people or other entities, and
the social interactions among them. This dual nature enabled the success and the
establishment of one of the most disruptive communication platforms of the last
fifteen years with high social, economic, and political value.
The rise of OSNs has dramatically transformed our society by revolutionizing the
way we communicate, socialize, make business, and many other activities. Initially,
OSNs have enabled social interactions that would be limited by physical constraints
[109] and they facilitated the interplay between users with similar interests [14]. For
example, OSNs allow users to create and subscribe to groups that are focused on
specific topics, interests, or hobbies. During the last decade, OSNs have also changed
marketing strategies by transforming the way most businesses operate and advertise
their products. Political communication is no exception, as it has moved from the
real (offline) world to the digital (online) one. OSNs play a central role in today’s
politics representing a fundamental asset for propaganda. In this regards, OSNs
offer an exceptional channel to broadcast messages and information: They permit
information spreading at a huge scale by offering online platforms where news can
reach millions of people in a fraction of minute.
As a matter of fact, the complexity of today’s online ecosystem captures the facets
of the modern information society: Accessing the news, sharing opinions, and en-
tertaining social connections are just a few examples of the variety of engagements
that individuals regularly perform online. Such engagements appear harmless and do
not require any explicit cost, as most OSNs are free. However, the online ecosystem,
because of its dual technological and social nature, hides pitfalls still largely unknown
to the final users, which may seriously impact their life and our entire society. Looking
at the existing literature on this theme [6], [206], [34], [42], [82], [90], [229], we can
classify these perils in the following five risk categories:
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• Security: The major threats in this category are related to personal profile hack-
ing, phishing (i.e., deceiving users to steal confidential data), ransomware (e.g.,
threatening users to publish their data or block the access to their system unless
a ransom is paid), and fake links that aim to attain personal information.
• Manipulation: A phenomenon that has arisen in the last decade is related to
the manipulation of public opinion over OSNs. The powerful influence that
peers have on each other has been largely used to manipulate peoples’ belief
and opinion (from politics to finance) and, thus, poses a critical threat to public
life. Also, the fact that the information diffusion in OSNs is really fast represents
also a huge drawback as false information can easily and quickly spread across
the online population, thus, empowering misinformation diffusion, which in
turn contribute to the manipulation of public opinion.
• Privacy: By publicly sharing personal data and various contents, users’ privacy is
at risk. In fact, any third party interested in advertising products or manipulating
users’ belief can utilize such data for profiling and predicting users’ interest,
opinion, and future behavior. Also, users that share personal information in
OSNs can be subject to crimes such as identity theft and stalking.
• Safety: Contents shared in OSNs might not be appropriate for kids, who can
have access to a large variety of dangerous material, e.g., obscenity. Additionally,
bullying and harassment have been largely diffused in OSN (a phenomenon
referred to as cyberbullying) eliciting issues such as increased suicidal ideation,
lower self-esteem, and a wide range of negative emotional responses (frustration,
depression, anxiety, etc.)
• Health: Addiction, depression, sleep disorders, and cognitive absorption are
just a few of the several health issues that the frequency of OSNs usage has on
its users.
For every category, it is clear how both the technical facets of OSNs and the im-
proper usage of their users contribute to such risks [85, 209], which can impact people
personal and collective life. Motivated by these significant perils, and by the users’
unconsciousness of such problems, in this thesis, we aim to explore the nature of
OSN abuse and investigate both the users’ misuse of online platforms and the OSN
technical vulnerabilities that enable such risks. In particular, we examine the perils
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related to the privacy leakage and the manipulation of opinions in OSNs. In the next
Section, we detail our effort towards such objectives and we describe the problems
faced in this thesis.
1.2 Problem Overview
In this Section, we provide an overview of the problems faced in this thesis and we
detail how they are linked to each other. As mentioned in Section 1.1, our objective
is to investigate the factors driving the perils related to the privacy leakage and the
manipulation of opinions in OSNs. These issues affect OSN users at a different granu-
larity. While the former has repercussions at the individual level (e.g., the violation
of personal information), the latter concerns our society as a whole (e.g., the risk
of influencing the mass in voting events). Although these two perils appear to be
disconnected, they share a significant feature. In both cases, social relationships
and interactions play a significant role in fostering and exacerbating such risks. For
instance, the fact that users more likely interact with and connect to people similar
to them (e.g., with the same interests or opinions) [92, 172] may reveal users’ undis-
closed personal information and/or expose them to manipulation attempts. The most
remarkable and recent example that encompasses both these issues is represented
by the political scandal of Cambridge Analytica, a data analytics firm that worked
with Donald Trump’s election team and in the Brexit campaign. This company used
Facebook users’ personal information to build a system that could profile US voters,
in order to target them with personalized political advertisements and influence their
choices in voting events [47]. The personal data of about 87 millions Facebook users
were acquired via the 270,000 Facebook users who used a third-party application for
academic research. By giving this application permission to acquire their data, users
also shared information about their friends. This resulted in the data of about 87
million users, the majority of whom did not consent to release their data [47]. This
fact shows that although the privacy and manipulation perils affect users at a different
granularity, their emergence involves the whole OSN community and, in turn, our
society [97].
Both these issues are inherently related to the structure and functionalities of OSNs.
Differently from the World Wide Web (WWW), which is mainly structured around
content, OSNs are organized around individuals, i.e., OSN users. Connections among
such users results in a network, which provides a means to instantiate (and maintain)
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Figure 1.1: Overview of the four sub-problems faced in this thesis
social relationships, connect to users with similar interests, and discover content
generated by others [176]. The network structures of OSNs foster the spreading of
information and behaviors across the online population [52, 63, 237]. Considerable
research has focused on the diffusion of information in OSNs, which is also referred
to as electronic Word of Mouth (eWOM), demonstrating that eWOM plays a crucial
role in influencing people’s behavior [43, 103, 132]. The concept that the interplay
among individuals may affect their behavior is a social phenomenon referred to as
social influence, which is acknowledged as a fundamental factor governing human
behavior. As a result, the network structure, in terms of who is connected to whom,
can substantially affect the extent to which a behavior, an opinion, or a product,
are adopted by individuals and diffuse across the online population [50]. Therefore,
the understanding of how users influence each other can have an impact both on
the privacy abuse (e.g., to predict users’ interests, opinions, or activities) and on the
manipulation of the public opinion (e.g., to maximize the spread of fake news and to
target influential or impressionable users). For these reasons, social influence plays a
relevant role in both the perils analyzed in this work and, thus, holds a central position
in the discussion of this thesis, as also represented in Fig. 1.1. In particular, Fig. 1.1
shows an overview of the four sub-problems faced in this study and how they are
interconnected among each other. The concept of social influence bonds the privacy
and manipulation issues (as we explained above), while the sub-problem named
awareness embraces these three sub-problems with the objective of increasing users’
knowledge and understanding of the risks behind their online activities.
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In the next Section, we detail the objectives of this thesis and the specific problems we
aim to tackle throughout this work.
1.3 Problem Statement
As we described in Section 1.2, the network-oriented nature of OSNs, along with the
tremendous volume of data released on online platforms, poses significant risks for
both the individual users and the entire society. Therefore, an in-depth understanding
of OSNs structure and functionality is necessary to evaluate the impact of users’ online
activity on such risks. In particular, in this thesis, we aim to investigate privacy and
manipulation issues in OSNs with the final goal of raising users’ awareness of such
perils. As mentioned in Section 1.2, we divide this objective in four sub-problems. In
the following subsections, we provide a detailed description of the Research Questions
(RQs) we seek to answer for each sub-problem of this thesis.
1.3.1 Boundaries of Users’ Privacy
OSN users can publish a variety of content (e.g., opinions, news, videos, music, etc.)
and disclose information about themselves (e.g., age, sex, interests, residential ad-
dress) in their profile. By flooding online platforms with these data, users leave a
digital trace that, if properly analyzed, can provide very detailed information about
them. The availability and the amount of such personal data in OSNs is of paramount
importance in today’s data-driven economy. In fact, such information can be ex-
ploited by a third party (e.g., a marketing company) that uses the OSN platforms to
perform targeted advertisement and offer increasingly-tailored services to the users.
This fact raises inherent privacy issues that users can address by limiting the amount
of content they share. However, this approach does not totally protect users from the
disclosure of their personal data. Although OSN providers include in their platforms
several privacy-preserving strategies (e.g., to restrict the access to the published con-
tents to some users only), it has been shown [155] that such strategies are not fully
effective in the protection of personal data in most popular OSNs.
Sensitive information about a given person can still be obtained from data released by
other users within the OSN [22, 155]. In this respect, social cues (e.g., the strength of
social connections and similarity patterns between users) are widely regarded as one
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of the main causes of privacy vulnerability in OSNs. This is due to the fact that users
more likely interact with and connect to people similar to them (e.g., with the same
interests, who visited common locations, etc...) [92, 172]. OSN functionality, in turn,
amplifies this issue by supporting public messages and interactions among users. For
instance, a user can be mentioned by others in relation to a given topic, which may
unintentionally reveal interests for that subject. Hence, users are not in full control of
the public exposure of their personal information and their privacy is not bounded by
what they deliberately share [97].
Along this research direction, the goal of the privacy leakage sub-problem is to assess
the vulnerability of users’ personal information and provide them with strategies to
control the level of their privacy. For this purpose, we aim to respond to the following
RQs:
RQ 1.1: Can an attacker infer users’ personal information from publicly-available data
of other OSN users?
RQ 1.2: Can we provide users with countermeasures to control the public exposure of
their data?
RQ 1.3: Can we allow users to measure the impact of their characteristics, behavior, and
online activity on their privacy?
In Section 1.4.1, we summarize our efforts to answer the above RQs and we detail our
contribution.
1.3.2 The Social Influence Phenomenon
Social relationships and interactions are widely recognized as a means to diffuse
behaviors and information [50, 63]. As a result, the network structure of OSNs can
critically influence the decision of a user to adopt a behavior, believe an information,
or alter an opinion [51, 52]. For these reasons, the social influence phenomenon is
considered a crucial factor governing human behavior. Although social interactions
among OSN users occur online, social influence underlies real life spreading phenom-
ena, such as the diffusion of opinions and the adoption of products, with inevitable
repercussions on marketing, politics, health, and business. For this reason, various
applications (e.g., viral marketing) rely upon the modeling of social influence among
7
Chapter 1. Introduction
OSN users (i.e., measuring the extent to which users influence each other). In fact,
this analysis can provide useful indication to predict users’ future interests, opinions,
and activities. As a consequence, as we mentioned in Section 1.2, the manipulation
of public opinion and the privacy leakage are issues inherently related to the social
influence phenomenon.
Based on this discussion, the objective of this sub-problem is to model social influence
among OSN users for measuring to what extent they are affected by others’ activity
and, accordingly, forecasting their future behavior. In particular, we aim to investigate
whether social influence modeling can be used to predict users’ future activities
and, in turn, to violate their privacy. As we are interested in measuring whether
and to what extent an individual is influenced by other subjects, we focus on social
influence at the user-level. The latter provides, for each subject, prediction of a given
spreading process (e.g., adoption of a product) based on others’ behavior. Existing
models [106, 208] have two main drawbacks, detailed in Chapter 2, which we aim
to overcome by proposing a novel approach. Also, existing approaches rely only on
direct social relationships among users (e.g., friendship) without considering other
factors that might impact users’ future decisions and activities (e.g., their location,
interests, etc).
In summary, the sub-problem related to social influence aims to understand whether
social influence modeling can be used to violate users’ privacy and seeks to answer
the following RQs:
RQ 2.1: How is it possible to overcome the limitations of existing social influence models?
RQ 2.2: Can other factors (e.g., location) impact influence modeling other than social
relationships?
In Section 1.4.2, we describe our contribution and the proposed solutions to answer
these RQs.
1.3.3 Manipulation of the Public Opinion
As we mentioned in Section 1.2, the issue related to the manipulation of public opinion
leverages the social influence phenomenon to affect and alter peoples’ belief. Various
studies raised awareness about the risk of mass manipulation of public opinion,
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especially in the context of political discussion [174, 220, 234]. In particular, the
massive diffusion of digital misinformation and the increasing presence of malicious
accounts in OSNs have been identified as major threats to democracies, other than
main factors contributing to OSN manipulation [82]. Misinformation denotes the
spread of low-credibility content, such as false or misleading news reports, hoaxes,
conspiracy theories, click-bait headlines, junk science [213]. Malicious actors, e.g.,
foreign agents or fake automated accounts, are OSN users that embed themselves in
online social systems and interact with their users with the objective of influencing and
manipulating the public opinion. Previous works found evidence that these malicious
actors play a disproportionate role in manipulation and misinformation campaigns
globally [130, 200, 219]. In turn, OSN users are vulnerable to this manipulation, re-
sharing content posted by and interacting with malicious accounts [213].
The 2016 Brexit referendum and the 2016 US Presidential election represent recent re-
markable examples of social media political manipulation, as both of them spotlighted
a massive presence of malicious users and false information in OSNs (recognized by
the research community, OSN providers, and government agencies) [9, 36, 71, 131].
Since then, OSN service providers have been increasing their efforts to suspend ma-
licious actors and maintain a healthy conversation on their platforms. However,
malicious activity on social media has not entirely stopped: social media bots (i.e.,
automated and software-controlled accounts [86]) and trolls (i.e., state-sponsored
human operators [20]) are still active [70, 134, 167]. These malicious actors keep evolv-
ing and changing their strategies to escape detection and the resulting suspension
from OSN platforms. Therefore, detection of coordinated campaigns is an open chal-
lenge for the research community [57, 87, 232]. While researchers offered different
approaches for the detection of bots, the automated identification of troll accounts
has been proven to be a challenging (yet unsolved) task. However, as the strategies of
bots have been becoming increasingly sophisticated, it is of paramount importance
to keep the pace of such malicious accounts in order to build and adapt effective
countermeasures for their detection.
In this thesis, we propose to investigate the online activity of malicious actors in OSNs
for enabling the detection of such accounts and curbing their manipulation attempts.
Towards the objective of fighting the sub-problem related to the manipulation of
public opinion in OSNs, we aim to respond to the following RQs:
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RQ 3.1: How are social bots evolving to mimic human behavior and avoid detection?
RQ 3.2: What are the strategies implemented by bots to manipulate OSN users and are
those strategies effective?
RQ 3.3: In a analogous way to the detection of bots, is it possible to implement an auto-
mated approach for the identification of troll accounts in OSNs?
In Section 1.4.3, we detail our work to answer the above RQs and tackle these chal-
lenges.
1.3.4 Challenges to Raise Users’ Awareness of OSN Perils
From the discussion in Section 1.2, it is evident how both technical and user vulnerabil-
ities contribute to privacy and manipulation issues. Whereas such perils are concrete
and have significant effects on personal and collective lives, OSN users are not aware
of or underestimate the potential risks behind their online activity. Moreover, there is
a lack of countermeasures to timely communicate users their current risks in a clear
and comprehensible way. However, building a service with such purpose presents
different challenges, especially in the context of applications running onto mobile
devices, which nowadays represent the main means to access OSNs [128]. The collec-
tion of users data, for example, is an operation that introduces additional privacy and
security issues.
In the context of the SwissSenseSinergy Project3, we realized that these issues espe-
cially affect application developers that aim to distribute crowd-sensing applications.
On one hand, there is a need to provide a service (e.g., a location-based service). On
the other hand, privacy and security of user data should be guaranteed (e.g., protect
their location information). However, application developers do not always have the
will and/or the skills to implement secure and privacy-preserving applications.
To tackle these challenges, this sub-problem aims to respond to the following RQ:
RQ 4: Can we develop a secure and privacy-preserving service for assessing and com-
municating users’ their privacy and manipulation risks in OSNs?
In Section 1.4.4, we summarize our solution to answer RQ 4.
3http://www.swiss-sense-synergy.ch
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1.4 Thesis Contributions
As mentioned in Section 1.3, the final goal of this thesis is to raise users’ awareness of
the abuse of OSNs. In particular, we focus on the perils related to the privacy leakages
and manipulation of opinions in OSNs. To increase users’ consciousness of such risks,
it is needed to investigate these issues, assess their significance, and evaluate the
factors impacting on their development. Therefore, in the following subsections, we
first detail our contributions related to the sub-problems, and corresponding RQs,
described in Section 1.3.1, Section 1.3.2, and Section 1.3.3. Finally, we introduce our
proposed solution to raise users’ awareness of OSNs abuse and tackle the challenges
presented in Section 1.3.4.
1.4.1 Privacy Measurement and Control
The first contribution of this thesis is related to the exploration of the privacy issue in
OSNs. Among all the sharable personal data, we consider the geographical location as
it is considered both a highly-valuable and a very sensitive information. For example,
user positions are often required for effective delivery of Location-Based Services
(LBSs). However, to protect their privacy, users rarely reveal their location in OSNs
(operation referred to as geo-tagging) [108]. Nonetheless, third parties that offer a
LBS might have alternative strategies to obtain users’ location (e.g., by implementing
either an illicit or licit strategy to capture the geographical position of a certain user)
and, thus, violate their privacy.
In this thesis, we explore the problem of geo-location privacy on Twitter. In accordance
with the RQs discussed in Section 1.3.1, we present methodologies to measure the
level of users’ geo-location privacy and to control the public exposure of their sensitive
information [163]. Specifically, to respond to RQ 1.1, we first assess the ability of an
attacker to correctly estimate a target user’s location by leveraging the information
shared by other OSN users. We propose a novel deep learning architecture that can
accurately infer users’ location from a set of publicly-available geo-tags. We show that
a deep learning approach is needed to model complex social relationships among OSN
users. The obtained results confirm the serious concerns about location privacy in
OSNs and motivate us to evaluate countermeasures applicable by users [101]. Thereby,
to address RQ 1.2, we investigate the effectiveness of two data perturbation techniques
that users can employ to control the public exposure of their geo-tags and, in this way,
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improve privacy. Finally, to shed light on the factors influencing privacy and to answer
RQ 1.3, we propose a model that measures privacy based on several users’ features
(e.g., social and behavioral characteristics) and allows to quantify the impact that each
feature has on privacy.
1.4.2 Social Influence Modeling
In line with the idea of exploring privacy leakages in OSNs, in the next contribution,
we consider to examine the social influence phenomenon. In particular, we aim to
model social influence among users to measure the level of influence they are subject
to and, accordingly, predict their future activity (e.g., attending a social event).
To address RQ 2.1, we introduce Social Influence Deep Learning (SIDL) [164, 165], an
approach based on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), which learns influence strength in
dyadic social connections from the history of users’ activity and, accordingly, predict
their future behavior. We show that an approach based on deep learning is suitable
to overcome the limitations of state-of-the-art approaches. We then propose a step
forward with respect to existing solutions in the literature. While previous approaches
only consider direct social relationships among users (e.g., friends, relatives, etc.) to
model social influence, we aim to investigate other factors that link users and might
affect their behavior. In particular, we examine the collective influence that groups
(or communities) of people can exert on an individual. Therefore, to respond to RQ
2.2, we present a novel interpretation of communities as sources of social influence by
considering different factors impacting people behavior (i.e., the geographical area
they live in, their interests, and their social ties) [162,170]. Our results validate the idea
of using social influence for predicting human behavior and, at the same time, raises
further privacy concerns: Although users may not disclose information about their
activity, we showed that their privacy is not only in their hands, as social influence
modeling can be efficiently used to predict their behavior, and in turn, violate their
privacy.
1.4.3 Detection of Manipulation Campaigns
In Section 1.3.3, we discussed the relevant perils of mass manipulation of the public
opinion. In the next contribution, we analyze the activity of OSN users that play
a pivotal role in manipulation campaigns, i.e., social bots and trolls, to improve
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their detection and adopt effective countermeasures. To respond to RQs 3.1 and
3.2, we first study the behavior of bot accounts that keep escaping detection and
continuously act in OSNs. For this purpose, we explore the evolution of social bots
during the last two US elections, i.e., the 2016 Presidential election and the 2018
Midterms [167, 168]. We examine the strategies implemented by bots to avoid the
suspension from OSNs (RQ 3.1) and to manipulate the opinion of OSN users (RQ
3.2). Also, we analyze how human users deal with these automated accounts as it
is of paramount importance to understand how humans handle the manipulation
attempts. The results of our analysis reveal the effectiveness and the mutable nature
of such increasingly sophisticated bot accounts. Our insights can inform actionable
policies to detect social bots and fight online abuse.
Finally, as we detailed in Section 1.3.3, differently from bots, the automated identifica-
tion of troll accounts is an open challenge for the research community. To address this
challenge and answer RQ 3.3, we examine the online activity of Russian trolls during
the 2016 US Presidential election and we propose a novel approach based on Inverse
Reinforcement Learning (IRL) to capture troll behavior and identify troll accounts
in OSNs [169]. We employ IRL to infer a set of online incentives that may steer user
behavior, which in turn highlights behavioral differences between troll and non-troll
accounts, enabling their accurate classification.
1.4.4 Awareness of OSN Perils
The final objective of this thesis is to increase users’ awareness of OSN perils. For
this purpose, we consider to implement a service to analyze and communicate to
OSN users their current risks in real-time. We envision this service to be offered
via a mobile application, since nowadays smartphones represent the main means
to utilize OSNs and share sensitive data (e.g., location) in online platforms [128].
However, as highlighted in Section 1.3.4, this objective presents different challenges
to be addressed.
To tackle these challenges and respond to RQ 4, we develop a crowd-sensing frame-
work, called VIVO, which allows to collect data from mobile devices in a secure and
privacy-preserving way [166], while enabling direct communication with mobile users.
VIVO has a broader objective of gathering crowd-sensed data (e.g., from smartphone
sensors) in real-time and supporting application development and testing. The fact
that we can also rely on data collected by mobile sensors (e.g., location), but not pub-
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lished in OSNs, is an asset to our analysis as this allows us to extend and validate the
models built relying only on OSN data to real life (offline) information. For example,
we can evaluate the privacy of the location of OSN users also when they do not share
their position on online platforms.
Overall, the VIVO framework is beneficial for the purpose of this thesis for three main
reasons: (i ) it provides a privacy-by-design facility for application developers, (i i ) it
allows us to deploy an application that collects heterogeneous data (from different
sources, not only related to OSNs) in real-time, and (i i i ) it permits to directly com-
municate with the users, thus, enabling a mechanism of direct feedback of the risks
behind their online activity (e.g., privacy leakage in an OSN).
1.5 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the existing works in the context of privacy, social
influence modeling, manipulation of public opinion, and awareness services. We
also present some fundamentals on machine learning and network science, which
represent relevant tools for our approaches, and we provide an overview of the OSNs
analyzed in this thesis.
Chapter 3 shows a study case on the privacy risks in OSNs by analyzing the problem of
geo-location privacy on Twitter. In particular, we present methods to assess the ability
of an attacker to correctly infer users’ locations and we propose strategies that users
can adopt to measure and control their privacy.
Chapter 4 is devoted to social influence models for predicting human behavior. We
present the SIDL approaches and a novel interpretation of communities as collective
sources of social influence. Moreover, Chapter 4 discusses the relation between privacy
and social influence modeling.
Chapter 5 explores the issue of the manipulation of public opinion in OSNs. In partic-
ular, we investigate the activity of the actors responsible for manipulation campaigns,
i.e., bots and trolls, providing insights and proposing approaches for their automated
detection.
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Chapter 6 presents the VIVO framework, details its architecture, and describes the
application we developed to raise users’ awareness on OSN risks.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis, discusses our findings, and presents future challenges
for OSN users.
15
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State of the Art
2.1 Overview
OSNs have rapidly grown from a clique aggregation channel to a global phenomenon
that is, nowadays, responsible for a significant fraction of overall Internet browsing
and user online engagement [146]. This has elicited a paradigm shift of our society, by
transforming the way people communicate, interact, and socialize. These changes do
not only concern social relationships. Politics, marketing, and advertisement are just
a few of the several other activities that today take place in OSNs, such as Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, WeChat, etc.
For this reason, the advent of OSNs, and their intrinsic multi-relational data, has also
offered the opportunity to study the dynamics of social relationships and human
behavior at a huge scale. The availability and quality of OSN data on such dynamics
allow researchers to experiment and validate offline studies (whose scalability was
limited) at a low cost. An example is related to the “small world” phenomenon studied
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by Milgram in 1967 [175], and further identified in modern techno-social systems
[4, 237], according to which any two individuals on the planet are connected through
a chain of no more than six intermediate acquaintances.
In this regard, an in-depth analysis of the graph structure of OSNs can lead to an un-
derstanding of individual and network features. The scientific discipline that studies
the structure and properties of complex networks (i.e., social networks, telecommuni-
cation networks, biological networks, etc.) is referred to as network science, which is
detailed in Section 2.7. For example, network science can be used to trace the flow of
information among users, analyze social relationships, predict spreading phenomena,
or detect influential users. Although this kind of investigation might appear harm-
less, and aimed only at describing network structures, it might be used for malicious
purposes. For instance, the analysis of users’ relationships and similarities can be
used to reveal their personal information and violate their privacy [97]. A case in
point is the Cambridge Analytica political scandal, where millions of Facebook users’
data have been used (without their consent) to profile US voters in order to target
them with personalized political advertisement and influence their voting choices [47].
Additionally, as OSNs have proven as effective tools to influence individuals’ opinions
and behaviors [14,15,24], the understanding of how influence spread among users can
be beneficial for manipulating their opinion, understanding their belief, and predict
their future behavior.
Along these research lines, in the next sections, we analyze the sub-problems (in-
troduced in Chapter 1) related to privacy leakage, social influence, manipulation of
opinions in OSNs, and users’ awareness of OSN perils. Finally, we review the basics
of the methodologies exploited in this thesis along with an overview of the OSNs
considered in our analysis.
2.2 Geo-Location Privacy Leakage in OSNs
The unprecedented amount of personal information available in OSNs is of
paramount importance in today’s data-driven economy. Contextually, there is
an increasing concern on the ability of users to effectively hide the personal in-
formation they are not willing to expose [247]. OSN providers include several
privacy-preserving strategies in their platforms (e.g., to restrict access to the published
content to some users only). However, it has been shown [155] that such strategies
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are not fully effective in the protection of personal data in the most popular OSNs.
In this respect, social cues (e.g., the strength of social connections and similarity
patterns between users) are widely regarded as one of the main causes of privacy
vulnerability in OSNs. For example, it is shown that public data in OSNs can be
effectively used to infer users’ personal information and to predict future users’
activities [17, 22, 26, 53, 144, 192, 249]. Similarly to these studies, this thesis shows how
OSN users are not in full control of their privacy [97], as sensitive information can be
obtained by analyzing other users’ data. In particular, we introduce a deep-learning
approach specifically targeted at the violation of users’ location privacy from publicly-
available data. We perform our analysis by considering the Twitter OSN as a study
case. Therefore, in Section 2.2.1, we examine the role of location on Twitter and we
compare our approach to existing solutions in the literature. Moreover, we propose a
model that allows us to assess the extent to which several factors affect the privacy of
users, therefore enabling its proper tuning and control. Along this research direction,
in Section 2.2.2, we provide an overview of existing works that aim to provide privacy
control for OSN users and we highlight their differences with respect to our proposed
approach.
2.2.1 Geo-location Privacy on Twitter
Being Twitter one of the most used OSNs, the importance of both sharing and pro-
tecting location information on its platform is widely-recognized [250]. For example,
various applications for emergency detection [13, 157], health monitoring [58], and
event recommendations [186, 243] are based on the location information shared on
Twitter. Recently, large efforts have been dedicated to the development of tools to
perform location inference on Twitter. According to [250], location on Twitter can
be of three main types: home location, mentioned location, and tweet location. The
first one represents a user’s long-term residential address, which may be published
at several levels of granularity (e.g., city or village) in the user profile. The second
refers to the locations that a user mentions in the text of her/his tweets. The third is
the geo-tag that a user may publish as a meta-data attached to her/his tweets. The
decision to either provide a geo-tag or not is done for each published tweet. On av-
erage, 1% of tweets are published with a geo-tag [108]. As described in [250], tweet
location can be uncovered by relying on multiple sources of information: (i ) tweet
content [78, 142, 243], (i i ) Twitter social network [207], and (i i i ) Twitter contextual
information [61, 212] (i.e., meta-data related to both tweets and users’ profiles).
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In this thesis, we propose a novel deep learning architecture for unveiling users’ geo-
location based only on social network information. The proposed approach aims to
infer the geo-tag of a generic user’s tweet by only leveraging the geo-tags shared by
other users on Twitter. The rationale is to investigate whether OSN users can effectively
hide their location information. This intuition takes inspiration from [207], where
a geo-tag published by a user is inferred considering information of her/his friends
on Twitter (i.e., friends’ geo-tag and the time when tweets are published). In [207],
nearby locations are merged into a cluster and the location inference is framed as a
classification task, where the objective is to maximize the classification accuracy. In
this approach, the classification error does not carry information on the geographical
distance between the target and estimated clusters. Differently from [207], in our
work, we measure privacy as the geographical distance between estimated and actual
locations and we frame the geo-location inference as a regression problem. The
objective of this regression is the minimization of the aforementioned distance, i.e.,
the privacy of a user. Also, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach that
attempts to assess users’ location privacy based only on the locations shared by other
OSN users.
2.2.2 Control of Geo-location Privacy
Although OSN users can employ privacy-control mechanisms (e.g., by allowing only
their friends to view the content they share) to protect their sensitive information,
location leakage in OSNs remains an open problem [155]. For example, Polakis et.
al [194] identify several vulnerabilities related to location privacy in Facebook and
Foursquare and propose a set of guidelines to limit them. A theoretical framework
to evaluate privacy-preserving strategies against various types of attacks in LBSs has
been proposed by Shokri et al. [214]. The most adopted technique to protect the
location is based on the perturbation of the location. For instance, [32, 114, 127]
propose to reduce the spatial and temporal resolution of location traces to protect
users’ anonymity. In this thesis, we apply similar data perturbation techniques on the
privacy of Twitter users. In particular, we quantitatively measure the impact on users’
privacy caused by the obfuscation and by the reduction of the shared geo-tags.
The topic of privacy control has recently gained attention. In [33], the authors develop
a method to measure the level of users’ anonymity in LBSs and propose countermea-
sures to increase their privacy. Baron et al. [29] propose a framework to assess the
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likelihood that the public exposure of a location leads to the leakages of personal
information (e.g., political view). By using this framework, users can evaluate their
vulnerability to privacy attacks and understand the factors behind it. Our work shares
with these previous studies the objective of giving users methods to measure and con-
trol their privacy. But specifically, and differently from [29, 33], we focus on protecting
users’ location information.
2.3 The Social Influence Phenomenon
Understanding how users influence each other can be beneficial to various applica-
tions, either favorable or harmful towards the final user. In this thesis, we focus on
malicious exploitations of such social phenomenon. We aim to model social influence
among users for measuring to what extent they are affected by others and, accordingly,
inferring their future activity. For instance, this measure of influence can be used to
disclose individuals that can be easily affected and manipulated, or be employed to
predict human behavior and, in turn, violate users’ privacy.
Being a driving factor in human behavior, a considerable amount of work has been
conducted to investigate social influence and analyze its effects [14, 24, 147]. In [216]
and [10], the authors propose how to qualitatively measure the existence of social
influence, whereas in [65] the correlation between people similarity and influence
is examined. Along with these qualitative studies, complementary research efforts
have focused on developing predictive models of diffusion processes [117]. This broad
research area presents two classes of social influence modeling. We can distinguish
macro- and micro-level models according to the outcome granularity. While the
former class [171, 181] focuses on predicting the result of a diffusion process at the
network level (e.g., number of adopters, spreaders, or infected individuals overall
the network), the latter aims to study social influence at the user-level, providing
prediction of a given spreading process for each subject [106, 208]. In Section 2.3.1,
we motivate the usage of a micro-level model for our purposes and we compare our
proposed approach to other solutions in the literature. In Section 2.3.2, we describe
the limitations of existing solutions and we introduce the rationale of our approach to
overcome such limitations.
21
Chapter 2. State of the Art
2.3.1 Micro-Level Social Influence Modeling
In this thesis, we focus on social influence at the user-level as we are interested in
measuring whether and to what extent an individual is influenced by other subjects.
More specifically, we leverage on dyadic social interactions between subjects to predict
their behavior. Such micro-level analysis suits several real-life applications, such
as targeted advertising, recommendation, and viral marketing. In particular, viral
marketing is a convenient example of how to exploit social influence to maximize the
adoption of a product or, more in general, the information spread. Although influence
maximization [73, 139, 141, 205] is not the target of this thesis, the seminal models
presented in [139] provide the underpinning of multiple existing approaches to model
diffusion processes in social networks. The models proposed by Kempe et al. [139],
referred to as Independent Cascade (IC) model and Linear Threshold (LT) model, map
a spreading process to every single node of an underlying graph. In the IC model, each
subject independently influences her/his friends with given influence probabilities
(the power to influence neighbors [106]), while in the LT model, a subject is influenced
by her/his friends if the combination of their total influence probabilities exceeds a
threshold. Both models assume to have as input a social network whose edges are
weighted by a measure of influence probability. However, these values are not known
in practice and, thus, they need to be estimated.
Many efforts have been made to quantitatively measure the influence probability
between pairs of friends [80, 106, 113, 159, 208, 225]. Existing works explored different
forms of social influence. In [225], the authors proposed a graphical probabilistic
model to measure influence strength. In their approach, they analyze influence
propagation at the topic-level with the objective of learning influence probabilities
with respect to given topics (e.g., politics). Similarly, Gruhl et al. [113] characterize
information diffusion by tracking topics and individuals across different blogs. More
recently, Zhang et al. [245, 246] studied social influence on Twitter and introduced
the concept of social influence locality on users’ retweet behavior. They proposed
two approaches, i.e., a logistic regression classifier and a factor graph model, based
on social influence locality and three kinds of hand-crafted features. On the other
hand, other approaches [106, 208] offer more general models (topic and domain
independent) by leveraging only the history of the actions performed by each subject
in the OSN. These works focused on online actions, such as following, grouping,
voting, tagging, etc. In particular, Goyal et al. [106] rely on an instance of the LT
model introducing different metrics to estimate the pairwise influence between two
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individuals. In [208], authors focused on the IC model and employ the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm to estimate the influence probability associated with
each edge. Similarly to [106, 208] (details on the differences of these approaches with
respect to the proposed solution are provided in Section 2.3.2), in this thesis, we
propose a model that does not require any specific knowledge of the domain under
analysis and can be generalized to every kind of human activity, both online (e.g., re-
sharing a content) and offline (e.g., attending a social event). More specifically, we aim
at learning influence strengths among subjects by leveraging the actions performed
by users in their history and how such actions propagated between each other. In fact,
our approach takes as input only the raw data related to users’ actions in OSNs (i.e.,
the action log) and, thus, does not require any hand-crafted features, which in turn
may depend on the specific OSN and on the availability of metadata. Although the
models suggested in [106, 208] can be generalized to various contexts, they have some
limitations, which we present in the next subsection.
2.3.2 Limitation of Social Influence Models
In this subsection, we first define the variables and formulation of existing social
influence models. Then, we describe their limitations with an illustrative example
and we introduce the rationale of our approach to overcome these drawbacks.
Let ui be a generic OSN user and A be the set of the actions performed by all the users
in the OSN. For each action a ∈ A, each user is either active, if she/he has performed
the action, or inactive, otherwise. We denote Sui ,a as the set of active friends of ui
for the action a. Existing approaches aim to predict whether a subject becomes
active based on her/his active friends. To achieve this purpose, they determine the
probability of activation pui (Sui ,a), i.e., the probability that subject ui becomes active
based on the active friends Sui ,a , by exploiting the history of ui actions. The main
assumption in these works is that the probability of various friends influencing ui are
independent of each other. Thereby, the activation probability pui (Sui ,a) is computed
as
pui (Sui ,a)= 1−
∏
u j∈Sui ,a
(1−pu j ,ui ), (2.1)
where pu j ,ui is the influence probability (strength) of u j on ui .
Previous solutions [106, 208] learn the probability pu j ,ui , from the actions performed
by both u j and ui . In particular, they consider ui as influenced by u j if the latter per-
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Figure 2.1: Example of influence probabilities in the social network of user u5
formed the action before the former. These approaches differ from each other for the
way the probabilities pu j ,ui are estimated. In the LT models of Goyal et al. [107], a node
becomes active if pui (Sui ,a) ≥ θ, where θ is the activation threshold. They propose
different probabilistic models to capture the influence probability pu j ,ui , referred to
as Bernoulli Distribution (BD), Jaccard Index (JI), Partial Credits - Bernoulli (PC-B),
and Partial Credits - Jaccard (PC-J). In the IC model of Saito et al. [208], each active
subject independently influences her/his inactive friends with influence probabilities
estimated by maximizing a likelihood function with the Expectation Maximization
(EM) algorithm. Such approaches [106, 208] have two main drawbacks: (i ) they as-
sume that the probability of friends influencing a subject are independent of each
other, and (i i ) they do not consider the actions not performed by the subject (but
performed by her/his friends) to learn the influence probabilities. Next, we detail such
drawbacks with an illustrative example.
Figure 2.1a represents the social network of subject u5. Each node drawn with a
dashed line represents a friend of u5, thus, edges indicate a friendship relation. Each
edge is weighted by the influence probability pu j ,ui . To avoid confusion in the figure,
only the incoming edges of node u5 are represented. Therefore, every edge represents
the influence exerted by a certain friend of u5 on u5. A red node represents an inactive
subject, while a black node denotes an active subject. According to Eq. (2.1), previous
approaches predict whether u5 performs a generic action a as a function of the active
friends (u1,u2,u4) and corresponding influence probabilities. The first limitation
of such a solution is related to the fact that the probability of friends influencing
a subject are considered independent of each other. This assumption may not be
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always true. For example, the fact that subject u1 and u2 are both active can differently
affect the decision of subject u5, especially when nodes u1 and u2 are friends and
influence each other, as displayed in Figure 2.1b. In this instance, the joint probability
of influencing u5 should be higher if compared to the combination of the independent
probabilities (Eq. (2.1)). The second limitation of existing works is related to the fact
that they learn the influence probability by considering only the actions performed
(positive instances) by the subject under analysis (u5 in our example). However, it may
be relevant to take into account the actions not performed by the subject (negative
instances), but performed by her/his friends, so as to understand who really affects
the subject’s decisions. For instance, we consider the case where subject u5 does
not perform a certain action, while some of her/his friends do (u1, u2, and u4 in
the example in Fig. 2.1a). In this case, by considering also negative samples we can
improve and enrich the influence model, as u5 may be affected by the friends that
share the same negative decision (u3 in the example in Fig. 2.1a).
In Chapter 4, we propose to overcome the above-described limitations by introducing
a novel approach based on deep learning. The rationale is to learn complex social
relationships by means of a DNN architecture, which simultaneously allows us to
(i ) consider dependencies among users’ friends, and (i i ) take into account negative
instances in the training phase. Chapter 4 describes the different deep learning
solutions we proposed and related performance, also comparing them with the results
of existing social influence models.
2.4 OSN Manipulation
During the last decade, OSNs have become the conventional communication channel
to share opinions and access the news [104]. Therefore, accuracy, truthfulness, and au-
thenticity of the shared content are necessary ingredients to maintain a healthy online
discussion. However, in recent times, OSNs have been dealing with a considerable
growth of false content and malicious accounts. The resulting wave of misinformation
highlights the pitfalls of OSNs and their potential harms to several constituents of our
society, ranging from politics to public health. In fact, OSNs have been used for mali-
cious purposes to a large extent [82]. Especially in the context of political discussion,
there is a significant risk of mass manipulation of public opinion. Numerous studies
concluded that OSNs can be a vehicle for political manipulation, citing factors such
as the effect of fake news and misinformation [21, 40, 111, 115, 130, 193, 210, 215, 234],
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bots [36, 38, 178, 213, 231, 239, 242], trolls [5, 19, 134, 244], and polarization [16, 23]. In
Section 2.4.1, we provide an overview of recent studies on the manipulation of public
opinion in the political context. In Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, we describe the malicious
actors that play a pivotal role in manipulation campaigns, i.e., bots and trolls, and
we compare our work to empower their detection with respect to other studies in the
literature.
2.4.1 Political Manipulation in OSNs
The most remarkable example of political manipulation in OSNs is represented by
the 2016 US Presidential election. Since then, there has been a big spotlight on the
sovereignty of the US election system and, more in general, on manipulation cam-
paigns in OSNs. This is further confirmed by the ongoing US Congress investigation of
Russian interference during the election, where Russia is accused of using trolls and
bots to spread propaganda and politically biased information. An in-depth analysis of
the 2016 presidential election [36], showed how bots activity can affect democratic
political discussion, which in turn can potentially alter public opinion and endanger
the integrity of elections. In [20], the authors studied the effects of the manipulation
campaign executed by the Russian troll accounts publicly disclosed by US Congress’
investigation. Additionally, [75] analyzed Facebook ads allegedly purchased by the
Russian government during the 2016 US election.
The online diffusion of false news is another issue in which the activity of bots and
trolls is believed to be relevant [35, 149]. In particular, [213] analyzed the pivotal
role of social bots in spreading articles from low credibility sources. US is not the
only example of reported political manipulation. Similar instances involved other
countries worldwide [130,200,219]. In [220], authors showed bots’ strategy of targeting
influential humans to manipulate online conversation during the Catalan referendum
for independence. The presence of bots in Twitter was also analyzed during the 2017
French Presidential Election [83]. Interestingly, an overlapping set of bots that acted in
the 2016 US election was also found in the French election, suggesting the existence
of a black market for reusable political disinformation bots [242]. More recently (July
1st, 2019), California became the first State to attempt regulating the usage of bots. In
fact, the Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act1 requires a self-disclosure of automated
accounts that intended to impersonate or replicate human activity in OSNs.
1https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1001
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In [218], it has been shown that social bots represent only one side of the problem.
Human actors also play a key role in the spreading of false information. In particular,
state-sponsored trolls activity have been largely studied in relation to the 2016 US
election [5, 19, 21, 134]. These studies rely on a list of 2,752 (now-deactivated) Twitter
accounts that have been identified as tied to the Russia’s “Internet Research Agency”
troll farm. The list of such accounts has been disclosed as part of the Congress’
investigation of Russian interference in the election. Most recently, Twitter released
[96] accounts and related content associated with potential information operations
of four countries (i.e., Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and Bangladesh) to enable further
investigation to researchers.
Although the attempts from social network providers to suspend suspected and ma-
licious accounts, the presence of bots and trolls in OSNs do not show any sign of
decline [70, 134, 242]. In the next subsections, we explore these malicious actors
separately and we describe our objectives in relation to existing works.
2.4.2 Social Bots
Social bots are defined as accounts managed completely or in part by computer
algorithms [86]. Such software-controlled accounts are designed to impersonate and
possibly alter human behavior. Bots can automatically create, share, and spread
content in OSNs with the objective of steering discussions and promote specific ideas.
While in the early days of OSNs (i.e., in the late 2000s) creating a bot capable to operate
in a human-like manner was not a simple task, nowadays deploying bots has become
increasingly simpler and, in some cases, no coding skills are required and several
source codes can be found online [143]. Also, bots can run within cloud services (e.g.,
Amazon Web Services2, Heroku3, etc.) and can be provided as a service, i.e. Bot-as-
a-Service (BaaS) [84]. More advanced conversational bots, powered by AI, are also
provided by companies like ChatBots.io4 and can be used to deploy spam campaigns,
where bots are autonomously capable of engaging with human users. The advances of
AI, especially in the area of neural-based natural language generation, has elicited an
increasing sophistication of bots’ capabilities of generating text content [84]. Also, the
availability of large pre-trained language models, such as OpenAI’s GPT-2 [198], have
2https://aws.amazon.com
3https://www.heroku.com
4https://home.pandorabots.com/
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allowed to program bots that can automatically produce genuine-looking short texts
on OSN platforms, making it harder to distinguish between human and automated
accounts [7].
The massive scalability that bots can reach through automation represents a major
concern in the fight against media manipulation [38,178,231], as further demonstrated
by the recent suspension of millions of compromised accounts by Facebook5 and
Twitter6. For instance, multiple bots handled by the same human operator (referred
to as bot master) can simultaneously generate the same content to amplify and create
an illusion of consensus towards a (false) piece of information [86]. In such a way,
bots can raise the popularity of a news or of an account and, thus, fool OSNs ranking
algorithms [242]. Both the strategies and the algorithms behind the sharing activities
of these software-controlled accounts are usually unknown and harder to detect unless
their activity is strongly coordinated [55].
Nowadays, bots were estimated to being a consistent portion (about 9–15%) of the
Twitter population [231], sharing around two-thirds of links to popular websites [238].
Researchers have brought to the table different tools for detecting malicious auto-
mated accounts [55, 57, 145, 222]. Such tools, based mainly on Artificial Intelligence
(AI), have proven to achieve prominent results in the identification of bots [242]. In
particular, Botometer7, a publicly-available machine learning-based tool maintained
by Indiana University [69, 231, 242], has demonstrated to be effective in bots identi-
fication on Twitter, with a classification (bot vs. human accounts) performance of
0.95 Area Under the Curve (AUC). Botometer is based on an ensemble classifier that
aims to provide an indicator, namely bot score, used to classify an account either as
a bot or as a human. To feed the classifier, the Botometer API extracts about 1,200
features related to the Twitter account under analysis. These features fall into six broad
categories and characterize the account’s profile, friends, social network, temporal
activity patterns, language, and sentiment.
However, as we mentioned above, bots have been becoming increasingly sophisticated.
They can interact with human users, engage in conversations, and also create original
content in a fully automated way [85]. Most importantly, bots have evolved to further
resemble the appearance of humans in order to escape detection. It is, therefore,
of paramount importance to adapt existing countermeasures to the mutable and
5https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/23/tech/facebook-transparency-report/index.html
6https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44682354
7https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/
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growing sophistication of automated accounts. This, in turn, requires to investigate
the strategies adopted by bots to keep interacting with humans and avoiding the
suspension from OSN platforms. For this reason, in Chapter 5 (Sections 5.2 and 5.3),
we aim to explore bots’ activity over years to monitor their evolution and examine
their current online behavior. In particular, we investigate bots’ activity in Twitter
during the last two US voting events, i.e., the 2016 Presidential Election and the 2018
Midterms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to track the activity
of malicious accounts over different elections for studying their evolution. More
specifically, we analyze both the strategies implemented by bots to manipulate the
opinion of the human population (while avoiding detection) and how human users
have handled such manipulation attempts over the years. The rationale of our study
is to provide insights related to bots’ strategy and evolution for informing actionable
policies in the detection of manipulation campaigns.
2.4.3 Trolls
Troll accounts denote a class of human users who aim to manipulate the public opin-
ion and sow conflict on social or political issues by sharing inflammatory and false
information in online platforms [44]. In the political context, and more specifically
during the 2016 US Presidential election, trolls aimed to harm the political conversa-
tion and create distrust in the political system [19]. These trolls were allegedly funded
by the Russian government to influence conversations about political issues, with the
goal of creating discord and hate among different groups [100]. In [19], the authors
characterized the effect of the manipulation campaigns carried out by Russian trolls
during the 2016 US Presidential election. An analysis of the production and consump-
tion of fake news generated by Russian Trolls on Twitter is offered in [20]. Along the
same research line, [21] studies how to predict users who spread trolls’ content with
the goal of understanding how to contain their influence in the future.
In [244], state-sponsored trolls have been investigated on Twitter and Reddit. In
particular, the authors focus on Russian and Iranian trolls trying to characterize
their behavior and strategies over time. They found that the behavior of such trolls
is not consistent over time. For example, they change their language, their (self-
declared) location, and tactics according to the targeted manipulation campaign. Also,
authors [244] found that trolls’ activity does not appear completely disjoint from the
activity of regular users. Thus, developing automated systems to identify and block
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such accounts is not a straightforward task and remains an open challenge [244]. In
fact, differently from bots, the detection of troll accounts have not found any effective
solution until recently.
Concurrently with our undertaking, two approaches for unveiling the activity of
Russian trolls on Twitter have been proposed [5, 134]. To identify trolls’ attempt to
manipulate the public opinion during the 2016 US election, [5] identified 49 linguistic
markers of deception and measured their use by troll accounts. They show that such
deceptive language cues can help to accurately identify trolls. In [134], the authors
proposed a detection approach that relies on users’ metadata, activity (e.g., number of
shared links, retweets, mentions, etc.), and linguistic features to identify active trolls
on Twitter. Our work is similar to the above-mentioned efforts in the objective of
unveiling troll accounts. However, differently from [5, 134], we do not aim at spotting
differences in trolls’ language or metadata. We do not exploit such signals to identify
trolls, but we focus on uncovering hidden behavioral differences between troll and
non-troll accounts. As we do not leverage either social network-dependent metadata
or language features, our approach can be generalized on different OSNs and to state-
sponsored trolls originating from different countries. In fact, our solution only relies
on the sequence of users’ activity on online platforms to capture the incentives the
two classes of accounts respond to.
2.5 Awareness of OSN Perils
Raising users’ awareness of OSN perils, along with providing them with some coun-
termeasures, is the final objective of this thesis. In Section 2.5.1, we describe existing
works in the literature that share with us the objective of increasing users’ awareness
of OSN risks and we present the challenges to be tackled to achieve this objective. In
Section 2.5.2, we introduce our proposed approach to face these challenges and we
compare it to existing solutions.
2.5.1 Awareness Services
The problem of raising users’ awareness of OSN perils has recently gained attention
with the explosion of political scandals, e.g., the Cambridge Analytica data breach [47]
and the Russian interference in the 2016 US Presidential election [20]. The research
community attempted to encourage a more cautious usage of OSNs, especially in the
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context of privacy. Several works tried to understand users’ concern about their privacy
and the initiative they act to protect their personal information [3, 105, 230]. Similarly
with our objective, more recent works developed the idea of implementing services
to support privacy awareness [118, 196]. In [196], the author provides guidelines and
details requirements to develop a privacy awareness service. Gulenko [118] developed
an application that inspects users’ Facebook profile and provide them an assessment
about the security and privacy of their account. The main difference of our work with
respect to this effort is that in [118] users’ privacy is evaluated by only checking the
privacy-setting that they selected on the OSN platform (e.g., if they have a public or
private profile). Our work, instead, has the objective of performing an evaluation
of users’ privacy not only based on privacy-settings but also, and mainly, on the
publicly-available data shared by the online population. In particular, in this thesis (in
both Chapters 3 and 4), we aim to investigate whether users’ personal and sensitive
information (e.g., their current location) can be inferred from data published by other
users (e.g., their friends and acquaintances) in online platforms.
However, as we described in Section 1.3.4, developing an awareness service represents
a challenging objective. This is especially true if the awareness service should be
implemented on mobile devices, e.g., smartphones. The main problem is related
to the collection of users’ data, which in turn can introduce additional privacy and
security risks. The collection of human data is not a simple task, which has struggled
researchers for years. Different approaches have been proposed by the research com-
munity. Among these approaches, Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) represents a promis-
ing solution. MCS is an emerging paradigm that is based on the sensing capabilities
of mobile devices [121]. Potential MCS applications span a wide spectrum in terms of
application domain [228], ranging from traffic estimation [133, 177, 189], and place
categorization [60] to smart cities [30, 179, 233] and social trend detection [120, 241].
Though these applications were established to pursue specific purposes, efforts have
also been made towards formally characterizing the operation of MCS systems in an
application-agnostic way. However, issues related to device heterogeneity, security,
and privacy have limited the rise of MCS platforms [11, 12].
To address these challenges, in this thesis, we introduce VIVO, an open framework
for crowd-sensed data gathering, where security and privacy are managed within the
framework at the client side. In the next subsection, we present the novelty of VIVO
with respect to existing solutions.
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Table 2.1: Testbeds comparison
LiveLabs NetSense PhoneLab IoTLab VIVO
standard smartphone OS 3 3 7 3 3
simultaneous experiments 7 7 3 3 3
open range of applications 7 7 3 7 3
real-time data collection 3 7 7 3 3
fixed and mobile sensors 7 7 7 3 3
embedded security 3 3 7 7 3
privacy-preserving 3 3 7 3 3
multi-platforms 3 7 7 7 7
incentives 3 3 3 7 7
2.5.2 MCS Testbeds
In this Section, we show how VIVO differs and overcomes some of the limitations of
existing MCS frameworks. Table 2.1 compares VIVO with existing solutions in the liter-
ature. VIVO allows an easy development and deployment of experimental software
on mobile devices. More precisely, similarly to PhoneLab [182] and SmartLab [148],
experiment developers can dynamically deploy their own application on each mobile
device involved in the data collection. However, while PhoneLab [182] requires a mod-
ified version of the Android OS to run on the employed smartphones, thus limiting
the set of potential participants (from now on referred to as volunteers), VIVO appli-
cations run on standard smartphone OS (i.e., Android), without any extra-hardware
requirements and pre-deployment testing. SmartLab [148] is an architecture for man-
aging a cluster of real and virtual devices. Users can install executables on devices,
capture their screen, and issue UNIX shell commands. While Smartlab is targeted
towards scenarios requiring low-level control over smartphones, e.g., deployment and
debugging, VIVO is a framework focused on the gathering of crowd-sensed data.
Recent similar efforts are LiveLabs [25], NetSense [221], and IoT Lab [81]. Livelabs [25]
is a mobile testbed that continuously collects sensor data from participant personal
devices in four public spaces in Singapore. The goal of this data collection is to analyt-
ically extract context information to trigger consumer trials provided by retailers or
service providers. NetSense [148] aims to understand the impact of the digital world
(mobile communications and OSNs) on social relationships by collecting sensor data
from instrumented smartphones distributed to hundreds of students at the University
of Notre Dame. IoT Lab [81] has been developed with the purpose of researching
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the potential of crowd-sensing as an extension to the traditional IoT infrastructure.
Through a smartphone application, the crowd was allowed to participate in experi-
ments by contributing with sensory data and knowledge.
Unlike these previous efforts, where a single static application is installed on each
smartphone to constantly save data collected from sensors, VIVO allows the deploy-
ment of multiple simultaneous experiments introducing an enrolled crowd-sensing
model. In such a model, developers are not limited to a fixed set of experiments
but they can build an open range of application without any constraint, in a more
agnostic and generic way.
Differently from other approaches, the data collected through VIVO can be accessed
both at the end of the experiment, as in traditional testbeds, as well as in real-time, as
needed by several Big Data applications. This enables a broad range of applications
that require low latency communication, e.g., navigation, recommendation, monitor-
ing, and control. Moreover, VIVO is a human- and sensor-based testbed. It integrates
two components: a crowd-sensing scheme composed of mobile devices (volunteer
smartphones), and Syndesi [79], an IoT framework for smart buildings, which includes
multiple fixed sensors. Syndesi [79] is a framework interconnecting heterogeneous
devices from wireless sensor networks as well as mobile devices, providing central
resource management and user-personalized smart automation. It is implemented in
the premises of the University of Geneva, although it has been designed to support
portability. One of its functionalities is the gathering of environmental data, such as
temperature, illuminance, and humidity from the devices possessing sensors that are
registered in its resource registry. The data are written into a database (Syndesi DB)
hosted by the Syndesi server. The integration between VIVO and Syndesi empowers
the seamless combination of resources coming from different sources, which allows
to study the interaction between human beings and the surroundings.
Finally, the fundamental provisioning of security and privacy along with its capability
of gathering heterogeneous data in real-time makes VIVO suitable for the purpose
of this thesis, by allowing applications for monitoring and controlling users privacy
and manipulation risks. We present our application to raise users’ awareness of such
risks, the VIVO framework and its architecture in detail in Chapter 6. Here, we just
point out that, differently from other MCS frameworks, VIVO manages security and
privacy within the framework, at the client side. In particular, we provide an API with
all the methods necessary to secure and privatize the collected data before they leave
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the smartphone. VIVO also supports differential privacy [76], which is a method to
share information about a set of data by describing aggregate statistics of the dataset
while preserving and limiting the disclosure of private information about individuals.
Differential privacy is also defined as a property that provides an upper bound on the
information a third party can obtain from the data after the release [77]. This means
that, if a differentially private method is used to protect data, then any third party
that sees a statistical result over the data would not be able to identify individuals’
information up to a certain specified privacy parameter (referred to as privacy loss).
The current limitations of VIVO concern mainly two aspects. The first limitation
is related to the fact that, as of today, VIVO applications can only run on Android
smartphones. A multi-platform capability (e.g., both iOS and Android) is desirable
to extend the set of participants and experiments. For instance, Livelabs [25] sup-
ports iOS, Android, and Windows Phone (WP) smartphones. The second limitation
concerns the recruitment of volunteers, which is a typical issue in crowd-sensing
platforms. Crowd incentives, as well as ensured Quality of Information (QoI) of crowd-
sensed data, are considerably important aspects for the success of MCS applications.
Existing solutions (e.g., NetSense [221], PhoneLab [182], Livelabs [25]) propose to offer
smartphones and discounted mobile planes to encourage volunteers to participate in
their experiments. Currently, VIVO does not provide similar incentives in exchange of
volunteers’ participation. To reward volunteers we launched the context “Volunteer of
the Year”, where each participant is encouraged to participate in the largest number
of experiments to win a prize. However, the recruitment of a large set of volunteers
requires more effective incentives. Therefore, we plan to develop a reward-based
mechanism that allows the experiment developer to advertise prizes to the volunteers
according to their involvement in the experiment.
2.6 Machine Learning
In this Section, we provide theoretical basics of machine learning algorithms employed
throughout this thesis. Section 2.6.1 details deep learning architectures based on
deep neural networks, which we use to assess users’ privacy in Chapter 3 and to
model social influence in Chapter 4. In Section 2.6.2, we describe the fundamentals
of reinforcement learning algorithms that we utilize for detecting malicious troll
accounts in Chapter 5.
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2.6.1 Deep Neural Networks
In this Section, we provide the background needed to comprehend the deep learning
paradigm, which is fundamental in several approaches presented throughout this
thesis. Deep Learning is a fancy marketing name for artificial neural networks, a class
of machine learning algorithms inspired by biological nervous systems. In recent
years, neural networks [150, 211] have found successful applications in a growing
number of areas ranging from speech and image recognition to natural language
processing and computer vision. This is confirmed by the intensive research and
development that has been carried out during the last years in numerous fields, not
only directly related to Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications.
An artificial neural network is defined by a combination of three layers: input layer (x),
hidden layers (h), and output layer (y). A Deep Neural Network (DNN) is an artificial
neural network with multiple hidden layers (h=h1,h2, . . . ,hL) between the input and
output layers. Each layer is composed of multiple processing units (neurons), which
use the output from the previous layer as input. The cascade of multiple layers is
connected as
h j =
φ j (xWxh j ) if j = 1φ j (h j−1Wh j−1h j ) if 1< j ≤ L
y=φo(hLWhL y ) ,
where Wkl indicates the weights of the connections between layer k and l , while φ j is
a non-linear activation function (e.g., sigmoid, ReLU, tanh, softmax) of each hidden
node at layer j , and φo is a non-linear activation function of each output node.
The cascade of multiple layers consisting of non-linear neurons allows a DNN to
approximate any continuous function. Moreover, DNN replaces the manual feature
extraction procedure by building up a complex hierarchy of concepts (abstractive
features) through the multiple layers to automatically extract relationships embedded
in the input data [125]. The predictive model of a DNN can be formulated as yˆ= f (x|Θ),
where yˆ denotes the predicted output, Θ represents the model parameters (i.e., the
inter-layers weights), and f indicates the function that maps the input x to the output
yˆ based on the DNN architecture, i.e., f (x)=φo(φL(. . .φ2(φ1(x)) . . . )).
We employ the DNNs’ capability of learning relationships embedded in the input
data to model social relationships and dependencies among OSN users. In particular,
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we developed two approaches for (i ) assessing users’ location privacy based on the
locations shared by other OSN users (presented in Chapter 3) and (i i ) modeling social
influence among users to forecast their future activities (presented in Chapter 4).
2.6.1.1 Recurrent Neural Networks
In Section 2.6.1, we described a general architecture of a DNN. As in such architec-
ture there are no loops (or cycles) between the nodes of the network and the flow
of information moves forward from the input to the output neurons (through the
hidden layers), this class of DNNs is referred to as feed-forward neural networks.
However, feedback connections have been extensively used in Recurrent Neural Net-
works (RNNs) for modeling the temporal dynamics of sequences in a wide range of
fields, such as machine translation, speech, handwriting, and image recognition. The
feedback loop allows RNNs to have memory of previous instances and makes them
suitable to learn sequential data, such as human activities. The most commonly used
RNNs are referred to as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [126] and Gated Recurrent
Unit (GRU) [64]. In this thesis, we rely on RNN architectures in Chapter 3 to learn
recurrences within a sequence of locations, and in Chapter 4 to model recurrent
patterns in social activities.
2.6.1.2 DNN Challenges
Although DNNs have reached outstanding performance on different tasks, they pro-
duce an obscure model and, for this reason, they are referred to as black boxes. A black
box is defined as a predictor, whose internals are either unknown to the observer or
they are known but are not understandable by humans [116]. As an example, we can
consider a machine learning model fed by a certain number of features, whose rele-
vance for the outcome prediction is not known or cannot be computed. Contrarily, an
interpretable (i.e., understandable) solution is desirable as deep learning is nowadays
used in critical areas, such as justice and medicine, where the understanding of the
model logic, functionality, and results can be necessary. However, according to the
analysis provided by Lipton [158], the word interpretability holds no agreed-upon
meaning, despite numerous papers assert the interpretability of their models. In this
study [158], the author claims that interpretability is not a monolithic concept, but it
reflects several distinct ideas. For this reason, to be meaningful, any assertion regard-
ing interpretability should fix a specific definition. Lipton describes two categories of
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interpretability. The first is related to the concept of transparency (as the opposite of
blackbox-ness) and focuses on the understanding of the model, its components, and
training algorithms. The second category, namely post-hoc explanations, does not aim
to explain how a model works but has the objective of extracting information from a
learned model. In particular, given the output of a black box predictor, the problem
consists in reconstructing an explanation for it, without necessarily elucidate the logic
behind the model. This problem is called outcome explanation problem, and it is
the notion of interpretability we study in Chapter 4 to model social influence among
OSN users. Overall, our attempt is in line with the emerging paradigm of eXplainable
Artificial Intelligence (XAI) [119, 191], which aims to create a suite of techniques for
producing more explainable models, while maintaining a high level of performance.
2.6.2 Reinforcement Machine Learning Algorithms
In this subsection, we present the fundamentals of reinforcement machine learn-
ing algorithms, which we utilize in Section 5.4 for the detection of troll accounts in
OSNs. Reinforcement Learning (RL) is defined as the problem faced by an agent that
learns how to behave through trial-and-error interactions with an uncertain envi-
ronment [136]. The objective of the agent, in this game-like situation, is to achieve
a goal by performing a sequence of actions in the environment. The agent, through
a trial-and-error strategy, learns the actions to take according to some rewards or
penalties (associated with the actions it performs). RL represents, along with super-
vised learning and unsupervised learning, one of the major field in machine learning.
As this approach relies on the experience that the agent acquires in the trials and
does not exploit any training examples, this machine learning field is not considered
a supervised learning solution. RL algorithms proved their effectiveness in various
fields, such as telecommunications, automation and control, and gaming as chess,
Atari, and Alpha Go. Nowadays, this approach is also capable of beating the world
champion e-sports team in strategy games as Dota 2 (a multiplayer online battle arena
game).
In this thesis, we utilize a variant of RL that aims at solving the inverse problem of
Reinforcement Learning, namely Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL). Therefore, in
this subsection, we first formalize the RL paradigm, which will guide the subsequent
presentation of IRL.
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Figure 2.2: Reinforcement Learning (RL) example [94]
2.6.2.1 Reinforcement Learning
The easiest example to understand RL is related to a maze scenario, where a robot
has to reach the endpoint in the shortest possible time. Figure 2.2 displays the envi-
ronment of such example. The robot has the possibility to move one tile at a time. It
gets numerical rewards or penalties (e.g., +/- 100 points) if it encounters lightnings or
mines, respectively. Also, the robot is penalized for every move, thus, it has to find the
fastest way to the endpoint in order to maximize the cumulative reward.
The most used and straightforward way to formulate a RL problem is to frame the
environment as a finite Markov Decision Process (MDP), which includes:
• A finite set of states S, which represents the situation in which the agent finds
itself in the environment (e.g., a tile of the maze);
• A finite set of actions A that the agent can perform in the environment (e.g.,
turn left in the maze);
• Transition probabilities T between states (e.g., the probability of transition from
state s ∈ S to state s′ ∈ S after performing action a ∈ A);
• A finite set of scalar rewards R associated with each transition (e.g., the robot
gets +100 points if it runs into a lightning);
• A discount factor γ, which determines the importance between short-term and
long-term rewards.
The general framework of a RL problem is displayed in Figure 2.3. The agent (e.g.,
a robot) has to learn how to achieve a goal (e.g., the endpoint of a maze) from the
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Figure 2.3: RL schema [223]
interaction with the environment (e.g., a maze with rewards and penalties). The
agent and the environment interact at each step t of a sequence of discrete time steps
(t = 0,1,2, . . . ) [223]. The interaction flow follows the schema displayed in Fig. 2.3: At
each step t , the agent selects an action At ∈ A based on its current state St ∈ S. The
environment responds to such action and presents to the agent a new state St+1 ∈ S
and a reward Rt+1 ∈R associated with the transition (St , At ). The sequence of state-
action pairs that arises from the interaction of the agent with the environment is
referred to as trajectory ζ= {(S0, A0), (S1, A1), (S2, A2), . . . }.
The MDP schema can be applied to various RL problems in many different ways.
It is out of the scope of this thesis to distinguish the different algorithms (e.g., Q-
learning, policy learning, etc.) and notions (e.g., the trade-off between exploration
and exploitation) discussed in the literature to solve RL problems. However, we
conclude this discussion by formalizing the common objective of RL problems. In a
RL approach, the agent seeks to select its actions in order to maximize the cumulative
rewards it expects to receive in the future. Therefore, the objective can be formulated
as a maximization of the expected (discounted) return Gt , which is defined as follows:
Gt =Rt+1+γRt+2+γ2Rt+3+·· · =
∞∑
k=0
γk Rt+k+1, (2.2)
where γ ∈ [0,1] is the discount rate introduced above.
2.6.2.2 Inverse Reinforcement Learning
IRL is a machine learning framework that aims at solving the inverse problem of RL.
While in RL the agent is provided with a reward function, which is used to achieve
a given goal, the rationale of IRL is to find the rewards that explain the observed
behavior of the agent. This objective has two main motivations [185]. The first
reason is for imitation purpose (i.e., to replicate the agent’s behavior), when a reward
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function is not explicitly determined [199]. The second reason is to support behavioral
studies, where computational models are needed for understanding human and
animal behavior [67, 227, 236].
Formalizing, the objective of IRL is to estimate a reward function that could have led
to agent actions. More specifically, and relying on the MDP frame described above,
the observed behavior of the agent is expressed as the history of its trajectory ζ. The
goal is to uncover the hidden reward function that maps each state-action pair (s, a)
to a real value rs,a ∈R. Therefore, IRL aims to find a function g such that: g (S, A)=R.
In many applications, however, the size of the state space does not allow to compute a
reward function for every state-action pair. Hence, current IRL techniques leverage
features that approximate the state-action space to capture the structure of the reward
function [1, 153, 185, 201].
Maximum Entropy IRL [251] represents the most popular solution to solve IRL prob-
lems. This approach maps a set of features f to the reward R as a weighted linear
combination of the feature values:
g ( f )= g ( f ,θ)= θT f =R. (2.3)
Most recent approaches propose non-linear models to represent the reward struc-
ture [59, 154, 240]. In particular, [240] introduces the usage of Convolutional Neural
Networks in the context of IRL in an approach called Maximum Entropy Deep IRL.
This approach showed comparable performance with respect to Maximum Entropy
IRL and is considered particularly suited for life-long learning scenarios [240].
In Section 5.4, we employ such techniques (both Maximum Entropy IRL and its non-
linear variation Maximum Entropy Deep IRL) to infer the rewards that could have
led troll and non-troll accounts to perform their online activity. We then consider to
exploit the estimated rewards as features of a supervised learning algorithm aimed at
classifying such accounts.
2.7 Network Science
The scientific field of network science focuses on the study of complex networks
(e.g., social networks, telecommunication networks, biological networks, etc.) [8, 49,
184]. The term complex captures the fact that it is difficult to derive the collective
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behavior and functionality of such systems by merely analyzing their components.
However, behind each complex system, there is an intrinsic network that encodes
the interactions between the system’s components. As a consequence, an in-depth
understanding of the network structure behind complex systems is needed for their
collective comprehension [28].
Consider for example the society that requires cooperation between billions of indi-
viduals, or the activity of billions of neurons in our brain. Complex networks have also
a fundamental role in the most groundbreaking technologies, ranging from Google’s
search mechanism to the functionality of OSNs and telecommunication technologies.
The fact that networks pervade nature, technology, and business elicited an increas-
ingly growing interest in network science during the last decade [28]. A key discovery
of network science is that the properties of networks emerging in different domains
are similar to each other. This allowed network scientists to use a common set of math-
ematical tools to explore such systems. In the next subsections, we present network
science fundamentals and the mathematical tools used throughout this thesis.
2.7.1 Network Science Fundamentals
In this subsection, we detail several properties and measures of complex networks
that we utilize to analyze OSNs. Networks are usually represented by means of a graph
composed of a set of nodes and the connections among them, referred to as edges.
The edges of a graph can be either directed or undirected. In the former case, a source
node points to a destination node indicating a unidirectional form of interaction (e.g.,
links in the WWW or phone calls). In the latter case, connections are not directed and
indicate bidirectional relationships (e.g., friendship). According to this difference, we
can distinguish directed or undirected graphs. Additionally, weighted networks are a
particular kind of graph, where each link (i , j ) has a unique weight wi j representing a
property of the connection. For example, in a social network weights can represent
the total number of interactions (e.g., phone calls) between pairs of individuals.
Given a generic graph G = (V ,E), where V = (v1, v2, . . . , vN ) is the set of nodes with
cardinality N , and E = ((vi , v j ), (vi , vk ), . . . , (vk , vl )) is the set of edges with cardinality
L, we can define:
• Degree ki is the number of connections a node i has with other nodes (e.g.,
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number of friends). In directed graphs, we define the in-degree k i ni (resp. out-
degree kouti ) as the number of in-coming (resp. out-coming) edges of node
i .
• Degree distribution represents how nodes’ degree are distributed. The distri-
bution is obtained by considering the degree probability pd , which represents
the probability that a node in the network has degree equal to d and, thus, it is
computed as:
pd =
nd
N
, (2.4)
where nd is the number of nodes with degree d .
• Average degree is the mean value of the nodes’ degree over all the network. In
an undirected graph is computed as:
〈k〉 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
ki = 2L
N
, (2.5)
where the factor 2 corrects for the fact that in the sum each edge is counted
twice. The average degree of a directed networks is calculated as:
〈
k i n
〉
= 1
N
N∑
i=1
k i ni =
〈
kout
〉= 1
N
N∑
i=1
kouti =
L
N
(2.6)
• Adjacency Matrix A provides a mathematical and complete description of a
graph. It is a N ×N matrix, whose generic element Ai j is equal to 1 if nodes i
and j are connected, and is 0 otherwise.
• Density D is the ratio between the number of edges L connecting the nodes and
the possible number of edges in a network with N nodes, which is N (N −1)/2.
• Diameter dmax is the longest of the shortest paths in the network, where the
shortest path between nodes i and j is the path with the fewest number of
edges.
• Clustering coefficient Ci is the ratio between the number of edges connect-
ing i ’s neighbors to each other and the total number of possible connections
among them. It captures the extent to which the neighbors of a given node are
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connected among each other. It is computed as
Ci = 2Li
ki (ki −1)
, (2.7)
where Li represents the number of links between the ki neighbors of node i .
• Average clustering coefficient 〈C〉 is the degree of clustering of the entire net-
work, which is computed by averaging Ci over all the nodes in the network.
2.7.2 Network Structures
One of the most interesting findings about complex networks is that these structures
are not random graphs. These networks show big inhomogeneities and a high level of
order and organization. The degree distribution is broad, with a tail that often follows
a power law. Thus, many nodes with low degree coexist with some nodes with large
degree. The distribution of edges is not only inhomogeneous globally, but also locally,
with high concentrations of edges within groups of nodes, and low concentrations
between these groups. This feature of real networks is called community structure
[93, 102] or mesoscale level structure (as the scale lies between the scale of the nodes
and that of the entire graph).
Usually, a community is defined as a group of nodes that have a higher likelihood of
connecting to each other than to nodes from other communities. In social networks,
for example, communities can represent circles of friends, or people living in the
same geographical area, or a group of individuals who pursue the same interests. In
particular, the tendency of individuals to associate and bond with similar others is
a social phenomenon known as homophily [172]. The rationale is that nodes with
similar attributes (e.g., age, opinions, interests, etc.) are more likely to attach to each
other than dissimilar ones. The concept of homophily is often used to weight the
edges of a weighted network to indicate and quantify the similarity between pair of
users [170].
Different applications exploit the concept of homophily, for instance to cluster individ-
uals in communities [170] or to infer personal information (e.g., political leaning) [167].
For example, label propagation is a widely used algorithm that leverages homophily
among individuals to assign them a label (e.g., left- or right-wing leaning). Label
propagation is a network-based algorithm, where each node is assigned a label, which
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is updated iteratively based on the labels of node’s network neighbors. A node takes
the most frequent label of its neighbors as its own new label. The algorithm proceeds
by updating labels iteratively and stops when the labels no longer change.
Another network structure of pivotal importance in the study of social networks is
represented by the ego network. The ego network is a star network, where the ego
is the center of the star and the other nodes, referred to as alter, are ego’s direct
social connections (e.g., friends, relatives, etc). This means that every edge in the ego
network represents a social tie between the ego and the alter.
2.7.3 Centrality Measures
Centrality measures aim to quantify the extent to which a node is central in a graph G .
These measures can provide a ranking that identifies the most important nodes within
the graph. The word importance can have different facets, which might vary with
the nature of the network and its application. For example, nodes can be important
for their prominence or structural importance within the graph, while others can
be important for the influence they have over the other nodes in the network. For
this reason, different centrality measures have been introduced. We here present the
following centrality measures:
• Degree centrality: every node is scored based only on its number of edges.
The degree centrality for a node i is the fraction of nodes it is connected to.
Therefore, it is computed as:
cd (i )=
ki
N −1 (2.8)
The same formulation holds for the in-degree (resp. out-degree) centrality
measure cdi n (i ) (resp. cdout (i )), which in turn replaces ki with k
i n
i (resp. k
out
i ).
• Betweenness centrality measures the number of times a node lies on the short-
est path between other nodes in G [41]. Formally, the betweenness centrality of
a node i is the sum of the fraction of all-pairs shortest paths that pass through i :
cb(i )=
∑
s 6=i 6=t∈G
σ(s, t |i )
σ(s, t )
, (2.9)
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where σ(s, t) is the total number of shortest paths from node s to node t , and
σ(s, t |i ) is the number of those paths that passes through node i .
• Closeness centrality scores every node based on their “closeness” to all the
other nodes within G . The closeness centrality of node i is the reciprocal of the
average shortest path distance to i over all the n−1 reachable nodes [95]:
cc (i )= n−1∑n−1
v=1 d(v, i )
, (2.10)
where d(v, i ) is the shortest-path distance between nodes v and i .
• Eigenvector Centrality is a measure of influence of a node in a graph by com-
puting the centrality for a node based on the centrality of its neighbors [39].
The eigenvector centrality tries to generalize the degree centrality by taking into
account the importance of the neighbors. Specifically, the eigenvector centrality
for node i is the i -th element of the vector x defined by:
Ax =λA, (2.11)
where A is the adjacency matrix of G with eigenvalueλ. In general, there exist dif-
ferent eigenvalues λ for which a non-zero eigenvector solution exists. However,
given that every element of the adjacency matrix is non-negative, according to
the Perron–Frobenius theorem there is a unique largest eigenvalue, which is
real and positive. This greatest eigenvalue results in the eigenvector centrality
measure.
• PageRank: it is a variant of EigenCentrality, which also considers the direction
and the weight of each edge. PageRank is the algorithm developed by Google to
rank web pages in their search engine [188].
Other techniques are also employed in the literature to explore the centrality (also
referred to as “embeddedness”) of nodes in a network. For instance, the k-core
decomposition aims to determine the set of nodes deeply embedded in a graph by
recursively pruning nodes with degrees less than k. In other words, the k-core is a
subgraph of the original graph in which every node has a degree equal to or greater
than a given value k. The k-core decomposition assigns a core number to each node,
which is the largest value k of a k-core containing that node. The higher the core
number k is the more embedded the node is in the network.
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2.8 OSNs
In this Section, we provide an overview of the different kinds of OSNs considered in
this thesis and their relation with our analyses and approaches.
Microblogging Platforms Microblogging is a combination of blogging (e.g., to add
content to a blog) and instant messaging that allows users to create short messages
to be shared in OSNs. These short messages can include different kinds of content,
including text, images, video, audio, and hyperlinks. Twitter represents the most
popular microblogging platform. In Twitter, users can share content and interact with
each other through messages referred to as “tweets”, which can have a maximum
length of 280 characters. Specifically, Twitter users can create original tweets, re-share
others’ tweets (i.e., retweet), respond to others’ tweets (i.e., reply), involve other users
in their tweets (i.e., mentions), and like others’ tweets. In this thesis, we use Twitter
data to assess user’ location privacy in Chapter 3 and to capture the online discussion
during US political elections in every analysis related to the manipulation peril in
Chapter 5.
Location-Based Social Networks Location-Based Social Networks (LBSNs) are
OSNs that are built upon the notion of bringing together the places we visit with the
friends we connect to [187]. In fact, in recent years, LBSNs have become popular
services that allow users to register (check-in) at named places and share their location
with their friends. Check-in information includes latitude, longitude, category of the
place (e.g., restaurant), the ID of the location, and time of the check-in. Historical
check-ins provide useful hints about user interests and preferences, and represent a
promising source of activity data to study human behavior and social dynamics [187].
In this thesis, we use data from Foursquare8, which is the most popular LBSN, to test
our proposed social influence approaches in Chapter 4.
Event-Based Social Networks An Event-Based Social Network (EBSN) is a web plat-
form where users can create events, promote them, and invite friends to participate.
Events range from small get-together activities, e.g., Sunday brunch or movie night, to
bigger events, e.g., concerts or conferences [160]. The rationale behind the choice of
8www.foursquare.com
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utilizing an EBSN is the intrinsic agglomerative power of the events. In fact, participa-
tion in an event represents a direct and explicit form of social interaction, other than a
personal interest. In this thesis, we use data from Plancast9, an EBSN that provides
a social network service to connect friends and users with common interests. In the
event main page, a Plancast user can see the information related to the event, e.g., date,
location, and description, along with the confirmed participants. This information
may activate processes of social influence, which can drive user participation in the
events [99, 170], as we describe in Chapter 4.
9www.plancast.com
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Geo-Location Privacy Leakage in OSNs
3.1 Introduction
It appears evident from Chapters 1 and 2 that the protection of users’ sensitive data
in OSNs is nowadays far from being effective. In this respect, geographical location
is considered both a very sensitive and highly-valuable information. On one hand,
users tend to protect their privacy by rarely publishing their location in OSNs. This
operation is referred to as geo-tagging. On the other hand, users’ position is a business-
relevant information that third parties, e.g., LBS providers, may be interested to
obtain. In previous studies, it has been shown that users’ unexposed location can
still be accurately inferred by combining different sources of information, such as
users’ generated contents (e.g., public messages), mobility patterns, and social cues
[78, 207, 212].
Along this research line, we explore the problem of geo-location privacy in OSNs. We
consider a scenario where a third-party entity (e.g., a LBS provider that uses OSN
platforms to perform targeted advertisement) is interested to obtain users’ locations.
This third party is the attacker that tries to violate users’ privacy by inferring the
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locations that users are not willing to expose. In such a scenario, our first objective
is to measure the level of geo-location privacy of a user. We define the geo-location
privacy of a user as the geographical distance between the actual location and the one
estimated by the attacker. Based on this definition, we investigate if a user’s privacy
can be violated by using information shared by other OSN users. More specifically, we
examine whether a user’s undisclosed location can be uncovered by leveraging other
users’ locations. Notice that such an attack does not require the implementation of
any illicit strategies, as it is based only on the information attainable from publicly-
available geo-tags. As users are generally not aware of the potential privacy risks
behind this public data exposure, it is crucial to provide them with tools to measure
the geo-location privacy and control it (i.e., to be capable of setting the level of privacy
a user is comfortable with). Summarizing, in this Chapter, we aim to respond to the
following RQs:
RQ 1.1: Can an attacker infer users’ personal information from publicly-available data
of other OSN users?
RQ 1.2: Can we provide users with countermeasures to control the public exposure of
their data?
RQ 1.3: Can we allow users to measure the impact of their characteristics, behavior, and
online activity on their privacy?
Towards the objective of addressing the above RQs, we provide the following three
main contributions [163] by considering the Twitter OSN as a study case:
• To assess users’ geo-location privacy (RQ 1.1), we propose a novel deep learning
architecture that, starting from publicly-available geo-tags, attempts to violate
users’ privacy by unveiling their unexposed locations.
• We propose two data perturbation techniques that users can employ to control
the public exposure of their geo-tags (RQ 1.2) and, in this way, improve privacy.
These strategies are called geo-tag obfuscation and geo-tag reduction and, by
using them, a user can provide noisy locations or diminish the number of shared
geo-tags, respectively.
• We model the privacy value obtained with the deep learning approach as a func-
tion of users’ characteristics related to mobility, social network, and enforced
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data perturbation (RQ 1.3). This model, which is based on a machine learning
algorithm, allows us to measure the impact of each feature on privacy, thus
enabling their proper control.
This Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the methodology to mea-
sure users’ geo-location privacy. In Section 3.3, we describe the proposed strategies
to control the level of users’ privacy. Finally, experimental settings and results are
presented in Section 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.
3.2 Geo-Location Privacy Measurement
In this Section, we initially present the formulation of the privacy measurement
problem. Then, we describe the deep-learning methodology that we employ to solve
it.
3.2.1 Geo-Location Privacy Definition and Measurement
As mentioned in Section 3.1, social cues represent relevant information to violate
users’ privacy. We model social relationships within the OSN platform as an undirected
graph G = (V ,E), where V is the set of users and E is set of edges encoding friendship
relations. Notice that, on Twitter, social connections are based on the followee/follower
paradigm. Hence, we consider two users to be friends if both follow each other and we
denote the 1-hop neighborhood of u as the set of u’s friends, the 2-hop neighborhood
as the set of u’s friends of friends, etc.
We now describe how we leverage other users’ (e.g., neighbors’) data to violate a target
user’s privacy. Privacy is generally considered a problem-dependent and subjective
metric. This holds true for location privacy as well. In fact, each user may have a
different perception of the intrusiveness of a precise localization. However, to perform
our analysis, we require an objective measure of privacy. We define the privacy Pu of
the generic user u as the average geographical distance between the locations visited
by u and the ones estimated by a certain attacker. In the following formula
Pu = 1
Nu
∑
ti
Di st (l (u)ti , lˆ
(u)
ti
) (3.1)
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l (u)ti and lˆ
(u)
ti
are the actual and estimated geo-tags of the tweet published by user u
at time ti . Di st (x, y) is the geographical distance between locations x and y . Notice
that such distance is always greater than (or equal to) zero as it is computed as the
Haversine distance [62] between pairs of latitude and longitude coordinates. Notice
that the Haversine distance measures the angular distance between two points on
the surface of a sphere and, therefore, considers the curvature of the Earth. Nu is
the total number of tweets published by u and provided with a geo-tag. It should be
noticed that, to assess users’ privacy, we use as ground truth the locations actually
shared by the users on Twitter. However, when we simulate the location inference task
(Section 3.2.3), we hide this information as it represents the target to be inferred by
the attacker.
Based on this formulation, we examine whether a user’s undisclosed location can be
violated by using other OSN users’ information. More specifically, we leverage the
location information shared by other OSN users. The rationale is to understand if
other users’ locations can provide useful information to infer the location of a given
user. As an example, the question we aim to answer is: Can we infer the location of
Alice given that Bob is in his office in Manhattan, Carol is in a gym in Brooklyn, and
Ted is in a bar in Times Square? Notice that Bob, Carol, and Ted are not necessarily
Alice’s friends.
Formally, the objective of the attacker is to estimate the geo-tag of the content (in the
considered case, a tweet) published by the generic user u from the set of geo-tags that
have been shared on the OSN platform by other users within a given period of time.
Such period of time is discretized into time slots of fixed duration ∆t and we refer to ti
to indicate the i -th time slot. To perform this inference, we need an estimatorΘ that
models both the spatial and temporal dependencies between target user u and the
other users within the OSN. In the following formula,
lˆ (u)ti =Θ(l
(u)
t<ti , l
(F )
t≤ti ) (3.2)
lˆ (u)ti is the estimated location of the tweet published by u at time slot ti ; l
(u)
t<ti is the set
of geo-tags published by u before time slot ti and l
(F )
t≤ti is the set of geo-tags published
by other users up to time slot ti . Notice that we include also the geo-tags provided by
other users within time slot ti itself because we expect these to be highly-informative
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Figure 3.1: Example of social proximity for the valid users selection phase
of the current location of u (as we explained above in the example related to Alice). In
the next subsection, we describe how we take into account both temporal and social
proximity to design the estimatorΘ.
3.2.2 Geo-tags Selection
From a theoretical standpoint, the estimator Θ could consider the whole historical
information available in the OSN, i.e., all geo-tags published up to ti . However, this
amount of data grows linearly with the number of users and with the considered
period of time. Hence, this approach cannot scale to large instances of OSN (which
can count up to several hundreds of millions of users in real scenarios). Also, most of
the geo-tags are expected to be uninformative with respect to the location of u at time
ti and can be safely discarded. In particular, tweets that have been published (i ) far
away in time and (i i ) by users with weak social relationships with u are expected to be
the least relevant ones [180]. To reduce the volume of available data, we perform a
data selection process that undergoes two subsequent phases, namely the valid slots
selection and the valid users selection.
In thevalid slots selection phase, we select the last T time slots before ti when user u
has published at least a geo-tagged tweet. Once this phase has been performed, in the
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valid users selection phase, N valid users are chosen, in each valid slot, among those
who have published a geo-tagged tweet within that slot. The valid users selection
phase is carried out privileging users with high social proximity with u. We denote as
social proximity the distance, in terms of hops, between users in the graph G (defined
in Section 3.1). In the example in Fig. 3.1, we represent the social network of u (green
node), where edges represent social connections in G . Nodes in red are 1-hop away
from u, nodes in blue are 2-hops away from u, and nodes in grey are 3-hops away
from u. According to the concept of social proximity defined above, we first select
the users that are 1-hop-away from u (e.g., red nodes in Fig. 3.1). If the number of
such users is less than N , the process is carried out for users that are 2-hops-away
from u (e.g., blue nodes in Fig. 3.1), etc. The process concludes when N valid users
are found. We refer to this set of users as neighbors. It should be noticed that when it
is not possible to assign u a set of N valid neighbors, e.g., in the case of disconnected
network components, we assign specific missing values to l(F )t≤ti , as detailed in the
following subsection. We stress the fact that other users’ geo-tags are considered if
provided in valid slots, i.e., when also the target user u has published at least one geo-
tag. This choice is motivated by the objective of learning a consistent spatio-temporal
dependency between u and her/his neighbors. Notice also that the N selected users
differ at each time slot, as not in every time slot the same users have geo-tagged their
tweets. In the next subsection, we present the deep-learning model that we use to
learn the estimatorΘ.
3.2.3 Deep Learning Model for Geo-Location Privacy Measurement
The deep learning architecture proposed to learn the estimatorΘ is trained separately
for each user. The architecture has two main inputs, namely the information rela-
tive to the geo-tags published by the target user before time slot ti and by her/his
neighbors up to time slot ti (included). The model is trained to map these inputs to
the output, i.e., the geo-tag of the target user at time slot ti . Notice that the generic
geo-tag lti is represented as a vector with 2 components, the first for the latitude
and the second for the longitude. The architecture is designed to initially process
its inputs separately and to perform a successive downstream elaboration of their
representations. This approach is common in the machine learning community to
learn an effective representation of the inputs [138]. To realize such design objective,
the deep learning architecture is composed of the following four main building blocks:
i ) Target User Transform, i i ) Neighbors Aggregator, i i i ) Concatenator, and i v) Regres-
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Figure 3.2: Overview of the deep learning architecture
sor. A representation of the architecture is depicted in Fig. 3.2. The transform and
aggregator blocks perform a first processing of previous geo-tags of the target user
and her/his neighbors, respectively; the concatenator simply juxtaposes the outputs
of the previous processing and provides a single input for the regressor; finally, the
downstream regressor returns the inference of the target user’s location. The overall
deep learning architecture is trained to minimize the Mean Squared Error (MSE) be-
tween the estimated and actual geo-tags of user u in the selected slots. Each block of
the deep learning architecture is described in detail in the next paragraphs.
Target User Transform This block takes as input the sequences of u’s geo-tags pro-
vided in the last T valid time slots, i.e., l (u)ti−T , ..., l
(u)
ti−1 . Each geo-tag is processed sepa-
rately by a feed-forward neural network, which returns an abstract representation of
its input, denoted as z(u)ti−T , ..., z
(u)
ti−1 . The considered neural networks are independent,
i.e., they do not share any parameter. The output of this block is a sequence of T ele-
ments containing the representations of the locations geo-tagged by u in the selected
T valid slots.
Neighbors Aggregator This block computes an overall representation of the in-
formation relative to the N neighbors who have been previously selected (in the
valid users selection phase, described in Section 3.2.2) in each valid time slot, i.e.,
l(F )ti−T+1 , ..., l
(F )
ti
. Notice that l(F )tk is the list of all the geo-tags provided by the selected
users within the k-th time slot. The list corresponding to each selected slot is individu-
ally processed by a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [126] and then by a feed-forward
neural network. The choice of the LSTM (introduced in Section 2.6.1.1) in this phase is
inspired by [122], in which it is suggested to use it as a tool to learn the representation
of a node’s neighbors within a graph. In our approach, topological information is
considered since, as explained in Section 3.2.2, neighbors are chosen according to
their proximity with respect to the target user. Apart from this, the LSTM guarantees
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higher expressive capabilities with respect to other data aggregation methods, e.g.,
mean aggregator [122]. The output of this block is denoted as y(F )ti−T+1 , ...,y
(F )
ti
, which is
a sequence of T elements containing the representations of the locations geo-tagged
by the selected neighbors in the T valid slots.
Concatenator This block receives in input two sequences of T elements, i.e.,
z(u)[ti−T ,ti−1] and y
(F )
[ti−T+1,ti ], which encode the representations of the geo-tags provided
in the selected T slots by the target user and by the N neighbors, respectively. The
concatenator block juxtaposes the elements in corresponding positions of the
sequences and returns a single sequence of T elements, denoted as w(u)[ti−T+1,ti ], which
can be processed by the downstream regressor.
Regressor The final block is composed of a LSTM and feed-forward neural network
module. This block processes w(u)[ti−T+1,ti ] (i.e., the output of the concatenator) and
returns lˆ (u)ti (i.e., the inferred geo-location). Notice that, even though the architecture
of this block is quite similar to that of the neighbors aggregator block, the design
strategies behind them are significantly different. In fact, in this phase, we want to
exploit the ability of the LSTM to learn recurrences within a sequence of temporal
data, which are useful to perform the inference task.
The proposed deep learning architecture returns an estimate location lˆ (u)ti for each
geo-tagged tweet shared by user u. Finally, the privacy of u is measured according to
Eq. (3.1), i.e., by computing the geographical distance between actual and estimated
locations. We remark here that, to compute users’ location privacy, we use as ground
truth the locations actually shared by the users on Twitter. However, we have hidden
these geo-tags in the location inference task as they represent the target values that
the attacker aims to estimate.
3.3 Control of Privacy Level
In this Section, we describe two strategies that users can implement to enhance their
privacy, i.e., to reduce the ability of an attacker to correctly infer their location. Then, as
the measured privacy is likely to be affected by other factors beyond data perturbation,
we also propose a privacy model that captures the impact on privacy of several users’
behavioral characteristics (e.g., data perturbation level and users’ mobility) and that
can therefore be employed as a more comprehensive privacy control tool.
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3.3.1 Strategies to Tune the Level of Privacy
Every time a user publishes a tweet, she/he can decide to either provide it with a
geo-tag or not. In this respect, each user is characterized by a particular behavior,
which can be defined as the percentage of tweets that she/he normally geo-tags. As
location privacy can be violated by relying on the information released by other OSN
users, to prevent this violation and preserve the secrecy of their location, users may
purposely alter the geo-tags of a portion of the tweets they normally publish. We
refer to this strategy as data perturbation and we introduce a variable p, the data
perturbation probability, i.e., the probability that a user deviates from her/his normal
behavior. For instance, a user who publishes, on average, 10 geo-tags per month, can
set p = 0.3 and reduce the number of normally geo-tagged tweets to 7. The remaining
3 tweets are perturbated. We propose to use two data perturbation strategies, namely
data obfuscation and data removal strategy and we describe them in the following:
• Data Obfuscation: According to this strategy, a geo-tag is shared, with probabil-
ity p, by randomly selecting a location within the boundaries of the city where
the user is sharing content (New York City, in our dataset).
• Data Reduction: Following the data reduction strategy, with probability p, a
user does not geo-tag a tweet that would have been provided with a location if
no perturbation were applied.
Other approaches to perturb geo-tags can also be considered, e.g., to delay the time in
which the tweet is published. This, and other possible techniques to perturb geo-tags,
will be evaluated in future work. Overall, the rationale of the perturbation strategies is
that, by increasing p, i.e., the level of data perturbation, a user can improve her/his
privacy. However, we shall still provide a quantitative answer to an important pending
question: how much privacy a user should expect to gain by increasing p? A user
who is interested to have a quantitative assessment of her/his privacy can follow the
approach described in Section 3.2.3 to infer her/his visited locations (as an attacker
would do) and, from this, evaluate her/his own level of privacy. This approach is
effective to estimate users’ expected level of privacy but has several drawbacks. First of
all, to assess the impact of the data perturbation level on the resulting privacy, the user
has to train and test the deep learning model using data perturbed for several values
of p. This process, besides being highly-time consuming, does not allow users to
understand the impact that several factors (e.g., related to her/his mobility behavior)
57
Chapter 3. Geo-Location Privacy Leakage in OSNs
Figure 3.3: Block diagram of the approach followed to learn the privacy model
beyond p have on her/his privacy. In fact, this model takes as input only raw data
(i.e., geo-tags) that do not explicitly capture the characteristics of users’ behavior.
Moreover, there is no possibility to interpret the impact of each feature on privacy,
since the output of the model is itself a location (and not a value of privacy). Lastly,
deep learning models are widely considered as black boxes whose outcomes are
difficult to interpret in relation to the input features [116, 158]. Hence, the proposed
deep learning approach is only capable to measure privacy, but it does not give users
a proper understanding on how to control it. In the next subsection, we describe a
privacy model that quantifies the impact of various factors on privacy and allows to
directly measure its level (i.e., without performing an intermediate location inference).
3.3.2 Privacy Model
In this subsection, we present a privacy model that provides users with an estimate of
their privacy level given a set of features that explicitly capture their characteristics and
behavior. This model is based on a machine learning algorithm trained in a supervised
manner to map diverse users’ features to their value of privacy. Machine learning
algorithms are commonly trained using ground truth values. In our case, however,
the target privacy cannot be regarded as a ground truth value in the traditional sense.
In fact, privacy is not an attribute of the users, but rather a value derived from the
estimation of their location, which in turn depends on many factors (e.g., the ability of
the attacker, amount of available data, etc...). In this study, we consider as target value
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the measurement of privacy obtained with the deep learning approach explained in
Section 3.2.3, as represented in Fig. 3.3. Notice that, in principle, any estimation of
privacy could be used as a target value Pu .
We train several machine learning algorithms (e.g., random forest and decision tree)
to obtain an estimator of users’ privacy (results in Section 3.5.3). These algorithms are
trained to minimize the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) with respect to the target privacy
value. The MAE is defined as:
M AE = 1|V |
∑
u∈V
|Pu − Pˆu |, (3.3)
where Pu and Pˆu are the target privacy value of user u (computed according to Eq.
(3.1)) and the privacy value estimated by the privacy model, respectively. |V | is the
total number of users present in our dataset.
To obtain the privacy model, such machine learning algorithm is fed with a set of fea-
tures, which are listed in Table 3.1. These features cover a broad range of parameters
that users can tune to control their privacy, and fall into three main categories, namely
mobility-related, topology-related, and data-perturbation-related. Mobility-related
features are considered to statistically describe the mobility (e.g., in terms of variability
of the visited locations [190]) of the users. Topology-related features aim to provide a
characterization of users’ position within the social network (e.g., in terms of the net-
work centrality measures described in Section 2.7.3). The data-perturbation-related
feature is p, i.e., the level of data perturbation the user is willing to adopt for tuning
her/his privacy.
Given these features for a certain user, the model outputs an estimate of her/his loca-
tion privacy. If, for example, a user is not satisfied with her/his privacy level, she/he
can evaluate how the secrecy of her/his information enhances by varying her/his
sharing activity (e.g., by geo-tagging less frequently), changing her/his social clique
(e.g., by diminishing the number of friends in the OSN), or perturbing her/his geo-tag
(i.e., by increasing the data perturbation probability p). We envision the utilization
of this model in a client-server scheme, where the client is a user who requires an
estimate of her/his privacy, while the server is a third-party entity that offers a service
of privacy awareness. Notice that this approach is also privacy-preserving since it
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Table 3.1: Features of the user’s geo-location privacy model
Category Feature Description
Mobility-
related
tweet frequency Frequency of geo-tagged tweets per day
avg. distance Average distance of geo-tags
var latitude (longitude) Variance of the geo-tags latitude (longitude)
corr. latitude (longitude) Autocorrelation of the geo-tags latitude (longitude)
median latitude (longitude) Median of the geo-tags latitude (longitude)
kurtosis latitude (longitude) Kurtosis of the geo-tags latitude (longitude)
skew latitude (longitude) Skewness of the geo-tags latitude (longitude)
Topology-
related
no. of friends Number of friends
PR PageRank
deg-centrality Degree centrality measure
eig-centrality Eigenvector centrality measure
cl-centrality Closeness centrality measure
bw-centrality Betweeness centrality measure
Data perturbation-related p Data perturbation probability
requires users to disclose to the server only the aforementioned features, which, as
detailed in Table 3.1, represent aggregate information (e.g., the variance of their visited
locations) and do not need the sharing of the visited locations.
3.4 Experimental Setup
In this Section, we show the setup of our experiments for measuring and control-
ling users’ geo-location privacy in OSNs. We first describe the data employed in
our analysis and we then detail the implementation of the proposed deep learning
architecture.
3.4.1 Twitter Data
We perform our evaluations on the Twitter dataset presented in [207], which includes
the information about social connections among users (i.e., pair of followees, follow-
ers) and 2,173,681 tweets collected within 100 kilometers from New York city center
for 31 days. Figure 3.4 shows the spatial distribution of the tweets over all the collec-
tion period. In Table 3.2, we summarize the statistics about the data and network
properties related to the social graph. Notice that we detailed the network properties
(e.g., average degree, diameter, etc.) in Section 2.7.
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Figure 3.4: Geographical distribution of the geo-tagged tweets in New York City
Table 3.2: Statistics of the Twitter dataset
New York City Dataset
Users |V | 6,082
Friendship relationships |E | 31,874
Average degree 〈k〉 10.22
Diameter dmax 19
Average clustering coefficient 〈C〉 0.15
Density D 0.001
3.4.2 Experimental Settings
We evaluate the privacy of a user (defined as the geographical distance between
her/his actual and estimated location) at a given time slot ti , given the information of
the geo-tags published on the past T slots. After preliminary evaluations, we found
that T = 3 was the best compromise between accuracy and training time of the deep
learning algorithm. Each slot represents a period of 3 hours, which is the average
time between two consecutive tweets in the dataset. Each location published during
the slots is expressed as a pair of latitude and longitude. Both latitude and longitude
have been normalized according to the standardization technique, which is widely
employed to perform feature scaling in machine learning.
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The deep learning architecture includes a target user transform (i.e., a feed-forward
neural network composed of a single layer with 5 neurons), a neighbors aggregator
(i.e., a LSTM layer with 5 neurons followed by a feed-forward neural network layer
with 2 neurons) and a regressor (i.e., a LSTM layer with 5 neurons and a feed-forward
neural network layer with 2 neurons). Among the configurations of hyper-parameters
that we have considered, the aforementioned one proved to achieve the best balance
between inference effectiveness and training time efficiency. The deep learning model
is trained to estimate the location of the target users at time slot ti from the previous
T geo-tags provided by the target user u (up to time slot ti−1) and those of the N
neighbors (up to time slot ti ) chosen in the valid users selection phase. The number of
neighbors N is set to 10, which is the approximate network average degree (see Table
3.2). The first 75% of the time slots are used for training purposes, while the remaining
25% are used to test the learned model. The 75% of training slots are further divided
into pure training slots (60%) and validation slots (40%).
3.5 Evaluation
This Section shows the results of the presented approach to measure users’ geo-
location privacy and provides an evaluation of the proposed countermeasures and
methodologies to control the public exposure of users’ locations.
3.5.1 Privacy Measurement
In this subsection, to address RQ 1.1, we present an overview of the results related to
the privacy measurement obtained by using the proposed deep-learning approach
described in Section 3.2.3. To motivate the use of a machine learning strategy, we
firstly show the average location inference error obtained using several alternative
approaches. In particular, we propose three baselines that perform the location
inference of a target user based on the same inputs of our deep-learning algorithm,
i.e., her/his most recent available location and the geo-tags of other users. Specifically,
the three baselines compute a value Fˆloc from the geo-tags of N = 10 target user’s
neighbors as follows:
• mean-based: Fˆloc is obtained by computing the average latitudes and longitudes
of the N neighbors.
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Table 3.3: Comparison between the deep-learning and the baseline approaches to
infer users’ locations
Approach Average Error [km]
Deep Learning 2.3
Median-Based 7.3
Mean-Based 7.7
Cluster-Based 9.2
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of the location privacy measurement
• median-based: Fˆloc is obtained by computing the median value of latitudes and
longitudes of the N neighbors.
• cluster-based: the geographical area considered in our dataset is divided into a
set of non-overlapping squares with sides equal to ∼ 155m. Fˆloc is the centroid
of the square mostly visited by the neighbors.
For each baseline, the location of the target user is then estimated by computing the
average between her/his most recent available location and Fˆloc . In Tab. 3.3, we show
the average error of the location inference obtained using the deep-learning approach
and the three baselines. As expected, the deep-learning algorithm significantly out-
performs all the considered alternatives, which confirms its ability to capture complex
relationships among the input data.
To further elaborate on the results obtained with the deep-learning strategy, we show
the distribution of the location privacy in Fig. 3.5. It can be noticed that 60% of the
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Figure 3.6: Geo-localization error vs variance of mobility
users have a level of privacy below 1km and almost 80% of the users achieve a privacy
measure below 3km. Overall, the average privacy measure is of 2.3km and the median
privacy value is of 0.4km. Such results corroborate our intuition that the secrecy of
the location information can be violated by leveraging publicly-available information
shared by other OSN users.
To better understand this result, in Figure 3.6, we depict the privacy measure as a
function of variances of latitude and longitude visited by each user. Users whose
privacy is lower (resp. higher) than the average (2.3km) are colored in blue (resp.,
red). The objective is to understand whether the variability of the visited locations
can impact users’ privacy. We expected that the variance of the locations visited by
the user could be a strong indicator of user’s privacy leakage. However, a subset of
users with limited mobility achieves a privacy level above the average, suggesting
that mobility variance is not the only factor determining the level of privacy risks. We
further analyze other factors impacting users’ privacy in Section 3.5.3.
3.5.2 Data Perturbation Strategy
The results related to the privacy assessment indicate a considerable peril for users’
privacy in OSN. To respond to RQ 1.2, we now evaluate the effect of two possible
countermeasures to increase the location error of attacker’s estimates. Thereby, we
examine the data perturbation strategies introduced in Section 3.3.1. In Fig. 3.7a, we
depict the percentile of the geo-location error with varying data perturbation prob-
ability p related to the data obfuscation strategy. Notice that the geo-location error
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Figure 3.7: Percentile of the geo-localization error using data perturbation strategies
corresponds to the definition of privacy provided in Section 3.2.1. We first observe
that the percentage of perturbed geo-tagged tweets significantly affects the ability of
the attacker to correctly infer the geo-tags. In fact, as expected, the localization error
increases with increasing p, i.e., users’ privacy increases as the level of perturbation
increases.
On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 3.7b, the data reduction strategy does not improve
users’ privacy as much as the data obfuscation strategy. The gap between the per-
centiles with varying p is very small, i.e., there is no significant privacy improvement
with respect to the unperturbed scenario (p = 0). This result suggests that even a
small percentage of uncorrupted information is sufficient to effectively estimate users’
location. This is further confirmed in Fig. 3.8, which compares the average local-
ization error of the perturbation strategies with varying p. Interestingly, in the data
obfuscation strategy, users’ privacy grows linearly with p, whereas the localization
error is almost constant around 3.5km using the data reduction strategy. We observe
that, using the data obfuscation strategy, privacy increases proportionally with the
data perturbation level, which can in turn be tuned according to the desired level of
privacy. This result suggests that data obfuscation is preferable with respect to data
reduction.
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of data perturbation strategies considering the average geo-
localization error with varying p
Table 3.4: Performance of the privacy model for several machine learning algorithms
Algorithm Error [km]
Random Forest 1.4
Decision Tree 2.1
Gradient Boosting 3.0
k-nearest neighbors 3.7
Ridge Regression 3.8
Support Vector Machine 4.1
3.5.3 Validation of the Privacy Model
In this subsection, to answer RQ 1.3, we show the results on the privacy model de-
scribed in Section 3.3.2. Specifically, we evaluate the ability of this model to estimate
users’ privacy and we examine the impact that users’ behavior has on their level of pri-
vacy. To obtain an estimator of users’ privacy, we train and compare several machine
learning algorithms. In particular, we train and test every algorithm by following a
10-fold cross validation approach.
Table 3.4 shows the MAE for the different considered approaches. For further evalua-
tions, we consider the model that yields the minimum MAE, i.e., the model based on a
random forest. This machine learning algorithm also allows us to study the relevance
of each feature in the assessment of users’ privacy. In fact, the random forest algorithm
computes and provides as an output the importance (or relevance) of each feature
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Figure 3.9: Features importance of the model based on random forest
in the estimation of the target variable. We present the feature importance of the
random forest in Fig. 3.9. First of all, we observe that mobility-related features, e.g.,
variance and median value of the visited locations, are the most relevant features to
assess users’ level of location privacy. This can be explained considering that mobility
patterns strongly affect the predictability of the visited locations. Perhaps surprisingly,
the median of the visited locations highly influences the outcome of the model. This
may suggest that some locations are strong indicators of the privacy of a user, which
is in line with the findings of [29]. It is also noticeable that the variables (e.g., variance
and median) related to the visited latitudes have a larger impact on the outcome with
respect to the variables related to the visited longitudes. Arguably, this is due to the
nature of users mobility within the specific urban area under analysis. Another very
relevant feature is the level of data perturbation, i.e., p. This confirms the discussion
done in Section 3.3.1, where the importance of tuning p to increase privacy has been
highlighted. Finally, we notice that topology-related features have the least significant
impact on the estimation of privacy, suggesting that the location privacy of a user is
quite unrelated to her/his position in the social network.
Until now, we have considered the MAE between estimates of privacy (i.e., Pˆu) and
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Figure 3.10: Distribution of the relative error ²u between estimates and ground-truth
values of privacy
corresponding reference privacy values (i.e., Pu) as the only metric to evaluate the
quality of the privacy model. However, the MAE does not consider the impact of each
estimate’s error on its actual reference privacy value. For example, an absolute error of
1km is much more significant if Pu = 3km with respect to the case where Pu = 50km.
To provide a more complete evaluation of the actual ability of the model to correctly
estimate privacy, we propose two model validation strategies. The first one is the
analysis of the distribution of the relative errors between estimates and target privacy
values. The second one is the Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plot, which graphically shows
the likelihood that two populations have been generated by the same model. The two
validation strategies are explained in detail in the following.
3.5.3.1 Distribution of relative errors
We now present the distribution of relative errors between the target privacy values
and the privacy estimates computed by the random forest model. The relative error of
the privacy of user u, i.e., ²u is defined as:
²u = |Pu − Pˆu |
Pu
. (3.4)
We depict the distribution of the relative error in Fig. 3.10. Notice that the relative
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Figure 3.11: Q-Q Plot
error provides much more valuable information with respect to the MAE shown in
Table 3.4 because it considers the error in relation to the reference privacy value (i.e.,
Pu). From Fig. 3.10, it can be noticed a low relative error for most of the users. More
specifically, for around 33% of the users, the random forest estimates the privacy with
a relative error below 10%. This percentage grows to 50% if a relative error below 20%
is considered.
3.5.3.2 Q-Q plot
The Q-Q plot allows us to graphically assess the likelihood that two populations have
been generated by the same model. In our case, the elements of the two populations
correspond to the privacy values estimated by the random forest model and the target
values, respectively. Each element of the population is represented in the Q-Q plot as a
point whose coordinates are the corresponding percentiles of the two populations. If
the data were generated from the same model, each point would lie on a line of slope
equal to 1 passing through the origin (represented in red in Fig. 3.11). In Fig. 3.11, it is
possible to observe that most of the points (in blue) lie in the proximity of this line (in
red). The obtained results suggest the use of the privacy model as a reliable tool to
estimate users’ privacy based on their characteristics.
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3.6 Conclusions
In this Chapter, we focus on the problem of geo-location privacy in OSNs, considering
Twitter as a study case. We address this problem from two different angles: on one
side, we develop methods to assess the ability of an attacker to correctly infer users’
locations; on the other side, we propose effective strategies that users can adopt to
measure and control their privacy.
To address RQ 1.1, we propose a deep learning model that can accurately infer users’
locationS by only considering publicly-available geo-tags. From this estimate, we
measure location privacy as the geographical distance between the inferred and the
actual position. Our experiments confirm the concerns about privacy perils in OSNs.
In fact, we showed that 60% of the users have a level of location privacy below 1km
and almost 80% of the users achieve a privacy measure below 3km.
To respond to RQ 1.2, we propose data perturbation techniques that users can use
to decrease the knowledge obtainable by analyzing their published geo-tags. We
measure the effectiveness of such strategies considering their ability to increase users’
privacy. In particular, the obfuscation of the actual location proved to be the most
effective strategy. In fact, we observe that, using the data obfuscation strategy, users’
privacy grows linearly with the perturbation probability p, whereas privacy does not
improve significantly using the data reduction strategy. This result suggests that data
obfuscation is preferable with respect to data reduction, as it allows to tune the desired
level of privacy by varying the data perturbation level.
To further increase users’ control and answer RQ 1.3, we model privacy considering
features that capture users’ behavior (e.g., characteristics related to the mobility of
the user and to the enforced level of data perturbation). This model, based on the
random forest algorithm, provides an accurate estimate of privacy (with an average
error of about 1.4km) and enables a principled understanding of the features that
mainly affect it. Features related to the mobility of the user and to the enforced level
of data perturbation resulted to be the most relevant factor behind the infringement
of users’ location secrecy. Finally, to provide a more complete evaluation of the ability
of the privacy model to correctly estimate privacy, we employ two model validation
strategies (i.e., distribution of the relative errors and the Q-Q plot), whose results
confirm the validity of the privacy model as a privacy estimation tool.
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Social Influence Modeling
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 presented an example of privacy leakage in OSNs. In particular, we showed
that users’ geo-location can be accurately estimated by relying only on spatial and
temporal dependencies among individuals. In this Chapter, we analyze the privacy is-
sue in OSNs from a different point of view. We study the social influence phenomenon,
a key factor that governs human behavior and drives individual decisions. The key
idea behind social influence is that the interaction with other individuals (or a group)
may affect subjects’ behavior. In line with this concept, it might be possible to predict
human behavior in new (and unseen) instances by modeling the flow of influence
among users, i.e., the influence strength between pairs of subjects.
According to this idea, the goal of this Chapter is to understand whether the modeling
of social influence can effectively provide a means to infer users’ future behavior and,
in turn, violate their privacy. As we described in Section 2.3, in this thesis, we focus on
modeling social influence at the user-level as we are interested in measuring whether
and to what extent an individual is influenced by other subjects. In Sections 1.3.2
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and 2.3, we detailed the limitations of existing approaches and we highlighted how
such solutions consider social relationships as the only factor impacting influence
dynamics. To investigate such open points, in this Chapter, we seek to answer the
following RQs:
RQ 2.1: How is it possible to overcome the limitations of existing social influence models?
RQ 2.2: Can other factors (e.g., location) impact influence modeling other than social
relationships?
To address RQ 2.1, we introduce Social Influence Deep Learning (SIDL) [165], a frame-
work that combines deep learning with network science [8, 49, 184] to model social
influence and predict human behavior. SIDL only leverages dyadic social interactions
between subjects to predict their behavior and provides a model that can be gener-
alized to any kind of OSN and, less specifically, to any real-life domain. Moreover,
we propose different approaches at varying social network granularity (i.e., the ego
network of each user, the community within each user is embedded, and the totality of
the social network) with the objective of facing two typical challenges of deep learning:
interpretability (introduced in Section 2.6.1) and scalability (defined in Section 4.2.1).
To respond to RQ 2.2, we explore the role of factors such as geographical proximity,
homophily (defined in Section 2.7), and social connections in the social influence
phenomenon. In particular, we investigate the role of different communities related
to such factors as sources of social influence. The rationale is that subjects may follow
and be affected by the collective behavior of individuals (i ) living in their physical
area, (i i ) with common interests, or (i i i ) in their social community.
This Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the SIDL framework,
its three approaches, and corresponding results. Section 4.3 introduces a novel inter-
pretation of physical, homophily, and social community as sources of social influence.
Finally, Section 4.4 discusses the correlation between social influence and users’ pri-
vacy presenting results and some notes of caution about the risks of sharing sensitive
data.
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4.2 Social Influence Deep Learning
In this Section, to respond to RQ 2.1, we present SIDL [164,165], a deep learning frame-
work that aims to model social relationships and, accordingly, infer human behavior,
in terms of performed activities. Although SIDL can be generalized to every kind of
human activity (both online and offline), we focus on real-world (offline) activities,
such as attending an event or visiting a location. To the best of our knowledge, our
work [165] is the first effort that seeks to provide a social influence model of real-life
activities. For this purpose, we analyze data from Plancast [160], an Event-Based Social
Network (EBSN), and Foursquare [27], a Location-Based Social Network (LBSN). In
particular, Plancast allows users to create social events (e.g., concerts, conferences,
etc.) and share their participation in these events, while in Foursquare users can regis-
ter at named places (e.g., restaurants, theatre, etc.) and share their location with their
friends. Such platforms provide remarkable opportunities to analyze users’ real-world
behavior and interactions from the lens of OSNs.
SIDL addresses the limitations of existing approaches (see Section 2.3) by learning the
interplay among subjects by means of DNNs (described in Section 2.6.1), a class of
machine learning algorithms inspired by biological nervous systems. The rationale
of SIDL is to represent each user in the social network as an input node of the DNN,
which in turn has the capability to automatically model relationships embedded
in the input [125]. In SIDL, we consider different models by varying the network
structure in which the user is embedded with the objective of addressing two typical
challenges (detailed in the next subsection) of deep learning models: interpretability
and scalability.
4.2.1 DNN Challenges
As mentioned in Section 2.6.1, the outcome explanation problem is the notion of
interpretability that we study in this Section to model social influence among OSN
users. Given the output of a black box predictor, the outcome explanation problem
consists in reconstructing an explanation for it. One of the most common techniques
to solve the outcome explanation problem is to focus on explaining what a neural
network depends on locally, instead of trying to understand the full mapping learned
by the model. This local explanation aims to predict the response of the predictor
in a neighborhood of a given input. One of the techniques generally used to accom-
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plish this purpose is Saliency Mask (SM). SM aims to explain the DNN outcome by
identifying a subset of the input, which is mainly responsible for the prediction. As an
example, in [91], SM is used to highlight the salient part of the images that causes a
certain outcome.
While interpretability is a more rational problem, scalability represents a practical
issue related to DNN implementation. The idea is that the social influence model
should be able to adapt and scale to previously unseen users. In this sense, scalability
issues may occur when new users register to a social network. A new user can perform
activities, create social connections with other OSN users, and influence them. In
such a case, the social influence model should be adjusted in order to consider new
users in the social network. Our objective is to mitigate this issue in the most efficient
way, in terms of time and resource consumption, while preserving performance.
Towards meeting these challenges, in this Section, we propose to combine network
science (see Section 2.7) with deep learning. We consider different models by varying
the network structure in which the user is embedded. We first describe the Global-
SIDL approach, which considers the whole social network in a unique model. We then
narrow our approach to the ego network of each individual and build a local model
(Local-SIDL) for each user. Finally, we propose to decompose the social network in
mesoscale level structures (introduced in Section 2.7), such as communities, so as to
consider a larger social structure within each user is embedded.
4.2.2 Problem Definition
Let G = (V ,E) be an undirected graph representing the social network, where V =
{u1,u2, . . . ,uN } is the set of users, and E is the set of edges that connect them. The
edge (ui ,u j ) ∈ E indicates a social tie between ui and u j , which in turn are referred
to as friends. We denote withAl the action log: a record of the actions performed by
every user in the social network. Each entry of the action logAl is a tuple (ti ,ui , a)
representing the action a performed by user ui ∈V at time ti . Let A be the set of the
actions performed inAl , for each action a ∈ A, each user is either active (if she/he
performed the action) or inactive (otherwise). In accordance with [106, 208], we say
that an action a ∈ A propagates from ui to u j if the two following conditions are met:
• (ui ,u j ) ∈ E ,
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• (ti ,ui , a), (t j ,u j , a) ∈Al with ti ≤ t j .
We consider the scenario where ti = t j to take into account the mutual influence
between users in performing an activity at a fixed time t = ti = t j , e.g., attending an
event. Finally, we indicate with Aui the set of actions performed by ui and with Sa,ui
the set of active friends of ui for the action a.
We keep track of users’ activities over time to model complex social relationships
among them. In particular, we focus on the comprehension of the social influence phe-
nomenon, with the final objectives of forecasting influence propagation in real-world
scenarios and, at the same time, understanding whether social influence modeling
can expose OSN users to privacy risks. The idea behind our social influence modeling
is to learn influence strengths among subjects by leveraging the actions performed
by users in their history and how such actions propagated between each other. Once
the model is trained, we target to exploit it to predict users’ real-life behavior based
on other users’ actions. More specifically, our objective is to infer whether users will
perform action a based on their active friends Sa,ui , ∀a ∈ A. The rationale of this
approach is based on the concept of social influence itself. A subject may perform an
action, e.g., to buy a new product or to watch a TV show, when her/his friends have
performed the same action.
4.2.3 Methodology
In this subsection, we first present the rationale of SIDL and the logic behind the
proposed solution. We then present the SIDL approaches and corresponding imple-
mentations.
4.2.3.1 Social Influence Deep Learning (SIDL)
In [164, 165], we introduced SIDL, a DNN-based framework for both modeling social
influence and predicting user behavior. To the best of our knowledge, SIDL is the first
approach that attempts to model social relationships by using neural networks. The
rationale of this solution is based on the capability of a DNN to extract relationships
embedded in the input data. Thereby, if we represent each user in the social network as
an input node of the DNN, we can model the interplay and dependencies among users
by leveraging their activity history. In particular, SIDL aims to overcome the drawbacks
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of previous works described in Section 2.3. In particular, existing models [106, 208]
have two main drawbacks: (i ) they assume that the probability of friends influencing
a subject are independent of each other, and (i i ) they do not consider the actions not
performed by the subject (but performed by her/his friends) to learn the influence
probabilities.
According to the SIDL approaches introduced in the next subsections, we concurrently
take into account the relationship between a given subject (from now on target-user)
and her/his friends and the interactions among them. This allows us to overcome the
first drawback of existing approaches. Also, for each target-user ui , we consider both
positive (i.e., ui ’s performed actions) and negative (i.e., actions not performed by ui
but performed by her/his friends) instances to model social influence. In particular,
we formulate the task of predicting whether ui will perform action a (based on her/his
active friends Sa,ui ) as a binary classification problem, where the DNN output yui ,a
is a Boolean variable that is equal to 1 if the target-user ui performed a, and is 0
otherwise. We train the DNN by leveraging the action log Al . More specifically, to
train the DNN and tune the model parametersΘ, we rely on the history of both (i ) the
actions propagated from ui ’s friends to ui (i.e., positive instances) and (i i ) the actions
not propagated from ui ’s friends to ui (i.e., negative instances). Notice that we denote
an action as propagated according to the definition given in Section 4.2.2. This, in
turn, addresses the second limitation of existing works (i.e., only positive instances
were used to learn influence probabilities). Once the DNN is trained, we utilize
the influence model to predict the target-user’s new (not performed yet) activities
according to her/his friends’ activities.
4.2.3.2 Global-SIDL (G-SIDL)
The first SIDL approach we present is based on the idea of modeling the entire social
network in a unique neural network, thus, we name this solution Global-SIDL (G-
SIDL). The rationale of G-SIDL is to have a unique model that includes every user in
the social network to learn the interplay among individuals and model their inter-
dependencies. To accomplish this purpose, we employ a DNN structured as follows:
The input layer is composed of two concatenated vectors referred to as target-user ID
vector (vI Dui ) and social network vector (v
SN
ui ), respectively. Both of them have length
N = |V |.
The former (vI Dui ) is a one-hot vector that uniquely identifies each target-user ui ∈V .
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Figure 4.1: Global-SIDL (G-SIDL)
One-hot encoding is widely used in machine learning to distinguish the elements of a
set. The target-user ID vector consists of all zeros with the exception of a single one that
identifies the target-user, i.e., ui is represented by the vector vI Dui , whose i
th element is
the only element equal to one. The latter (vSNui ) gives a representation both of the social
network connections and of the users’ activity. In particular, each element represents
a user in the social network and its value indicates the state (active/inactive) of the
user for a given action a. Thereby, the social network vector vSNui of the target-user ui
represents the social network of ui and the state of her/his active friends. The j -th
element of vSNui corresponds to user u j and the corresponding input value is computed
as follows:
vSNui ( j )=
1 if (u j ,ui ) ∈ E and u j is active0 otherwise
These two vectors are first concatenated and then fed into a multi-layer architecture,
as depicted in Fig. 4.1, where, for the sake of simplicity, a DNN with only one hidden
layer is depicted. In our experiments, we design a network with a tower structure,
where the bottom layer is the largest and the number of nodes of each successive
layer is half of its precedent. In such a way, according to [124, 125], higher layers
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with few nodes can learn more abstractive features from the input data. Details
about the implementation will be given in Section 4.2.6. The output of the DNN
yui ,a corresponds to the target-user ui and is equal to 1 if she/he performed a, and
is 0 otherwise. The predictive model of the G-SIDL approach can be formulated as
yˆui ,a = f (vI Dui ,vSNui |Θ), and the training is performed by minimizing the cost function
L = −yui ,a log(yˆui ,a)− (1− yui ,a) log(1− yˆui ,a), which is referred to as binary cross-
entropy loss.
Interpretability and Scalability Although the G-SIDL architecture provides a com-
plete picture of the social network by embedding every user in a unique model, it
presents two issues: interpretability and scalability. Note that, as we clarified in Sec-
tion 4.2.1, the notion of interpretability used throughout this Section is related to a
post-hoc explanation of the results. More specifically, we aim at understanding which
subset of the input data is mainly responsible for the prediction outcome [116]. As
each input of G-SIDL represents a social network user, the global model does not pro-
vide a comprehensible explanation of the results. In fact, G-SIDL maps the interplay
between all the users and does not allow to identify the subset of input responsible
for the prediction related to a given target-user, i.e., we cannot identify the subset of
individuals that mainly influence the target-user.
Towards meeting this challenge, we exploit the notion of local explanations and, more
specifically, the principle behind the Saliency Mask (SM) technique. SM is defined as
a summarized explanation of where the classifier “looks” to make its prediction [66].
A suitable example is provided by the image classification scenario, where SM is used
to find the part of an image most responsible for the classifier decision [91]. The idea
behind SM is to understand what a neural network depends on locally, i.e., to identify
a subset of the input used by the model to produce the output.
In this thesis, we reinterpret the usage of such a technique in the context of social
networks. According to the concept of local explanation, here we narrow the input
space by deleting regions of the social network that may not be relevant to infer
the activity of a given target-user. We follow the Smallest Sufficient Region (SSR)
approach [66, 91], which aims to identify the smallest set of the input that achieves
a classification accuracy in line with the general (complete) model. We provide two
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Figure 4.2: Local SIDL (L-SIDL) of user u5
different solutions by varying the network connectivity of each user and adapting the
DNN architecture accordingly. The two solutions, basically, represent two different
sizes of the SSR.
On the other hand, scalability issues may occur when new users register to the social
network. In such a case, G-SIDL requires to be retrained to include the new users in
the model. This process is computationally expensive, both in time and resources.
Our objective here is to mitigate this issue in the most efficient way while preserving
the performance of the G-SIDL approach. We next present the solutions proposed to
overcome both these issues.
4.2.3.3 Local-SIDL (L-SIDL)
Inspired by the SSR approach [66, 91], we consider the smallest social network within
each individual is embedded into. Thereby, we take into account only the set of one-
hop neighbors that each user is connected to. The resulting ego network (defined in
Section 2.7) is used as the input of each user-based model. We refer to this solution as
Local-SIDL (L-SIDL), as we create a local model for each target-user by employing a
DNN for each one of them.
Such a solution can represent a more interpretable and scalable solution if compared
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to G-SIDL. While in the global approach the post-hoc explanation of the results
was blurred by the huge number of inputs, we here restrict our analysis to the nodes
directly connected to the target-user. In such a way, we can better understand whether
and to what extent this subset of nodes influence the target-user. In terms of scalability,
the user-based model offers a more agile solution in terms of time and resource
consumption. In fact, a new user in the OSN requires only (i ) to create a new instance
of L-SIDL to model the new user, and (i i ) to retrain only the L-SIDLs related to the
new user’s friends to update their model by including the new user, which both
represent operations computationally less expensive (in terms of computational time
and resource) than the retraining of the whole G-SIDL. This assessment will be detailed
and discussed in Section 4.2.7.
As an example, Fig. 4.2 shows the L-SIDL related to the target-user u5, whose ego
network is shown in Fig. 2.1a. Also in Fig. 4.2, for the sake of simplicity, we depict a
DNN with only one hidden layer (L = 1), while in our implementation (Section 4.2.6)
we employ multiple hidden layers. Differently from Fig. 4.1, and more in general
from the G-SIDL approach, the number of input nodes of L-SIDL depends only on
the number of target-user’s friends. In fact, each input ui of the DNN displayed in Fig.
4.2 represents a friend of target-user u5. For each action a, input nodes can assume
value 1 if the corresponding friend performed action a before u5, and 0 otherwise.
The output of the DNN yu5,a corresponds to target-user u5, and is equal to 1 if she/he
performed a, and is 0 otherwise. The training is performed by minimizing the binary
cross-entropy loss between yˆu5,a and yu5,a , where yˆu5,a = f ((u1,u2,u3,u4))|Θ) is the
predicted output of the L-SIDL framework. Finally, we utilized the trained model
to predict whether the target-user will perform new activities based only on her/his
active friends Sa,u5 for those activities.
4.2.3.4 Community-SIDL (C-SIDL)
While L-SIDL can offer a more interpretable and scalable solution, the prediction
performance may be affected by the reduced amount of information that each DNN
utilizes. In fact, by splitting the social network into different and isolated ego networks,
we break the G-SIDL into N L-SIDL models, and in turn, we do not exploit and model
the interconnections between the ego-networks. Also, the L-SIDL approach does not
take into account nodes distant more than one hop (e.g., friends of a friend) from the
target-user. Thus, it assumes that the possible influencer nodes are only in the ego
network of the target-user.
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In this subsection, we propose Community-SIDL (C-SIDL), an approach that aims to
solve the trade-off between performance, interpretability, and scalability by embed-
ding users in mesoscale level structures, such as communities, and employing a DNN
architecture for each community. Such an approach, which can be viewed as a combi-
nation of deep learning with network science, offers a solution in-between G-SIDL
and L-SIDL. We move from the totality of the nodes (in G-SIDL) to a smaller subset
(but larger than a ego-network) by splitting the social network into 1≤M ≤N commu-
nities and by employing a DNN for each of them. We refer to this solution as C-SIDL
since each community is mapped into a distinct DNN. The rationale of this approach
is to preserve the social network structure at a lower resolution, as a community can
be considered as a partition of a graph [93], while enhancing the interpretability and
scalability issues. In fact, by deploying M DNNs, instead of one (G-SIDL), we contain
the inefficiency of the G-SIDL in the case of new users. In such a scenario, a new
user in the OSN requires only to retrain the C-SIDL corresponding to the community
she/he belongs to. We aim to partition the network by maximizing the modularity, i.e.,
the density of intra-community edges with respect to inter-community edges. As this
is a NP-hard problem, we make use of a heuristic algorithm. We employ the Louvain
method [37] for its computational efficiency.
The C-SIDL approach opens the door to different solutions by varying the inter-
community connectivity (i.e., the way communities are connected among each other).
For instance, each community can be considered as an independent component
of the graph or as a unit connected with other (linked) communities. Figure 4.3a
shows an example of three connected communities, referred to as C1,C2, and C3. In
Figure 4.3, we show the varying inter-community connectivity of C3 according to the
following approaches:
1. Isolated Communities-SIDL (IC-SIDL): each community is analyzed separately.
As shown in Fig. 4.3b, IC-SIDL does not consider inter-community edges of
community C3. The resulting IC-SIDL architecture is similar to G-SIDL, but the
inputs of the DNN are the only users belonging to C3.
2. Collapsed Communities-SIDL (CC-SIDL): every connected community is con-
sidered as a super node linked to the community C3, as it is depicted in Fig.
4.3c. In this solution, we collapse an entire community into a single input node
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(a) Three connected communities (b) IC-SIDL scenario for community C3
(c) CC-SIDL scenario for community C3 (d) IFC-SIDL scenario for community C3
Figure 4.3: Example of communities and inter-community connectivity
(community node) of the DNN. The resulting CC-SIDL follows the IC-SIDL im-
plementation but includes also the community nodes as input. As an example,
community node C1 (same for C2) acts as an input of the CC-SIDL of C3.
3. Inter-Friendship Communities-SIDL (IFC-SIDL): only users directly connected
to C3 are considered as input of the IFC-SIDL, other than the members within
C3 (as in IC-SIDL). Fig. 4.3d shows an example of two users ( f1, f2) connected to
C3.
4.2.4 OSN Data
For validating and evaluating the SIDL framework, we consider different datasets
from two OSNs. In particular, we focus on scenarios of real-life activities, such as
attending an event or visiting a location. The idea is that a subject might participate in
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an event because she/he sees her/his friends taking that decision, or she/he may visit
a location (e.g., a bar or a restaurant) because some friends have been there before
and suggested her/him that venue. For this reason, we analyze data from Plancast1,
an Event-Based Social Network (EBSN) [160], and Foursquare2, a Location-Based
Social Network (LBSN) [27]. EBSN and LBSN provide remarkable opportunities to
analyze users’ real-world behavior through OSNs. In these scenarios, the set of actions
A is defined by the event participation and location visits in the EBSN and LBSN,
respectively. Thereby, Aui ⊆ A represents the set of events (resp. locations) attended
(resp. visited) by subject ui ∈V , while a subject is considered active for the action a if
she/he decided to participate in (resp. visit) the event (resp. location) a ∈ A.
In this study, we analyze a dataset from Foursquare collected by Bao et al. [27], which
gathers Foursquare check-ins from the cities of New York and Los Angeles. The
first dataset (New York) was collected for 30 months from May 5, 2008, while the
second dataset (Los Angeles) gathered check-ins for 36 months from February 5,
2009. In Foursquare, users can check-in their location through a mobile application,
give recommendations (tips), connect with their friends, and share with them their
experiences. In such a scenario, users have the chance to discover new venues, look
for trend places, and read friends’ reviews. This bundle of information can produce a
social contagion effect, which may affect users’ activity.
We also rely on the EBSN Plancast and, in particular, we use a dataset collected by Liu
et al. [160] for three months (from September to November 2011). Plancast allows users
to subscribe to each other providing direct connections among them. Subscription is
similar to the concept of following on Twitter. Users can directly follow friends’ event
calendars: this mechanism allows a subject to be aware of friends’ interests, event
creation, and participation.
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4 summarize properties and statistics of both the OSNs analyzed
in this study. It should be noticed that we do not model users across the two OSNs
as their IDs have been anonymized before the data release. Thus, it is not possible to
match users from different datasets.
In Figure 4.5, we display the average number of friends that visited (resp. attended) a
given venue (resp. event). As we expected, events involve more friends, and in turn
represent a more direct and expansive form of social interaction, if compared to the
1www.plancast.com
2www.foursquare.com
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Table 4.1: Basic statistics of the OSNs used to test SIDL approaches
Foursquare Plancast
NYC LA
Users |V | 47240 30207 75598
Friendship Relationships |E | 596379 246560 1501618
Average degree 〈k〉 25.25 16.32 39.7
Diameter dmax 10 12 11
Average clustering coefficient 〈C〉 0.14 0.15 0.23
Density D 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
Total number of actions |A | 425692 268102 869200
Total number of venues v 206098 144348 401634
(a) Foursquare (b) Plancast
Figure 4.4: Distribution of the number of users that visited (resp. attended) a venue
(resp. event)
visit of a certain location, which may represent mainly individual behaviors [160].
However, the number of friends that visited a given venue is not negligible and, thus,
we consider this scenario in our study.
4.2.5 Experimental Settings
In this subsection, we describe the data processing and we discuss the training, vali-
dation, and testing phases of SIDL. Each dataset includes information about users’
activity over time and social connections among subjects in the OSN, while no ad-
ditional information or metadata are provided. These data allow us to build (as
explained in Section 4.2.2) the action log Al and the graph G , which represent the
only two inputs required by our framework. In fact, the former is used to keep track of
users’ activity over time and, in combination with the latter, to understand how the
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(a) Foursquare (b) Plancast
Figure 4.5: Average number of friends that visited a given venue (a), and that attended
a certain event (b).
actions propagated between the users. To reduce noise in the dataset and to build,
for each user, a reasonable training and test set, we remove users with less than 10
actions. For Plancast, we restrict our analysis to the US as the majority of the users
attended events organized in this country.
For each subject ui , we consider the set of actions the user performed (Aui ⊆ A) and
we randomly select nui actions not performed in order to consider negative samples,
where nui = |Aui |. It should be noted that, for each user, we consider only the actions
that have been performed by at least one of her/his friends, according to [106].
To limit overfitting and to reduce variability, we utilize a 10-fold cross validation. We
built the folds to preserve the percentage of positive and negative samples for each
subject in the dataset. Each sample (both for training and test) represents an action
performed (or not) by a given target-user. For each action in the training set, we
provide information about target-user’s friends activity along with the ground truth
related to the target-user activity. On the other hand, for the actions in the test set, we
employ only the information related to target-user’s friends activity with the purpose
of inferring whether the target-user performed the action.
4.2.6 SIDL Implementation
This subsection details the implementation of every SIDL approach previously de-
scribed. In each SIDL approach, every input node of the DNN represents a user in
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the OSN. The input node is a binary variable that indicates the activity of a user for a
given action. Inputs are fed into the DNN architecture according to the different SIDL
approach, as explained in Section 4.2.3.
While the input preparation for G-SIDL and L-SIDL is similar and has been already
detailed (in Sections 4.2.3.2 and 4.2.3.3, respectively), some additional clarifications
are needed for the C-SIDL approaches. In C-SIDL every community is mapped into
a different DNN. The different C-SIDL approaches differ from each other in the way
the inter-community links are considered. As an example, Figure 4.3 shows the three
different scenarios for community C3. IC-SIDL, which does not take into account the
inter-community links, follows exactly the G-SIDL implementation but its inputs are
the only nodes belonging to the community under exam (C3 in the example in Fig.
4.3b). On the other side, CC-SIDL and IFC-SIDL consider the inter-community links
in two different ways.
In CC-SIDL, each connected community to C3 is collapsed into a single input node,
named community node. The resulting DNN complies with the IC-SIDL implementa-
tion for the nodes belonging to C3, but also includes the community nodes C1 and C2.
Each community node is employed as an additional member of C3 and is considered
as a friend of the users directly connected (the top right users in the example in Figure
4.3c) to the community node itself. To represent the community node’s activity for a
given action we tested different strategies. We set the community node to (i ) a binary
value, which assumes value 1 if at least one user within the collapsed community
performed the action, (i i ) a binary value, which assumes value 1 if at least 50% of the
users within the collapsed community performed the action, or to (i i i ) a real value
representing the fraction of the users within the collapsed community that performed
the action. Among the three strategies, we used the first approach as it achieved
slightly better results (details on the performance in the next Section). Finally, IFC-
SIDL considers the inter-community friends as additional members of the community
under examination. In the example in Fig. 4.3d, users f1 and f2 are included in the
DNN related to community C3 and considered as friends of the connected nodes.
We implemented the DNNs by following a tower pattern composed of L = 3 layers
with {128,64,32} nodes, respectively. For the Foursquare dataset, we used a fourth
layer of 256 neurons (i.e., L = 4 layers with {256,128,64,32} nodes) as it improved the
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Table 4.2: Grid search for hyperparameters optimization
Accuracy Batch Size Initialization Epochs Optimizer φ j φo
88.7 20 Glorot 25 RMSProp sigmoid sigmoid
88.6 10 Glorot 10 RMSProp sigmoid sigmoid
88.3 20 normal 10 RMSProp ReLU sigmoid
87.8 10 Glorot 10 RMSProp ReLU sigmoid
87.7 10 Glorot 10 Adam sigmoid sigmoid
85.7 10 Glorot 10 Adam ReLU sigmoid
performance with respect to the three layers architecture used for the Plancast dataset.
We tuned hyperparameters performing a grid search on a validation set (10% of the
data). In particular, we examined the following hyperparameters:
• Batch size defines the number of samples used to update the model at each
iteration;
• Initialization of the inter-layer weights;
• Epochs represent the number of times each sample in the dataset is considered
during the training;
• Optimizer indicates the optimization algorithm used to update the network
weights;
• Activation function at the hidden layers φ j and at the output layer φo are the
non-linear function used to activate the neurons over all the network.
The hyperparameter optimization consists of an exhaustive searching through
the following hyperparameters space: batche size = {10,20}, initialization =
{normal,uniform, Glorot}, Epochs = {10,25}, optimizer = {RMSProp, Adam}, ac-
tivation functions φ j = {sigmoid,ReLU}, and φo = {sigmoid,ReLU}. Table 4.2 depicts
the six best results, in terms of accuracy, for the combinations of the above hyperpa-
rameters. Thereby, we employ a sigmoid as activation function (both at the hidden
layers and at the output layer), and we use RMSProp [68] as optimization function.
We train the network in data batches composed of 20 samples for 25 epochs. We
further evaluated the impact of the number of epochs in the performance by testing
the model for 50 and 100 epochs. Despite the gain of about 0.1% (in the case of 100
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epochs), we decided to use 25 epochs for a time efficiency reason, as a larger number
of epochs implies a longer training time. Finally, we apply a dropout technique [217],
with a dropout equal to 0.1, to avoid overfitting.
4.2.7 Evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate the results of the SIDL approaches and we compare
them with two state of the art approaches: The Linear Threshold (LT) model proposed
by Goyal et al. [106], and the Independent Cascade (IC) model of Saito et al. [208].
We use as baseline these two solutions as they offer general models to learn social
influence between users by leveraging only the history of the actions performed by
each subject. In fact, (i ) they do not rely either on specific hand-crafted features
or on topic affinity, which in turn may depend on the OSN analyzed and on the
availability of metadata (e.g., personal attributes), and (i i ) they both take as input only
the action logAl and the social graph G . In a similar way, we focus on a model that
can be generalized to any kind of OSN and, less specifically, to any real-life domain.
Both these approaches rely on two commonly used models in information diffusion,
namely the LT and IC model, which we introduced in Section 2.3. In particular, they
first aim at learning influence probability between users, and then they combine the
social influence model with the diffusion model to predict users’ activity. In [106],
Goyal et al. introduced different metrics to estimate the pairwise influence between
two individuals and proposed a static and dynamic (time-dependent) version of the LT
model. We evaluated all the metrics and variations of the LT model proposed in [106]
and we report the results related to the Discrete Time (DT)-Bernoulli approach as it
achieved better performance if compared to the other metrics. We refer to this solution
as LT-DT indicating the discrete time version of the LT model. On the other hand,
Saito et al. [208] employed the IC model along with the Expectation-Maximization
(EM) algorithm to estimate the influence probability associated with each edge. We
developed this model, here referred to as IC-EM, by minutely following the 2-steps
learning and the experimental setup suggested in their paper [208].
4.2.7.1 Performance Comparison
In Figure 4.6, we compare the performance of these solutions with our proposed
approaches in terms of prediction accuracy. This metric stands for the number of
correctly classified samples over all the samples classified. Results indicate that the
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Figure 4.6: Models performance in terms of accuracy: G-SIDL vs. L-SIDL vs. C-SIDL
(IC-, CC-, and IFC-SIDL) vs. baseline models (LT-DT [106] and IC-EM [208]).
proposed SIDL approaches, G-SIDL, L-SIDL, and C-SIDL, achieve an average accuracy
of 86.6%, 80.1%, and 85.2%, respectively, and outperform baseline algorithms (LT-DT
and IC-EM), which both achieve an average accuracy of 70.0%. Compared to the
baseline classification accuracy, G-SIDL, L-SIDL, and C-SIDL reach an average gain of
23.7%, 14.4%, and 21.7%, respectively.
As we expected, G-SIDL outperforms the local approach, while C-SIDL, with its three
variations (IC-, CC-, and IFC-SIDL), offers a valuable alternative to the global solution.
Three aspects are worth noting:
• IC-SIDL performs better than L-SIDL as it considers the community within the
user is socially embedded, and not only the direct social connections. How-
ever, this solution breaks the connectivity between linked communities, thus,
performs worse if compared to CC-SIDL and IFC-SIDL.
• CC-SIDL slightly overcomes the IC-SIDL accuracy but has a small gain with
respect to L-SIDL. Collapsing an entire community in a unique node over-
simplifies the inter-communities social relationships, but provides additional
information if compared to the IC-SIDL solution.
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(a) Foursquare (b) Plancast
Figure 4.7: Accuracy, TPR, and TNR of SIDL approaches
• IFC-SIDL achieves the best performance among the C-SIDL approaches and
its accuracy closely approaches G-SIDL, highlighting the importance of inter-
community edges in modeling social influence.
To better investigate the performance of our approaches, we examine other binary
classification metrics, such as True Positive Rate (TPR) and True Negative Rate (TNR).
TPR measures the percentage of positive samples that are correctly identified as such,
while TNR is the analog for negative samples, i.e., it measures the percentage of
correctly classified negative instances. In our scenario, these two metrics represent
the ability of the classifier to identify performed actions and not performed actions,
respectively. In Figure 4.7, we compare our approaches using accuracy, TPR, and TNR.
Please note that for the C-SIDL approach we consider IFC-SIDL as it outperforms the
other two C-SIDL solutions (IC-SIDL and CC-SIDL). Overall, we observe that TNR is
higher than TPR in every approach, meaning that our system (slightly) better classifies
negative samples. The difference between TPR and TNR is more pronounced in the
L-SIDL approach, while in C-SIDL and, especially, in G-SIDL the two metrics are
more balanced. Interestingly, the difference between TPR and TNR is less noticeable
in Plancast than in Foursquare, probably because the number of friends per visited
location is significantly lower if compared to Plancast events, as we previously showed
in Figure 4.5, and the model, in turn, is less accurate to classify this kind of activity.
4.2.7.2 Community Analysis
Further, we investigate whether the number of members per community impacts
the prediction performance. For this purpose, we compute the Pearson correlation
coefficient [31] between the accuracy and the number of members per community.
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(a) Foursquare (b) Plancast
Figure 4.8: Intra- and Inter-community activity
The result does not show a statistically significant correlation (ρ=0.3, p-value=0.17
> α=0.05). We then explore whether and to what extent connected communities
share their activities. To accomplish this purpose, for each community, we compare
the actions performed by its members, namely intra-community actions, with those
performed by the members of the inter-connected communities, referred to as inter-
community actions. More specifically, for each community, we compute the fraction
of users that performed a given activity considering (i ) only the members of the
community, and (i i ) considering both the members of the community and of the
inter-connected communities. Figure 4.8 depicts the results for both datasets. As
expected, intra-community actions present higher fractions of users if compared to
the combined (intra- with inter-community) scenario. However, the contribution
provided by the inter-connected communities is not negligible and, according to the
prediction performance, plays a significant role. Interestingly, in Plancast both the
percentage of intra- and inter-community actions is higher with respect to Foursquare,
further highlighting the differences we revealed before. In the Plancast dataset, we
can also note that for some activities every member of the community performed the
action. After further inspection, we recognize that these activities correspond to small
clique events, which involved communities composed of a few members.
4.2.7.3 Scalability
In Table 4.3, we summarize the performance of the three SIDL approaches and com-
pare them in terms of scalability (defined in Section 4.2.1). We measure scalability
by considering the computational time required to train a single DNN in every SIDL
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Table 4.3: Comparison among the three presented approaches in terms of perfor-
mance and scalability
L-SIDL C-SIDL G-SIDL
Accuracy 80.1% 85.2% 86.6%
TPR 74.4% 82.4% 84.3%
TNR 85.9% 88.1% 88.7%
Computational Time t 7.8t 75.1t
# of DNNs N L 1
approach. We sort the table in increasing order of computational time or decreasing
order of number of DNNs employed. The value t , in Table 4.3, is about 42 seconds,
which has been computed by averaging the computational time required to train a
single L-SIDL over the datasets. Although the G-SIDL approach achieves the best
classification performance, it requires a (unique) DNN with a huge number of inputs
(two times the number of nodes in the social network), which is not scalable for a huge
graph. In fact, retraining G-SIDL every time a new user registers to the OSN is time and
resource consuming. On the other side, L-SIDL offers more flexibility and efficiency
as every user is modeled with a different DNN. Therefore, this approach may easily
handle new users in the OSN by creating a DNN for the new user and updating only
the DNNs of the new user’s friends. The input size of each L-SIDL equals the number
of friends of the target-user. Thus, the corresponding DNN is significantly smaller
than the global neural network (G-SIDL). For this reason, the training phase of a single
L-SIDL is, on average, 75 times faster than the G-SIDL. However, the computational
efficiency of the L-SIDL approach is paid in terms of performance. The local solution
breaks the whole social network structure in disconnected ego networks and, thus,
performs poorly (average accuracy of 80.1%) if compared to G-SIDL (average accuracy
of 86.6%).
The trade-off is solved by C-SIDL, which achieves performance close to the G-SIDL
with limited issues in scalability: a new user in the OSN requires only to retrain one
C-SIDL, whose computational time is about 10 times faster than G-SIDL and 8 times
slower compared to L-SIDL. Note that the number M of communities, and in turn the
number of DNNs in C-SIDL, depends on the connections between users in the social
network and on the detection algorithm utilized to extract the communities. As a
consequence, the input size of a C-SIDL depends on the number of members per each
community. It should also be noticed that computational times are averaged over the
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different datasets, and that we run our experiment on a machine with a NVIDIA Tesla
K20 (2496 CUDA cores - 5GB DDR5 RAM), a CPU Intel Xeon E5 2670 with a frequency
of 2.3 GHz, and a 128 GB DDR3 RAM.
4.2.7.4 Interpretability
In Sections 2.6.1 and 4.2.1, we delineated the interpretability issue of DNNs and
of the G-SIDL approach, respectively. In this subsection, we summarize our effort
to provide a more interpretable model with respect to G-SIDL, while preserving its
classification performance. In particular, we analyze whether C-SIDL and L-SIDL
give us a better understanding in the post-hoc explanation of the results (which is
the notion of interpretability used in this study) with respect to G-SIDL. Though the
one-hop neighborhood (ego network) appeared as the straightforward solution to
detect the set of input (nodes) that affected the prediction related to a given user,
the performance related to the L-SIDL approach shows that the ego network alone
is not enough to explain the social influence phenomenon. As we discuss in Section
4.3, mesolevel structures (defined in Section 2.7), such as communities, provide a
significant contribution to the understanding of this phenomenon. Results show
that C-SIDL closely approaches the performance of the general model. Therefore,
the SSR identified by a community better explains the results achieved by G-SIDL if
compared to the SSR built with the ego network only (L-SIDL). In these terms, C-SIDL
provides better interpretability of the global model if compared to L-SIDL. Overall,
we can further explain the gap between L-SIDL and C-SIDL in terms of influential
nodes considered within each social structure. The rationale of L-SIDL is that the most
influential nodes stand in the ego network of each user, while the idea behind C-SIDL
is to consider a larger social structure (i.e., a community), which in turn includes a
larger number of users (not necessarily connected to the target-user) and, therefore,
(additional) potential influencers.
4.2.7.5 SIDL Augmentation
In this subsection, we discuss potential extensions of our proposed approach along
with some preliminary results. In particular, we explore the usage of different deep
learning architectures across our framework. In the current version, SIDL uses feed-
forward neural networks, a class of DNNs in which the flow of information moves
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Table 4.4: Architecture performance in terms of accuracy: Feed-forward vs. LSTM vs.
GRU.
Foursquare Plancast
NYC LA
Feed-forward 89.3% 87.0% 85.1%
LSTM 91.1% 89.2% 85.6%
GRU 86.7% 85.3% 83.3%
forward from the input to the output neurons through the hidden layers. As intro-
duced in Section 2.6.1.1, feedback connections have been extensively used in RNN for
modeling sequential data, such as human activities.
For this reason, we propose to use a RNN architecture in the SIDL approach. We
expect that such a solution might be more beneficial in modeling users actions and
dependencies over time with respect to a feed-forward architecture. In this subsection,
we show some preliminary results obtained employing SIDL with two of the most
commonly used RNNs: Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [126] and Gated Recurrent
Unit (GRU) [64]. More specifically, in this test, we consider G-SIDL as it achieves the
best prediction performance, but the same architecture can be extended to the other
SIDL approaches. In Table 4.4, we compare the results of the three DNN architec-
tures on the two datasets. We observe that LSTM outperforms the GRU solution and
achieves a better accuracy of the feed-forward architecture. Interestingly, the gap is
particularly noticeable in the Foursquare dataset. This may be due to the different
nature of the activity in the two datasets. While an event is a one-shot activity held on
a specific date, the visit of a certain location may occur in distinct days from one user
to another. This hypothesis, with related analysis and a broader exploration of DNN
architectures, will be expanded upon in future work.
4.2.8 Discussion
In this Section, we have shown how social influence modeling can be effectively used
to infer users’ future activities and, in turn, violate their privacy. In particular, to
address RQ 2.1, we have introduced SIDL, a framework that combines deep learning
with network science. SIDL approaches have proven to outperform existing social
influence models by overcoming their limitations. Compared to the performance of
such models, the SIDL approaches, G-SIDL, L-SIDL, and C-SIDL, reach an average
gain of 23.7%, 14.4%, and 21.7%, respectively. Moreover, SIDL allowed us to face
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two typical challenges of deep neural networks: interpretability and scalability. We
have shown that the approach based on mesoscale structures (C-SIDL) provides a
more interpretable solution (in terms of post-hoc explanation of the results), while
maintaining a good trade-off between scalability (in terms of computational time)
and prediction accuracy.
4.3 Community Influence
In Section 4.2, we present SIDL, a framework for modeling social influence, which
leverages dyadic social interactions between users to predict their behavior. In Section
4.3, to answer RQ 2.2, we still aim to learn social influence at the user-level, but we
explore the collective influence that a group of people might have on an individual.
Also, we consider different factors that can impact subjects’ behavior, other than
social relationships. Many works in the literature attempted to figure out the factors
that affect people decisions and actions. We can classify them in three interlaced
categories: physical location, homophily, and social ties.
In Section 4.3, we propose to examine the role that distinct communities, linked to
these factors, play as sources of social influence. Although the ego network is typically
used in the social influence modeling, our hypothesis is that individuals are embedded
in communities not only related to their direct social relationships, but that involve
different and complex forces. To this end, we analyze physical, homophily, and social
communities to evaluate their relation with subjects’ behavior.
To examine the role of these communities in the social influence modeling, we rely
on the EBSN Plancast [160]. The motivation of this choice is related to the concept of
event (defined in 2.8), which represents a collective and agglomerative circumstance
and, thus, perfectly fits the purpose of this study. Differently, LBSNs describe mainly
individual activities [160], thus, they are less relevant for studying group influence, as
further confirmed in Section 4.2.7.2.
4.3.1 Problem Definition
In this subsection, we define the problem and the elements involved in this analysis,
which aims to address RQ 2.2. We indicate with V the set of users and with A the
set of events in our dataset. We denote Au as the set of events attended by u ∈ V .
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Further, we define the centroid of interests cu , which represents the user’s area of
interests based on the locations of the attended events. Given that our dataset does
not include any information related to the users’ home location, we evaluate cu
to assign a representative geo-location to the user. This centroid is expressed as a
pair of latitude and longitude coordinates. We compute cu in two steps. First, we
detect and remove the outliers from the list of coordinates in Au , according to the
Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) measure. Second, we calculate cu by averaging the
coordinates of the remaining events in Au .
We then define three graphs related to three interlaced factors affecting human behav-
ior, i.e., physical location, homophily, and social ties. The rationale is to characterize
connections among OSN users by capturing their common (i ) visited places, (i i )
interests, and (i i i ) social relationships. Based on this idea, let SG be Social Graph,
SG = (V ,Es), where Es is the set of edges connecting users in the social network. The
generic pair of users (u, v) is referred to as friends if (u, v) ∈ Es , and we denote with
Fu the set of u’s friends. We denote PG = (V ,Ep ) as the complete Physical Graph,
where each pair of users (i , j ) is connected by an edge weighted by a function of
the geographical distance between the users’ centroid of interest. We utilize a Gaus-
sian kernel as a function to transform the geo-distance into a measure of similarity:
High similarity between a pair of users indicates a short distance between their cen-
troids of interest. Finally, we define the complete Homophily Graph HG = (V ,Eh),
whose edges Eh are weighted by an interest similarity measure defined as follows:
w HGu,v = (|Au ∩ Av |/|Au ∪ Av |). This metric indicates the number of common events
attended by each pair of generic users (u, v), normalized by the joint set of attended
events. It represents how similar two users are in terms of interests.
We partition these three graphs in order to create a set of communities within each
graph: Social Communities (SC ) for SG , Physical Communities (PC ) for PG , and
Homophily Communities (HC ) for HG . The purpose is to group together users that
have common social ties, which are in physical proximity, and which share interests,
respectively. Similarly to Section 4.2.3.4, we extract communities so as to maximize the
modularity and we utilize the Louvain method [37] for its computational efficiency.
Finally, for each user u ∈V , we define the ego network eg ou , where the ego is u and the
other nodes are the alter, i.e., u’s friends. As every edge in the ego network represents a
social tie between the ego and the alter, we extract eg ou from SG . Thus, eg ou is a user-
centered subgraph of SG . Overall, we can see each user u ∈V as embedded in the ego
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network eg ou and in three different communities, each one representing a distinct
characteristic of the individual in three dimensions: social (ties), space (physical
location), and interests (homophily). We denote the three communities within each
user u is embedded as SCu , PCu , HCu . We point out that eg ou and SCu capture two
different social structures. The first includes only nodes directly connected to the
user (e.g., friends), the second includes additional nodes (e.g., friends of a friend),
according to the results of the Louvain partitioning method, and represents a larger
social structure within the user is settled.
In this Section, we consider communities of different nature to evaluate their impact
on human behavior and, in particular, on influence processes. More specifically, we
aim to examine the role of physical, homophily, and social communities as sources of
social influence and evaluate their relation with subjects’ behavior. Differently from
Section 4.2, here we explore the influence exerted by a group of people as a whole
entity. Therefore, we analyze each community as a single source of social influence,
instead of measuring influence probability among each pair of subjects. The rationale
of this approach is based on the idea that subjects may follow the collective behavior
of individuals (i ) living in their physical area, (i i ) with common interests, or (i i i ) in
their social community.
4.3.2 Methodology
In this subsection, we present the methodology we employed to analyze the social
influence phenomenon with respect to the communities presented above. From now
on, we will use the term group to indicate both the three communities and the ego
network. To analyze the influence exerted by each group on a given user, we rely on
the activity performed by the user and the group members as well. In particular, for
each event e attended by u, we compute the group participation feature pge (u) as
follows:
pge (u)=
|{i ∈ g |e ∈ Ai }|
|g | , (4.1)
where g ∈ {eg ou ,SCu ,PCu , HCu} and i ∈ V . This feature indicates the number
of users in group g that attended event e, normalized by the dimension of the
group. In such a way, we build, for each user, a dataset Du , where each row rep-
resents an event attended by u and is a 4-tuple composed of the four features
{peg oue (u), p
SCu
e (u), p
PCu
e (u), p
HCu
e (u)}. Each feature represents a measure of group
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participation in an event. A high value indicates that most users in the group took part
in the event. The idea is that when a subject sees that most of the group members have
confirmed their participation in an event she/he may be more willing to participate.
To test this intuition, we try to predict user participation in social events based on
group participation features. It should be noticed that our primary goal is not to
find the best algorithm to perform the prediction, but to show that the communities
we identified above influence human behavior and can be used to predict subjects’
decisions. We rely upon supervised machine learning algorithms to infer whether a
user participated in an event according to group participation. We frame this task
as a classification problem, where the target T is a Boolean variable indicating user
participation in the event and the attributes are the group participation features in
the dataset Du . However, this dataset includes only the events attended by u. To
make the dataset balanced and, in turn, to infer also negative instances (i.e., the user
does not participate in the event), we also consider n events not attended by u, where
n = |Au |. We select the n closest events to the centroid of interests cu . For each event,
we compute the four features pge (u), as in Eq. (4.1). Finally, the balanced dataset
Bu includes 2n events, equally distributed between positive and negative instances,
where each row is composed of four features {peg oe (u), p
SC
e (u), p
PC
e (u), p
HC
e (u)} and a
target T . Notice that, from now on, we will indicate the features as {eg o,SC ,PC , HC },
to simplify the reading.
4.3.3 Evaluation
We perform the classification on a per-user basis, i.e., by considering each user sep-
arately. In order to limit overfitting and to reduce variability, we utilize a 10-fold
cross-validation to split the dataset Bu into training and test set. We build the folds
so as to preserve the percentage of attended events in the dataset. To perform the
classification task, we employ three machine learning algorithms: Decision Tree (DT),
Support Vector Machine (SVM), and DNN.
In Table 4.5, we report the classification performance related to these three ap-
proaches, in terms of accuracy, precision, and recall. It is noticeable how SVM and
DNN outperform DT, especially in terms of accuracy and precision. We decide to
continue our analysis by utilizing SVM due to its computational efficiency.
We now investigate the relevance of each group (both communities and the ego
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Table 4.5: Classifier performance
Classifier DT SVM DNN
Accuracy 77% 81% 81%
Precision 74% 84% 85%
Recall 72% 76% 75%
Table 4.6: Performance utilizing one fixed feature
Feature eg o SC PC HC
Accuracy 77% 77% 77% 76%
Precision 81% 81% 82% 82%
Recall 72% 71% 69% 67%
Table 4.7: Prediction performances comparison: all features vs. one fixed feature vs.
feature selection
all features one fixed feature feature selection
Accuracy 81% 77% 80%
Precision 84% 82% 84%
Recall 76% 70% 76%
network) in subjects’ behavior. First, we try to evaluate our method utilizing only
one feature among {eg o,SC ,PC , HC }. The goal is to understand whether one of the
group features can be used to infer users’ activities, without performance loss. In
Table 4.6, we show the classification performance for each group participation feature
taken singularly. It can be noticed that none of the results approaches the previous
performance (SVM in Table 4.5), where all the features were considered. The ego
network alone is not sufficient to achieve such results. This proves that also SC , PC ,
and HC are relevant in this analysis and corroborates our hypothesis.
Second, per each user, we select only one specific feature according to a feature
selection algorithm. We utilize the concept of mutual information to select the feature
that contributes most to the output variable. Table 4.7 compares the performance of
the three described approaches: all the group features (SVM results in Table 4.5), one
fixed group feature per every user (average results of Table 4.6), and one group feature
per user based on the feature selection algorithm. Interestingly, feature selection
closely approaches the performance obtained utilizing all the features. We notice
that the selected group features are equally distributed among the users, i.e., each
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feature is selected for almost 25% of the users: Certain users are mainly influenced
by their physical community, some others by their social community, some by their
homophily community, and others by their direct social relationships, i.e., their ego
network. This evidence confirms the importance of all the four groups, and it further
validates our hypothesis. In fact, each community is differently significant for the
users and each of them has a reference influence group, which is more correlated with
her/his actions. In the next subsection, we explore the relation between each of these
groups and their relevance in terms of influence strength.
4.3.4 Behavioral Phenotypes
To investigate the role that groups have in influencing users’ behavior, we characterize
each user u with respect to the four group features pge (u). For this purpose, we utilize
Du (as described in Sect. 4.3.2), and we compute the average of the features p
g
e (u)
over all the events that u attended. We denote this value as group influence i gu , which
is defined as:
i gu =
1
|Au |
∑
e∈Au
pge (u), (4.2)
where g ∈ {eg o,SC ,PC , HC }. Thereby, each user is identified by four features, each
one of them representing the degree of influence the group has in the user participa-
tion history.
Our aim now is to understand if there exists any relation between these features over
all the users under investigation. We start analyzing the relation of the ego network
with the three communities. Figures 4.9a, 4.9b, and 4.9c relate i eg ou with the group
influence values of the other three groups. Each point in the figures represents a
user. The y-axis indicates the group influence values related to the ego network
parameter, while the x-axis changes with the group under inspection. We observe
scattered correlation patterns between the ego network feature and the other three
group influence features (i SCu , i
PC
u , i
HC
u ). As expected, the strongest correlation can
be observed between i eg ou and i
SC
u , as the ego network is a subgraph of the SG . We
then evaluate the combination of the three group influence features related to the
communities, as shown in Figs. 4.9d, 4.9e, and 4.9f. Every Fig. presents similar
patterns among each other, but different distributions and stronger correlations with
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Figure 4.9: Correlation between group influence features
respect to the figures above. From Figs. 4.9d, 4.9e, and 4.9f, it can also be noticed
the presence of structures that indicate classes of correlation between every pair of
features.
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Figure 4.10: Group influence features in a 3-D space: Each color distinguishes a finger
To further investigate and to better understand these structures, we observe and
evaluate the three group influence features in a three-dimensional space, as depicted
in Fig. 4.10a. To minimize visual clutter in the 3-D visualization, we do not plot
users with values close to zero. From Fig. 4.10a, we can clearly detect structures
that look like five fingers. These fingers show a three-fold correlation between the
group influence features. This correlation further confirms the interdependence
among the three driving factors of human behavior considered in this study, i.e., social
relationships, physical location, and homophily. Every user in a finger has the same
type of behavior in terms of percentage of influence among the communities. In
fact, the ratios between feature values are constant over the finger. This unexpected
clustered pattern shows ratios between features that do not vary inR3, but that assume
discrete values in the three-dimensional space. It should be noticed that these fingers
overlap with each other when projected onto a 2-D plane, thus, it is possible to
recognize only two fingers per plot in Figs. 4.9d, 4.9e, 4.9f.
We observe that each finger can reasonably be conceived as a line passing through
the origin. To cluster together points on the same finger, we convert the Cartesian
coordinates to spherical ones (r,θ,φ) and we project each point on the surface of a
unit sphere. This procedure reveals five separate clusters, as depicted in Fig. 4.10b.
In such a way, only θ and φ are needed to distinguish the points on the five fingers.
We utilize the k-means algorithm to perform the partitioning. The number of clusters
k = 5 has been chosen according to the number of visible fingers. Clustering results
are shown in Figs. 4.10a and 4.10b. The colors in the plots distinguish each finger and
reveal five classes of users, which from now on we will call fingers.
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Figure 4.11: Group influence features in a 3-D space: Each color distinguishes a class
of influence
Furthermore, we propose to cluster users according to the overall level of influence
they experienced by jointly considering the group influence features. We aim to parti-
tion users in three clusters based on whether they were subject to “low”, “medium”, or
“high” degree of social influence. We refer to these partitions as influence classes. We
use the k-means algorithm (k = 3) to group the users into these classes based on the
group influence features (i SCu , i
PC
u , i
HC
u ). The results are depicted in Fig. 4.11, which
includes also users with group influence feature values close to zero (differently from
Fig. 4.10a). Red points represent users highly influenced by the groups, green points
indicate the low influence class, while blue points represent the class of users with
medium degree of social influence.
The two partitions (i.e., fingers and classes of influence) presented above reflect two
different properties in the spherical coordinates (r,θ,φ). Each user is characterized by
a specific combination of the three features, with the radial variable r characterizing
the overall level of social influence, and the angular variables (θ,φ) describing specific
ratios between pairs of community-features. The level of social influence is deter-
mined by many factors related to the users, e.g., involvement in the communities,
personal preferences, social relationships, and geographic location. As a consequence,
we observe a distribution of values between a minimum and a maximum with a broad
dispersion around the mean value. We would have expected a similar distribution
also for the angular variables. Instead, we observe a multimodal distribution com-
posed of a small number of centroids, i.e., the five fingers, with a narrow distribution
around each of them. These statistical patterns are probably a clue of some inter-
esting sociological and psychological factors driving human behavior. This result
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Table 4.8: Performances based on classes of influence
average low medium high
Accuracy 80% 72% 82% 87%
Precision 80% 71% 82% 88%
Recall 71% 57% 73% 82%
Table 4.9: Performances based on fingers
average f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
Accuracy 78% 80% 78% 78% 77% 79%
Precision 79% 80% 75% 83% 74% 82%
Recall 67% 67% 69% 68% 65% 66%
confirms that subjects’ behavior can be described by a limited number of behavioral
phenotypes [195]. To our knowledge, this is the first study that proves the existence of
behavioral phenotypes related to the social influence phenomenon.
4.3.5 Activity Prediction based on Behavioral Classes
Finally, we propose to utilize the classes described above (both fingers and influence
classes) to predict users’ behavior, in terms of event participation. More specifically,
we aim to exploit the activity information of class members to infer the activity of
other users belonging to the same class. Notice that with the term class we refer
both to fingers and influence classes, which have been both defined in Section 4.3.4.
We treat each class separately, building a unique model for each cluster of users. In
particular, we utilize a subset of the class members in the learning process and the
remaining members in the testing phase. We employ the same features used in 4.3.3
and, also in this scenario, we use a 10-fold cross-validation. Table 4.8 and Table 4.9
report the prediction results related to the influence classes (low, medium, high) and
fingers ( f1, f2, f3, f4, f5), respectively. As a baseline, to be compared with these results,
we evaluate the prediction performance considering all the users as belonging to the
same class. This results in an accuracy of 72%, a precision of 75%, and a recall of 66%.
We can observe that:
• The highly influenced class achieves the best performance. This is reasonable
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Table 4.10: Performance of the prediction based on behavioral classes
average low medium high
Accuracy 82% 74% 83% 89%
Precision 84% 75% 86% 92%
Recall 79% 73% 78% 85%
and it was also expected because every feature is a measure of social influence
and, thus, they fit highly influenceable users. For the same reason, the low
influence class performs poorly compared to the other two classes of influence.
• Fingers do not exhibit the same behavior of influence classes. There is no
finger that outperforms the others. This is understandable because every finger
represents a class of correlation, and as such, it includes also users belonging to
the low influence class.
• The baseline result is close to the performance related to the fingers. It appears
that predictions in finger classes get perturbed from users belonging to different
influence classes.
These considerations gave us the idea to combine the 3 classes of influence and
the 5 fingers in 3× 5 sub-classes, named as behavioral classes. In such a way we
expect to take benefits from both partitions. The results, reported in Table 4.10,
confirm our intuition. The behavioral classes outperform all the previous results.
The improvement is also reflected in the influence classes: all of them achieve better
performance with respect to the outcomes in Table 4.8. This enhancement is due to
the further partitioning introduced with the fingers, which allows similar users to be
grouped together according to the two properties described in Section 4.3.4.
Overall, we showed how users’ activity can be predicted based only on their behavioral
class. In fact, in this approach, we do not count on the activity history of the user,
while we rely only on the information related to the members of her/his behavioral
class. This knowledge has also more predictive power if compared to users’ personal
data (Table 4.7) and raises significant privacy concerns, which will be discussed in
Section 4.4.
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4.3.6 Discussion
To answer RQ 2.2, in this Section, we have investigated the impact of different fac-
tors on social influence. In particular, we have evaluated the collective influence of
physical, homophily, and social communities on users’ behavior. Our results have
demonstrated the ego network alone is not sufficient to model social influence as
other factors play a relevant role in human behavior. We have shown that subjects are
also affected by the collective behavior of individuals who (i ) live in their geographical
area, (i i ) have similar interests, or (i i i ) are in their social community.
4.4 Social Influence and Privacy
The findings obtained throughout this Chapter opens the door to necessary consid-
eration and discussion on users’ privacy in OSNs and, in particular, on the relation
between social influence and privacy. The results described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3
showed that social influence modeling can be conveniently used as a means to infer
individuals’ behavior and, in turn, violate their privacy. Users’ activity and behavior, in
turn, can represent sensible information, which a subject may not be willing to share
in some (or future) instances. Although users may not disclose such information,
we showed that their privacy is not only in their hands, as the availability of public
information in OSN acts as a proxy to predict their behavior. As an example, we can
consider the case of a generic user that, after sharing her/his data in the OSN for a
certain period of time, decides to stop releasing information about her/his activities
on the platform. In such a case, if her/his friends keep sharing their activity in the OSN,
a (previously trained) social influence model can be used to infer the undisclosed
activity of the user.
To further investigate this argument, we repeat our experiments in a different setting.
We evaluate the prediction accuracy of SIDL by varying the probability p that each
individual’s friend shares the information about a given activity, i.e., if a friend per-
formed a certain activity, we exploit that knowledge with probability p. In this analysis,
we use the G-SIDL approach as we are mainly interested in exploring the privacy leak-
age in OSNs rather than focusing on the interpretability or scalability of the model.
In Figure 4.12, we depict the accuracy of our model at varying p. Diverse aspects
are worthy of consideration. There is a noticeable gap between the performance in
Plancast and Foursquare. This is likely due to a higher involvement of friends in a
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Figure 4.12: SIDL prediction accuracy at varying sharing probability p
social event compared to a visit in a certain location, as we showed in Section 4.2.
Further, we can observe that our model, on average, is able to correctly classify about
70% of users’ activities in case of p = 0.5. This result further highlights the weakness
of data privacy in social platforms: with only 50% of available information from users’
friends, we are able to classify around 70% of their activities. Such findings corroborate
our hypothesis by suggesting that users’ information domain is not only confined to
what they deliberately share.
To further support our claim, we focus on the results in Section 4.3.5, which show an
interesting, and possibly more alarming, scenario. The model presented in Section
4.3 allowed us to discover behavioral classes that group together users with similar
behaviors. In Section 4.3.5, we employ such classes to train a machine learning model
by using information from a subset of users belonging to a certain behavioral class and
test it on another subset of users belonging to the same behavioral class. Basically, we
use the activity information of the members of a class to predict the future activities
of other members of the same class. Results show that, by following this approach,
users’ activities can be accurately predicted. In particular, the information provided
by other users belonging to the same class has even more predictive power than
the activity history of the users themselves. This finding further highlights the data
privacy problem and indicates that the issue concerns the entire society. As Garcia [97]
claims, we need to stop thinking that the decision to keep information private is
under individual control and realize that information secrecy may be affected by the
decisions of others.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we explore the privacy leakage in OSNs in relation to the social influ-
ence phenomenon. To respond to RQ 2.1, we present SIDL, a framework that combines
deep learning with network science for modeling social influence and forecasting
human real-life activities. We validate and evaluate our approach using datasets
from Plancast (an EBSN) and Foursquare (a LBSN). Our experiments reveal that SIDL
approaches outperform state of the art baselines achieving an average prediction
accuracy of 86.6% (G-SIDL), 80.1% (L-SIDL), and 85.2% (C-SIDL). We show that the
opportune combination of network science with deep learning can address both the
interpretability and scalability issues while maintaining accurate performance. In
fact, C-SIDL provides a post-hoc explanation of the results by identifying a subset of
users, which are mainly responsible for the prediction outcome, using social network
mesolevel structures. Moreover, C-SIDL closely approaches the performance accuracy
of the G-SIDL approach, also providing a more scalable model.
To address RQ 2.2, we show that the ego network alone is not sufficient to explain the
social influence phenomenon as other groups, such as physical, homophily, and social
communities, are also relevant sources of influence. In fact, our results demonstrate
that users are differently affected by the collective behavior of subjects that live close to
them, that share the same interests, and that are in their social proximity. According to
these factors, we discover a finite number of behavioral classes, which group together
users with similar characteristics. These classes can be powerfully exploited to infer
users’ activities using only the information of other members (not necessarily friends
or acquaintances) that belong to the same behavioral class, further highlighting the
privacy leakage in OSNs.
Overall, the results of this Chapter demonstrate how influence modeling can be used
to infer individual undisclosed activities and corroborate the idea that users’ privacy
also depends on influence dynamics. This fact highlights the weakness of privacy on
online platforms and raises privacy concerns that regard our society as a whole.
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Detection of Manipulation Campaigns
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, we analyzed social influence, a fundamental factor driving human behav-
ior. We showed that an interested party can infer users’ undisclosed actions and violate
their privacy by modelling influence strength among them. This, beyond confirming
privacy leakages in OSNs, highlights how social relationships and interactions can
affect individuals’ decisions. The concept that the interplay among users can shape
peoples’ behavior and belief has been used for other malicious purposes to a large
extent. Various studies have discussed the role of social influence in the spreading of
information raising awareness about the risk of mass manipulation of public opinion.
Examples of OSN manipulation can be found in a variety of contexts, ranging from
politics to public health. In the political context, manipulation campaigns have been
creating significant concerns for democracy and fairness of political elections. In this
context, the 2016 Brexit referendum and the 2016 US Presidential election represent
recent remarkable instances of OSN manipulation [9, 21, 36, 71, 130, 131, 239].
Since then, OSN service providers have been increasing their efforts to suspend ma-
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licious actors, e.g., bots and trolls (both described in Section 2.4), and maintain a
healthy conversation on their platforms. However, malicious activity in OSNs has
not entirely stopped: Bots and trolls are still active online [19, 20, 134, 167] and play
a pivotal role in manipulation and misinformation campaigns globally. In fact, the
detection of such malicious actors in coordinated campaigns is still an open problem
for the research community [57, 87, 232]. In particular, bots have been becoming in-
creasingly sophisticated to resemble human appearance and, in turn, avoid detection,
while the automated identification of troll accounts has not found any established
solutions yet. To tackle these problems, in this Chapter, we aim to respond to the
following RQs:
RQ 3.1: How are social bots evolving to mimic human behavior and avoid detection?
RQ 3.2: What are the strategies implemented by bots to manipulate OSN users and are
those strategies effective?
RQ 3.3: In a analogous way to the detection of bots, is it possible to implement an auto-
mated approach for the identification of troll accounts in OSNs?
Along these research directions, the main objective of this Chapter is to examine the
activity of malicious users with the final objective of improving their detection and
adapting effective countermeasures. For this purpose, we examine the online behavior
of bots and trolls during different political elections in the US. More specifically:
• To address RQ 3.1, we investigate the evolution of bots over the last two US
election events, i.e., the 2016 Presidential election and the 2018 Midterms, with
the objective of recognizing their scheme to mimic human users and escape
detection [168].
• To respond to RQ 3.2, we aim to uncover the strategies implemented by bots for
engaging with humans and measure their effectiveness in the latest US election,
i.e., the 2018 Midterms [167].
• To tackle RQ 3.3, we analyze the activity of a set of (publicly identified) Russian
trolls during the 2016 US Presidential election to characterize their behavior
and propose an approach for their automated detection [169].
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The contribution of these analyses is two-fold. First, the purpose of the study on bots
is to keep the pace of such malicious accounts in order to provide insights that can
inform actionable policies for adapting existing countermeasures for their detection.
Second, the investigation related to troll accounts aims to build an automated tool for
their identification, which nowadays is far from being effective. Notice that we focus
on voting events in the US as the 2016 Presidential election represents the first widely
recognized case of manipulation campaign in OSNs, where the activity of both trolls
and bots have also been unveiled by government bodies (e.g., the US Congress). It
is, therefore, of paramount importance to study the evolution and the strategies of
malicious actors that interfere in such events to prevent and mitigate their activity in
future occurrences.
This Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we examine the evolution of bot
accounts between the 2016 and 2018 US elections. Section 5.3 studies bots’ strategy
to interact with humans also focusing on their political leaning. In Section 5.4, we
introduce and present an approach based on Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) to
detect trolls in OSNs.
5.2 Social Bots Evolution
Social bots, due to their scalable nature, represent a major concern in the fight against
OSNs manipulation [38, 178, 213, 231], as further demonstrated by the recent suspen-
sion of millions of compromised accounts by Facebook1 and Twitter2. Despite the
attempts from OSN providers to suspend suspected, malicious accounts, the pres-
ence of social bots does not show any sign of decline [70, 242]. In such a scenario,
detecting and keeping the pace of increasingly sophisticated malicious accounts is
needed to build and adapt effective countermeasures. For this purpose and, more
specifically, to address RQ 3.1, we aim to study the evolution of bots’ strategy to mimic
human users and avoid detection. Also, understanding how human users deal with
the manipulation attempts of these automated accounts is extremely important to
stop manipulation campaigns and raise awareness of such peril.
To explore the evolution of both bot and human users, in this Section, we monitor
the activity of Twitter accounts engaged in the political discussion during the last two
US voting events. We identify bots and characterize their activity in contrast with
1https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/23/tech/facebook-transparency-report/index.html
2https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44682354
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humans. In the next subsection, we describe the methodology employed to collect
the data, detect bots, and analyze the strategy and evolution of bot accounts over the
two voting events.
5.2.1 Methodology
In this subsection, we detail the tools and methodologies used to detect and analyze
bots’ activities on Twitter during the last two US elections.
5.2.1.1 Data Collection and Processing
We capture the political discussion on Twitter by gathering election-related posts
(i.e., tweets) during the two election periods through the Twitter API using a set of
keywords as a filter. Different keywords have been selected per each election. For
the 2016 US Presidential Election, we make use of the dataset collected in [36], which
represents a benchmark in the research community. Tweets have been collected from
September 16, 2016 to October 21, 2016 by using the following 23 keywords: #elec-
tion2016, #elections2016, #tcot, #p2, #hillaryclinton, #donaldtrump, #presidentialde-
bate, #debates2016, #imwithher, #trump2016, #nevertrump, #neverhillary, #trump-
pence16, #hillary, #trumpwon, #debate, #trump, #garyjohnson, #jillstein, #jillnothill,
#debatenight, #debates, #VPDebate. Overall, 42.1 million tweets generated from
5.9 million users have been gathered. For the 2018 US Midterms, tweets have been
collected from October 6, 2018 to November 19, 2018 using the following keywords:
#2018midtermelections, #2018midterms, #elections, #midterm, and #midtermelec-
tions. As a result, 2.6 million tweets from 997,406 users have been gathered.
In this study, we consider those users who are present in both the datasets to perform
a comparative analysis between the two election periods. The rationale is to analyze
the evolution of human and bot activity, behavior, and interplay. Thereby, we consider
the 278,181 accounts that published tweets both in 2016 and 2018. This subset of
users represents a continuum between the two election conversations, other than the
core of the online discussion. In fact, these users were involved in 54% and 65% of the
tweets collected in 2016 and 2018, respectively. To examine the same time window for
the two voting events, data from the two datasets have been filtered considering only
tweets ranging from the month before the election to the day following the election.
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The 2016 US Presidential election occurred on November 8, 2016, while the 2018
Midterms occurred on November 6, 2018. The filtering results in 8,383,611 tweets
from 2016 and 660,296 from 2018, originating in total from 244,699 users.
5.2.1.2 Bots Detection
One of the most important tasks for the uncovering and understanding of OSN ma-
nipulation is the identification of automated accounts, i.e., bots. While increasingly
sophisticated techniques keep emerging [145], in this study, we rely upon Botometer
(presented in Section 2.4), a publicly-available machine learning-based tool main-
tained by Indiana University [69, 231, 242] to detect automated accounts on Twitter.
For each analyzed user, Botometer outputs a score, namely bot score, which ranges
from 0 to 1. The lower is the score, the higher is the probability that the user is
human. Prior studies used 0.5 as a threshold to separate humans from bots. However,
according to the re-calibration introduced in Botometer v3 [242], along with the
emergence of increasingly more sophisticated bots, we here use a bot score threshold
equal to 0.3 (i.e., a user is labeled as a bot if the score is above 0.3). This threshold
corresponds to the same level of algorithmic sensitivity of a score equal to 0.5 in prior
versions of Botometer (cf. Fig. 5 from [242]).
Botometer allows us to assign a score to the ∼245K accounts. We performed such
examination on January 2019. According to Botometer, 12.6% of the scored accounts
were classified as bots, 86.1% as humans, while the remaining 1.3% of the accounts
were not found on Twitter (indicating users that have deleted their account, have been
suspended for violation of the Twitter rules, or have been quarantined by Twitter for
further verification). The percentage of discovered bots (12.6%) represent a consistent
result with respect to previous studies, e.g., the analysis of the 2016 US Presidential
election [36].
5.2.1.3 Sentiment Analysis
To characterize the emotional content generated by both humans and bots, we rely
upon sentiment analysis. More specifically, we employ SentiStrength [226] to map
each tweet to the sentiment it expresses. SentiStrength is a lexicon-based approach
that is conceived for OSNs text analysis. Lexicon-based algorithms are based on
sentiment lexicons, dictionary of emotions where words are attributed to a given
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sentiment strength. SentiStrength attributes a numerical score of sentiment intensity.
In particular, it returns two sentiment strengths for determining the level of positive
and negative sentiment, which range from 1 to 5 (with 5 being the greatest strength).
Overall, we are interested in the total sentiment, thus, we subtract the negative senti-
ment from the positive one. Thereby, the final score ranges from -4 (most negative)
to 4 (most positive). As an example, the sentence “I am happy today even though
it is raining” has a positive strength equal to 2 and a negative strength equal to -1.
Therefore, the total sentiment is positive (+1).
5.2.1.4 Granger Causality
To investigate the interplay between humans and bots, we evaluate whether human
interaction with bots can be predicted by leveraging the volume of bots activity. For
this purpose, we use the Granger causality test [110] on the time series representing
the volume of shared content of these two classes of users.
More in general, Granger causality is used to determine whether time series X can be
used to predict time series Y. Granger causality postulates that X “Granger-causes” Y if
the predictions of future values of Y based on the combination of the past values of X
with the past values of Y are better than the predictions of Y based only on the past
values of Y. This holds true unless also the reverse (Y Granger-causes X) is verified. In
such a case, no conclusion can be drawn. We further apply a differentiation to remove
seasonal effects and, then, we tested the stationary time series. The autoregression
of Y is augmented by lagged values of X and those individually significant (t-statistic)
that increase the explanatory power of the regression (F-test).
5.2.2 Results of the Analysis
In this subsection, we discuss the results of our study. Based on the collected data, we
perform an analysis of the evolution of bot and human accounts over the two election
periods considered in this investigation. We first examine the temporal dynamics and
the volume of the content shared by human and bot accounts. Then, we focus on bots’
strategy to avoid detection and, finally, on their interaction with humans.
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Figure 5.1: Posting inter-time for bots and humans
Table 5.1: Volume (in percentage) of sharing activities of humans and bots in the two
election periods
Humans Bots
2016 2018 2016 2018
Original Tweet 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.15
Retweet 0.76 0.72 0.83 0.79
Reply 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.03
Mention 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03
5.2.2.1 Temporal dynamics
We explore bot and human dynamics by measuring the time lag between consecutive
sharing activities (i.e., tweets). Figure 5.1 displays the inter-time tweet distribution
comparing bot and human users in the 2016 and 2018 elections. Notably, in the
2016 election, the distribution of bots’ tweet activity largely differs from the humans’
distribution3. The discrepancy is particularly relevant in the time range between 10
minutes and 3 hours, consistent with other findings [197]: in 2016, bots shared content
at a higher rate with respect to human users. On the other hand, in the 2018 Midterms,
inter-time distributions are similar, suggesting that bots have been refined to emulate
human timing.
To better understand the impact of each type of sharing activity on this result, we
disentangle Twitter posts in original tweets (i.e., original content generated by users),
retweets (i.e., re-share of the original content generated by other users), replies (i.e.,
response to a post), and mentions (i.e., involvement of other users in a post). Figure 5.2
3Note that, to validate our findings, we repeated this evaluation at varying bot score threshold
(from 0.3 to 0.7) with no significant changes on the results.
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(a) Original tweet (b) Retweet
(c) Reply (d) Mention
Figure 5.2: Inter-time distribution of the different sharing activities for bots and
humans in 2016
depicts the inter-time distribution of the above sharing activities in the 2016 election,
while no relevant discrepancy can be noticed in these sharing activities in the 2018
Midterms. From Figure 5.2, it is noticeable that the inter-time distributions of original
tweets (Fig. 5.2a) and retweets (Fig. 5.2b) present the two principal gaps between
humans and bots in 2016. This finding is in line with the established bots’ strategy
consisting of overwhelming online platforms with a high volume of original tweets
and retweets, as shown in previous studies [36, 86]. The fact that such gaps are not
present in the distributions related to the 2018 Midterms election further confirms
that bots have been ameliorated to mimic human behavior and escape detection.
5.2.2.2 Activity Volume
To further investigate the nature of the difference in the temporal dynamics, we mea-
sure the volume of each sharing activity in the two election periods. In Table 5.1, we
show the percentage of each activity over all the content shared by bots and humans.
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It can be noticed that both humans and bots significantly diminished the amount of
retweets in the 2018 Midterms (t-test results: t (5,840,537)= 64.6, p < .001 for humans
and t (3,083,630)= 42.4, p < .001 for bots), while the percentage of mentions does not
exhibit a noticeable variation in both groups of account. Additionally, humans have
doubled the number of replies (t-test: t (5,840,537)= 152.3, p < .001) in 2018 and bots
generated more original tweets (t-test: t (3,083,630)= 29.8, p < .001) in 2018 than in
2016.
The growing propensity of humans to discuss a post (either positively or negatively)
instead of simply re-sharing the content generated by other accounts, represents an
encouraging finding. This insight acquires even more significance considering the
cost related to each form of interaction. While retweeting is a one-click operation,
with a relatively small human cost in terms of time and effort, a reply requires a larger
undertaking. From the perspective of bots, a retweet can be programmatically exe-
cuted with one command line; however, programmatically composing a meaningful
reply requires the use of sophisticated natural language models, such as those based
on DNNs [198], which often require significant computing resources for training.
Interestingly, although bots increased the number of original tweets (with respect to
the 2016 election) and, comparably to humans, reduced the number of retweets, the
gap in the inter-time distribution in 2018 appears to be reduced, suggesting a more
cautious broadcasting strategy adopted by bots. To shed light on this result and, more
in general, to explore the evolution of the actions of both humans and bots on Twitter,
we now analyze separately the three sharing activities that showed more variation
between the two election periods, i.e., original tweet, retweet, and reply.
5.2.2.3 Original Tweet Activity
As far as original tweets are concerned, we found an anomalous pattern in the way
bots published their content. Both in 2016 and 2018, bots published multiple times
the content they generated. While in 2016 this repeated activity was mainly performed
by each bot separately, i.e., each message was published multiple times by the same
bot, in 2018 this repeated activity was also shared between bots, i.e., multiple bots
shared the same message once. More specifically, during the 2016 (resp. 2018) election
period, 5% (resp. 2.4%) of the tweets generated by bots were published more than
once by the same author. The significant drop (t-test: t (388,196)= 17.4, p < .001) in
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Figure 5.3: Probability distribution of multiple authors sharing the same content
during the 2016 and 2018 election periods
this repeated activity during the 2018 election is, however, replaced by an increasing
number of single sharing operations (of the same content) performed by multiple
bots, possibly in the context of a coordinated effort.
In Figure 5.3, we investigate this scenario by showing the probability distribution
related to the number of multiple authors sharing the same content in 2016 and
2018. Although the majority of content is shared by a few bots (from 2 to 3) in both
periods under consideration, it is noticeable how in the 2018 election the number
of authors sharing the same content increased. To evaluate the statistical difference
between the sets of multiple authors in 2016 and 2018, we employ the Mann-Whitney
rank test, which in turn corroborates our intuition (p-value < .001). The distributed
sharing activity among bots can be conceived as a strategy to avoid detection. In
fact, the replication of the same content represents one of the most common signals
to identify automated accounts [231, 242]. Therefore, an account that repeatedly
publishes the same content is simpler to classify as a bot with respect to accounts
that share diverse content. Also, this multi-bot strategy can be used to promote ideas
or information by creating the illusion of a consensus among the OSN population,
as multiple accounts spreading the same information can elicit the idea of people
sharing the same opinion [86].
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(a) Bots’ replies (b) Bots’ original tweets
(c) Humans’ replies (d) Humans’ original tweets
Figure 5.4: Sentiment scores of replies and original tweets for bots and humans
5.2.2.4 Reply Activity
We investigate whether the same repeated activity is also recognizable in the replies
provided by bots to other accounts’ posts. We found some instances of multiple
replies in both the periods under investigation, but in both cases with a limited extent
(around 1.1% of replies were repeated).
To characterize the emotional content of the replies generated by bots and humans,
we rely upon sentiment analysis and in particular on SentiStrength (introduced in
Section 5.2.1.3). In Figure 5.4, we show the sentiment score distribution of bots’
and humans’ replies, in contrast with the sentiment score of their original tweets
in the two election periods under analysis. Two facts are worth noting. First, from
Figs. 5.4a and 5.4c can be noticed that both humans and bots shared less neutral
(SentiStrength score = 0) replies in 2018. Second, the gap in the sentiment scores
between the two election periods is more evident for bots (Figs. 5.4a and 5.4b),
especially for negative replies, with the 2018 period exhibiting significantly more
negative replies than 2016. With respect to original tweets, no remarkable difference
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exists between 2016 and 2018 regardless of the source (human or bot). Overall, the
difference between the score sentiment of replies and original tweets is only noticeable
in the 2018 election period, while the distributions are similar for the 2016 election.
From these observations, we conclude that bots exhibited a more inflammatory and
negative behavior in their conversation (i.e., replies) during the 2018 election with
respect to the 2016 election, while they showed a similar attitude in the sharing of
original content. This can be viewed as a strategy to engage with humans and gain
their endorsement by strongly supporting a given faction in a conversation. In fact,
participating in an online discussion allows a direct interaction among users that is
different from sharing original content, which in turn can reach a limited number of
accounts and does not necessarily entail interplay among users.
5.2.2.5 Retweet Activity
To examine the re-sharing activity (i.e., retweet) in the two voting periods, we initially
consider the top retweeted posts created by bots and shared by humans. By analyzing
the top 10 retweets in this subset, we notice an interesting difference between the
two periods: On one hand, in the 2016 Presidential election, the majority of the
retweeted posts were in support of candidate Trump, and in opposition to candidate
Clinton [36]. On the other hand, in the Midterms, the most retweeted posts of bot-
generated content were tweets aimed at surveying the Twitter population. From now
on, we refer to these tweets as poll-tweets. In Table 5.2, we show the poll-tweets in the
top 10 of human retweets of bot-generated content. Note that, for privacy reasons,
we anonymized (using @???) the user names of the accounts associated with the
originators of these examples, while we show the user names of the accounts that
have been suspended for the violation of Twitter’s rules. The objective of these tweets
seems to have a quantitative understanding of voter turnout, political leaning, and
preferences. This exploratory attitude of bots in the Midterm elections appears in
contrast with the behavior towards the candidates shown in the 2016 Presidential
election.
Although poll-tweets seem harmless and aimed only at surveying human opinion,
their turnout might impact the human perception on the polled issues. To understand
whether bots fostered the spread of poll-tweets, we analyzed the most retweeted
content by bots. Results show that the most re-shared (i.e., retweeted) post is a poll-
tweet, and 4 additional poll-tweets are in the top 10 retweeted content by bots. In
Figure 5.5, we depict the timeline of the hourly volume of retweets shared by bots and
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Figure 5.5: Timeline of the retweet volume of the poll-tweets shared by bots and
humans
humans related to the poll-tweets listed in Table 5.2. Notice that we do not display the
volume of retweets in the days after October 21 as the number of these tweets during
that period is negligible. Interestingly, human users participated in these polls to a
larger extent with respect to bots, which in turn were responsible for the creation and
sharing of these posts.
Additionally, to investigate whether bots’ retweet activity predicts humans partici-
pation in these polls, we evaluate the Granger causality (defined in Section 5.2.1.4)
between the hourly volume of poll-tweets shared by bots and the hourly volume of
poll-tweets shared by humans. Results of the Granger-causality test are displayed in
Table 5.2, where the first column displays the content of the poll-tweet, the second
column shows the value of F-test for significant causality, and the third column de-
picts the temporal lag (in hours) for which the causality has the highest F-test value.
These results corroborate our hypothesis: For each poll-tweet under investigation, the
volume of retweets from bots is Granger-cause of the volume of human retweet. This
result suggests that, while bots acted as initial spreaders of poll-tweets, the human
population was affected by the mass involvement in these polls and actively partic-
ipated in and interacted with bots’ poll-tweets. This finding evidences and further
confirms the powerful influence of bots in online discussions.
Interestingly, three accounts that created the most successful polls (@kwilli1046,
@The_Trump_Train, and @Golfman072) have been suspended by Twitter. Additionally,
another suspended account classified as human (@MikeTokes) published a poll-tweet
(“NATIONAL POLL: you are voting in the November 6, 2018 elections, what party are
122
5.2. Social Bots Evolution
you voting for and why?") that received a large number of retweets from bots (top
3 of bots-retweet from human-generated content). This may indicate a combined
approach leveraging both human (e.g., trolls) and bot activities.
5.2.2.6 Bots’ Targeted Interaction
To further explore the retweet interactions from bots to humans (i.e., bots retweeting
human content), we measure to what extent bots targeted humans within the social
network. Prior work shows that bots target the most connected humans [220]. In
particular, the number of incoming edges (e.g., followers) is often associated with
the influence and the centrality that each user has in the social network. For this
purpose, we compute the in-degree centrality (detailed in Section 2.7) of the retweet
network. We here recall that the in-degree centrality is a network analysis measure
that assigns a score to every node in a network based only on the number of inbound
links held by each node. In our scenario, the rationale is to understand whether bots
interacted mainly with the most retweeted (influential) humans, whose endorsement
can be beneficial to spread information across the social network. This, in turn,
might indicate a strategy for increasing the resonance of bots’ content, as influential
nodes can reach a large number of accounts and, thus, spread information to a wide
audience. The nodes of the retweet network are the users, while every link of the
network represents a retweet. In this context, the in-degree centrality measures the
incoming interactions of each user over all the interactions. Hence, accounts with
high in-degree centrality indicate users whose content has been largely re-shared and,
thus, represent highly influential nodes in the social network.
In Figure 5.6, we display the violin plot distribution of the in-degree centrality related
to the humans targeted by bots in the two voting periods. A violin plot is a method to
visualize the distribution of numerical data and its probability density. While in the
2018 Midterms most of the probability mass is in the range between 0 and 0.01 (low
centrality score), in the 2016 election bots also targeted a considerable set of humans
with larger centrality scores. On average, we find that the humans targeted by bots
in 2016 has in-degree centrality scores two times larger with respect to the humans
targeted in 2018 (1.7 ·10−2 vs. 8 ·10−3, p-value < .001). We conclude that in 2016, bots
supporting the Presidential candidates were interested in attracting the attention of
the most influential human users in the social network, while during the Midterms
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Figure 5.6: Distribution of in-degree centrality of humans targeted by bots
they interacted with any targets regardless of their position and relevance in the social
network, further confirming their exploratory attitude during the 2018 Midterms and
their mutable nature over different election periods.
5.2.2.7 Causal modeling of human-bot interactions
To further investigate the human-bot interplay, we evaluate the causality between bot
and human interactions. We measure the Granger causality [110] of the daily volume
of retweets between humans and bots. Our results show that in the 2018 Midterms
retweets from bots to humans (i.e., bots retweeting human generated content) were
Granger-cause (F-test = 3.51, p-value = 0.02, steps = 5 days) of the retweets from
humans to bots, while there was no signal of causality revealed in the 2016 election.
In the 2016 Presidential election, users evidently re-shared content disregarding the
authenticity of the information and its source [9, 36]. On the other hand, in 2018
humans likely engaged with bots as a consequence of bots prior interaction with
them. Furthermore, in 2018, the volume of retweets from bots to humans was also
Granger-cause (F-test = 4.46, p-value = 0.01, steps = 5 days) of the retweets from bots
to bots, suggesting that bots strategically distribute and organize their interactions
with other bots.
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5.2.3 Discussion
In this Section, to address RQ 3.1, we have studied bots strategy to mimic human
online behavior and avoid detection. Our results revealed bots evolution and mutable
nature over the last two election events in the US. More specifically, we have shown
how, in the 2018 Midterms, bots changed the volume and the temporal dynamics
of their online activity to better mimic humans and avoid detection. For the same
purpose, bots exhibited a more cautious broadcasting strategy, which also allows them
to elicit the illusion of public consensus. We have also noticed a relevant reduction in
the usage of retweets, both from human and bot accounts. Human users significantly
increased the volume of replies, which denotes a growing propensity of humans in
discussing (either positively and negatively) their ideas instead of simply re-sharing
content generated by other users. This is a positive sign, since the spread of low-
credibility content during the 2016 US Presidential election has been often associated
with indiscriminate re-sharing [36, 213, 234].
While the increase in usage of replies, along with the reduction of retweets, may repre-
sent an encouraging step forward for the fight against misinformation, this intuition
should be contextualized considering social media history and development over the
last few years: Prior to the investigations into the 2016 US Presidential election, most
OSN users may have not been aware of the existence of malicious and/or automated
accounts. This may have changed over the course of the last few years. Although the
observed change exhibited by human users in 2018 provides an optimistic perspec-
tive, there exists an inevitable interplay between the behavior of human users and
bots. The mutable nature of bots, coupled with their continuous online presence, is a
cause of concern when considering the integrity of the online information ecosystem,
especially with respect to online political discussions concerning voting events all
over the world.
This set of open problems poses numerous challenges in the fight against OSN abuse
and motivates further research for a better understanding of bots’ behavior, strategies,
and effectiveness.
5.3 Social Bots Partisan Behavior
Section 5.2 highlighted the need for further research to keep the pace of bots strategy
and mutable behavior. In particular, understanding and uncovering how bots manip-
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ulate human users is of paramount importance for fighting the manipulation of OSNs.
In this Section, to respond to RQ 3.2, we face this problem from a different angle. We
explore bots partisan behavior (i.e., their endorsement towards a political faction) by
evaluating their political leaning and, accordingly, we investigate their strategy for
engaging with humans and infiltrating political discussion. We focus on the online
discourse during the latest US election, i.e., the 2018 Midterms, as we are interested in
studying the activity, and corresponding impact, of the most recent and sophisticated
bot accounts. With the final goal of measuring the effectiveness of bots manipulation
attempts, we pursue the following steps.
First, we investigate whether social bots lean and behave according to a political
ideology (i.e., liberal or conservative leaning). In line with this idea, we explore to
what extent they act similarly to human users with the same political inclination
(from now on simply human counterpart). Second, we explore bots’ strategy to
manipulate humans and we examine whether some differences can be observed
between the strategies of liberal and conservative bots. For this purpose, we measure
bots’ activity in terms of volume and frequency of posts, interactions with humans, and
embeddedness (described in Section 2.7) in the social network. Finally, we estimate
the effectiveness of bots’ strategies in involving humans in their conversation and
evaluate the degree of human interplay with social bots.
In the next subsection, we present the methodology employed to carry out this analysis
and we introduce the metrics used to measure the effectiveness of bots’ strategy in
engaging with humans.
5.3.1 Methodology and Metrics
In this subsection, we describe the tools and methodologies used to detect bots,
analyze their political leaning, and measure the effectiveness of their strategies during
the 2018 US Midterms.
5.3.1.1 Data and Bot Detection
In this analysis, we leverage the Twitter dataset described in Section 5.2.1.1 to study
the online conversation during the 2018 US Midterms election and analyze social
bot activity and interactions with humans. Differently from Section 5.2, where the
analysis was focused on the set of users that shared content during both the 2016 and
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Table 5.3: Dataset statistics
Statistic Count
# of Original Tweets 452,288
# of Retweets 1,869,313
# of Replies 267,973
# of Users 997,406
Figure 5.7: Bot score distribution
2018 elections, in this Section we consider the full set of users involved in the tweets
collected during the 2018 Midterms. We report in Table 5.3 additional details of the
2.6 million tweets collected for 42 days around the election day from nearly 1 million
users.
Similarly to Section 5.2, we rely upon Botometer to detect social bots. In Figure 5.7,
we depict the bot score distribution of the 997,406 distinct users in our dataset. The
distribution exhibits a right skew: most of the probability mass is in the range [0, 0.2]
and some peaks can be noticed around 0.3. According to prior studies, and similarly
to Section 5.2.1.2, we use the 0.3 threshold to separate humans from bots.
According to this choice, we classified 21.1% of the accounts as bots, which in turn
generated 30.6% of the tweets in our data set. Overall, Botometer did not return a score
for 35,029 users that corresponds to 3.5% of the accounts. We used the Twitter API to
further inspect them. Interestingly, 99.4% of the 35,029 accounts were suspended by
Twitter, whereas the remaining percentage of users protected their tweets turning on
the privacy settings of their accounts.
127
Chapter 5. Detection of Manipulation Campaigns
Figure 5.8: Label propagation example
5.3.1.2 Political Ideology Inference
In parallel to the bot detection analysis, we examine the political leaning of both
bots and humans in our dataset. To classify users based on their political ideology,
we capture and analyze the URLs they shared. Specifically, we rely on the political
leaning of the media outlets (e.g., newspaper, TV station, etc.) related to the URLs
published in users’ tweets. We make use of a list of partisan media outlets released by
third-party organizations, such as AllSides4 and Media Bias/Fact Check5. We combine
liberal and liberal-center media outlets into one list (composed of 641 outlets) and
conservative and conservative-center into another (composed of 398 outlets). After
cross-referencing the shared URLs with the media outlets URLs, we observe that
32,115 tweets in the dataset contain a URL that points to one of the liberal media
outlets and 25,273 tweets with a URL pointing to one of the conservative media outlets.
To label Twitter accounts as liberal or conservative, we use a polarity rule based on the
number of tweets they produce with links to liberal or conservative sources. Thereby,
if an account has more tweets with URLs pointing to liberal sources, it is labeled
as liberal and vice versa. Although the overwhelming majority of accounts include
URLs that are either liberal or conservative, we remove any account that has an equal
number of tweets from each side. Our final set of labeled accounts includes 38,920
users.
Finally, we use label propagation (introduced in Section 2.7) to classify the remaining
accounts in a similar way to previous work [20]. Label propagation is a network-based
algorithm, where each node is assigned a label, which is updated iteratively based
on the labels of node’s network neighbors. A node takes the most frequent label
4https://www.allsides.com/media-bias/media-bias-ratings
5https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
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of its neighbors as its own new label, as shown in the example in Fig. 5.8, where
edges represent social connections, while red and blue nodes indicate conservative
and liberal users, respectively. The algorithm proceeds updating labels iteratively
and stops when the labels no longer change. For this purpose, we construct a social
network based on the retweets exchanged between users. The nodes of the retweet
network are the users, which are connected by a direct link if one user retweeted a
post of another user. To validate the results of the label propagation algorithm, we
apply a 5-fold stratified cross validation to a set composed of 38,920 seed accounts.
We train the algorithm using 80% of the seeds and we evaluate the performance on the
remaining 20%. Finally, we compute precision and recall by reiterating the validation
of the 5-folds. Both precision and recall scores show value around 0.89 with bounds
from 0.88 to 0.90. Both the scores for liberals are about 0.87 with 0.85-0.88 bounds,
while for conservatives the scores are around 0.93 with 0.92-0.93 bounds. To further
validate the proposed approach, we use as ground truth the political leaning of the
media outlet that users shared in their profile, obtaining precision and recall scores in
line with the previous approach.
5.3.1.3 Bots’ Strategy Effectiveness
We introduce four metrics to estimate the effectiveness of bots’ strategy in involving
humans and, at the same time, measure to what extent humans rely upon, and interact
with the content generated by social bots. Thereby, we propose the following metrics:
• Retweet Pervasiveness (RT P ) measures the intrusiveness of bot-generated con-
tent in human-generated retweets:
RT P = no. of human retweets from bot tweets
no. of human retweets
(5.1)
• Reply Rate (RR) measures the percentage of replies given by humans to social
bots:
RR = no. of human replies to bot tweets
no. of human replies
(5.2)
• Human to Bot Rate (H2BR) quantifies human interaction with bots over all the
human activities in the social network:
H2BR = no. of humans interaction with bots
no. of humans activity
, (5.3)
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where the numerator counts for human replies/retweets to/of bots generated
content, while the denominator is the sum of the number of human tweets,
retweets, and replies.
• Tweet Success Rate (T SR) is the percentage of tweets generated by bots that
obtained at least one retweet by a human:
T SR = no. of tweet retweeted at least once by a human
no. of bots tweets
(5.4)
5.3.2 Results of the Analysis
In this subsection, we describe the results of our analysis. In particular, we examine
bots’ political leaning and, accordingly, we analyze their strategies and measure the
effectiveness of their actions in terms of human engagement.
5.3.2.1 Bots’ Political Leaning
The combination of the outcome from the bot detection algorithm (i.e., Botometer)
and the political ideology inference allowed us to identify four groups of users, namely
Liberal Humans, Conservative Humans, Liberal Bots, and Conservative Bots. In Table
5.4, we show the percentage of users per group. Note that percentages do not sum up
to 100% as either the political ideology inference was not able to classify every user,
or Botometer did not return a score, as we previously mentioned. In particular, we
were able to assign a political leaning to 63% of bots and 67% of humans. We find
that the liberal user population is almost three times larger than the conservative
counterpart, similarly to other existing works [20, 21]. This discrepancy is also present,
but less evident, for the bot accounts, which exhibit an unbalance in favor of liberal
bots. Further, we investigate the suspended accounts to inspect the consistency of
this result. The inference algorithm attributed a political ideology to 63% of these
accounts, which shows once again the liberal advantage over the conservative faction
(45% vs. 18%).
Figure 5.9 depicts the network of online interactions among Twitter users during the
election period. In particular, the interaction network displayed in Fig. 5.9 captures the
exchanged retweets among pairs of users. Thus, we refer to this interaction network
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Table 5.4: Number (percentage) of users per group
Liberal Conservative
Humans 386,391 (38.7%) 122,761 (12.3%)
Bots 82,118 (8.2%) 49,488 (4.9%)
as the retweet network. Specifically, Figure 5.9 shows two retweet networks. We first
describe the elements in the retweet network and then we clarify the differences
between the two displayed networks in Fig. 5.9.
In the retweet network, nodes represent Twitter users and links represent retweets
among them. We indicate as source the user that retweeted the tweet of a target
user. Links with weight (i.e., frequency of occurrence) smaller than 2 are hidden
to minimize visual clutter. Blue nodes represent liberal accounts, while red nodes
indicate conservative users. Darker tones (blue and red) depict bots, while lighter
tones (cyan and pink) relate to humans, and the few green nodes represent unclassified
accounts. The link takes the same color of the source node (author of the retweet),
whereas node size is proportional to the in-degree (defined in Section 2.7) of the
user. Nodes are spatially distributed according to a force-directed layout [135]. Such
a scheme arranges nodes in a network by simulating a force that attracts (i.e., to
move close to each other) nodes connected by an edge and repulse (i.e., to move
away from each other) disconnected nodes. In our setting, this means that users are
spatially distributed according to the number of retweets exchanged between each
other. Therefore, users that retweet (resp. do not retweet) each other are displayed
close (resp. distant) to each other. The output of the force-directed layout [135], in
Fig. 5.9, results in a network naturally split into two communities, where each side
is almost entirely populated by users with the same political ideology. As mentioned
above, Fig. 5.9 shows two retweet networks. Specifically, Fig. 5.9 depicts two k-core
decomposition (detailed in Section 2.7) graphs of the retweet network. In a k-core,
each node is connected with at least k other nodes. Figures 5.9a and 5.9b capture the
10-core and 25-core decomposition, respectively. The purpose of showing the k-core
decomposition is to understand the position of bots and humans within the retweet
network for every political wing.
Overall, three facts are worth noting: (i) bots are embedded, with humans, in each po-
litical side, suggesting that bots support and behave according to a political ideology;
(ii) as k increases, the left k-core appears to disrupt, while the right k-core remains
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Table 5.5: Top 20 hashtags generated by liberal and conservative bots
Liberal Bots Conservative Bots
#MAGA #BrowardCounty
#NovemberisComing #MAGA
#TheResistance #StopTheSteal
#GOTV #WalkAway
#Florida #WednesdayWisdom
#ImpeachTrump #PalmBeachCounty
#Russia #Florida
#VoteThemOut #QAnon
#unhackthevote #KAG
#FlipTheHouse #IranRegime
#RegisterToVote #Tehran
#Resist #WWG1WGA
#ImpeachKavanaugh #Louisiana
#GOP #BayCounty
#MeToo #AmericaFirst
#AMJoy #DemocratsAreDangerous
#txlege #StopTheCaravan
#FlipTheSenate #Blexit
#CultureOfCorruption #VoteDemsOut
#TrumpTrain #VoterFraud
well connected, suggesting that conservatives are more central users in the online
discussion if compared to liberals; and, (iii) as k increases, bots appear to outnumber
humans, suggesting that bots may populate areas of the retweet network that are more
central and better connected.
Next, we examine the topics discussed by social bots and compare them with their
human counterparts (i.e., human users with the same political inclination). Table 5.5
shows the top 20 hashtags utilized by liberal and conservative bots. We highlight (in
bold) the hashtags that are not present in the top 50 hashtags used by the correspond-
ing human group to point out the similarities and differences among the groups. In
this table, we do not take into account hashtags related to the keywords used in the
data collection (such as #elections, #midterms), and hashtags used to support the
political group (such as #democrats, #liberals, #VoteRed(or Blue)ToSaveAmerica) as
(i ) the overlap between bot and human hashtags is noticeable when these terms are
considered, and (i i ) we aim to narrow the analysis to specific topics and inflammatory
content, inspired by [220]. Moreover, we used an enlarged subset of hashtags for the
human groups to further strengthen the differences and, at the same time, to better
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Table 5.6: Number (percentage) of tweets per group
Liberal Conservative
Humans 957,726 (37.0%) 476,231 (18.4%)
Bots 288,659 (11.1%) 364,727 (14.1%)
understand the objective of social bots. Although bots and humans share the majority
of hashtags, two main differences can be noticed. First, conservative bots abide by
the corresponding human counterpart more than the liberal bots. Second, liberal
bots focus on more inflammatory and provocative content (e.g., #ImpeachTrump,
#ImpeachKavanaugh, #FlipTheSenate) with respect to conservative bots.
5.3.2.2 Bots’ Strategies
In this subsection, we investigate social bot activity based on their political leaning. We
explore their strategies in interacting with humans and the degree of embeddedness
in the social network.
Table 5.6 depicts the number (and percentage) of tweets generated by each group.
Despite the group composed of conservative bots is the smallest in terms of number
of accounts (see Table 5.4), it produced more tweets than liberal bots and closely
approaches the number of tweets generated by the human counterpart. By computing
the number of tweets per user, we note that conservative bots produce 7.4 tweets per
account, which is more than twice the ratio related to the liberal bots (3.5), almost
the double of the human counterpart (3.9), and almost three times the ratio of liberal
humans (2.5). The fact that bots produce a larger number of tweets with respect to
humans is not surprising, as confirms bots’ attitude to infiltrate and flood online
platforms with their content [86]. However, the larger volume of tweets shared by
conservative bots, with respect to the volume of tweets shared by liberal bots, suggests
a diverse broadcasting strategy adopted by the two groups (conservative vs. liberals)
of automated accounts.
To further investigate the different strategies of liberal and conservative bots, we ex-
amine their interplay with humans by considering the previously described retweet
network. Figure 5.10 shows the interaction among the four groups. We maintain the
same color mapping described before, with a darker color (on the bottom) represent-
ing bots and a lighter color (on top) indicating humans. Node size is proportional
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Bots
Humans
(a) Overall interactions (b) Group-based interactions
Figure 5.10: Interactions according to political ideology
to the percentage of accounts in each group, while edge size is proportional to the
percentage of interactions between each group. In Figure 5.10a, this percentage is
computed considering all the interactions in the retweet network, while in Figure
5.10b we consider each group separately. Therefore, the edge size gives a measure
of the group attitude to interact with the other groups. Consistently with Figure 5.9,
we observe that there is a limited amount of interaction between the two political
sides. The majority of interactions are either intra-group or between groups of the
same political leaning. From Figure 5.10b, we can observe that the two bot factions
(i.e., conservative vs. liberal leaning) adopted different strategies. Conservative bots
balanced their interactions by retweeting group members 43% of the time, and the
human counterpart 52% of the time. On the other hand, liberal bots mainly retweeted
liberal humans (71% of the time) and limited the intra-group interactions to 22% of
their retweet activity. Interestingly, conservative humans interacted with the conser-
vative bots (28% of the time) much more than the liberal counterpart (16%) with the
liberal bots. To better understand these results and to measure the extent of human
engagement with bots, in the next subsection we evaluate the four metrics introduced
in Section 5.3.1.3.
Finally, we examine the degree of embeddedness (defined in Section 2.7) of both
humans and bots within the retweet network. For this purpose, we first compute
different network centrality measures, and then we adopt the k-core decomposition
technique to identify the most central nodes in the graph. In Tables 5.7 and 5.8, we
show the average out- and in-degree centrality for each group of users. As we described
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Table 5.7: Out-degree centrality
Liberal Conservative
Humans 2.66 ·10−6 4.14 ·10−6
Bots 3.70 ·10−6 7.81 ·10−6
Table 5.8: In-degree centrality
Liberal Conservative
Humans 2.52 ·10−6 4.24 ·10−6
Bots 2.53 ·10−6 6.22 ·10−6
in Section 2.7, the out-degree centrality measures the number of outgoing links, while
the in-degree centrality considers the number of incoming links. Overall, conservative
groups have higher centrality measures than the liberal ones. We can notice that
conservative bots achieve the highest values both for the out- and in-degree centrality.
To further investigate bots’ embeddedness in the social network, we use the k-core
decomposition (described in Section 2.7). We recall that the objective of this technique
is to determine the set of nodes deeply embedded in a graph. In fact, the k-core
is a subgraph of the original graph in which every node has a degree equal to or
greater than a given value k. We extracted the k-cores from the retweet network
by varying k in the range between 0 and 30. Figure 5.11 depicts the percentage of
liberal and conservative users as a function of k. We can notice that, as k grows, the
fraction of conservative bots increases, while the percentage of liberal bots remains
almost stationary. On the human side, the liberal fraction drops with k, whereas the
conservative percentage remains approximately steady. Overall, conservative bots
sit in a more central position in the social network and are more deeply connected if
compared to the liberal counterpart.
5.3.2.3 Bots’ Effectiveness in Human Engagement
In this subsection, we aim to estimate the effectiveness of bots’ strategies in involving
humans and measure to what extent humans rely upon, and interact with the content
generated by social bots. We examine the effect of bots’ activity by means of the four
metrics described in Section 5.3.1.3. We evaluate each political side separately, thus,
we compare the interaction between bots and humans with the same leaning. In
136
5.3. Social Bots Partisan Behavior
Figure 5.11: k-core decomposition
Table 5.9: Bots’ Strategy Effectiveness
Metric Liberal Bots Conservative Bots
RT P 14.1% 25.6%
RR 4.5% 15.5%
H2BR 12.3% 23.2%
T SR 35.3% 35.0%
Table 5.9, we depict the results for each group of bots. Diverse aspects are worthy of
consideration. We can observe that conservative bots are significantly more effective
in involving humans in their conversations than the liberal counterpart. Although
the T SRs of the conservative and liberal bots are comparable, the gap between the
two groups, with respect to the other metrics, is significant. To carefully interpret
this result, it should also be noticed that (i ) the T SR is inversely proportional to
the number of tweets generated by bots, and (i i ) conservative bots tweeted more
than the liberal counterpart, as depicted in Table 5.6 and explained in Section 5.3.2.2.
Overall, conservative bots received a larger degree of interaction with (and likely trust
from) human users. In fact, conservative humans interacted with the bot counterpart
almost twice with retweets (RT P ), and more than three times with replies (RR) if
compared to the liberal group. Finally, the H2BR highlights a remarkable amount of
human activities that involve social bots: Almost one in four interactions performed
by conservative humans goes towards conservative bots.
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5.3.3 Discussion
The identification and exploration of bots’ strategy is a fundamental asset to detect ma-
nipulation campaigns and fight OSN manipulation. Nowadays, this task has become
particularly challenging as bots (based on AI) have been refined to infiltrate online
discussion in a synergistic way in order to avoid detection (as described in Section 5.2).
To tackle this problem, and respond to RQ 3.2, in this analysis, we have considered
to analyze the collective behavior of bots based on their political leaning. In fact, we
have shown that social bots are embedded in each political wing and behave in a
similar way to their human counterpart (i.e., human users with the same political
inclination). We have observed different strategies between conservative and liberal
bots. Specifically, conservative bots stand in a more central position in the social
network and abide by the topics discussed by the human counterpart more than the
liberal bots, which in turn exhibit an inflammatory attitude. Further, conservative bots
balanced their interaction with humans and bots of the conservative wing, whereas
liberal bots focused mainly on the interplay with the human counterpart. Overall, the
strategy of the conservative bots appears as the most effective in engaging humans.
5.4 Trolls Detection
Numerous studies showed that bots represent only one factor driving the manipula-
tion issue in OSNs. For example, trolls are largely known for their purpose of sowing
conflict and spreading misinformation. In the political context, a case in point is the
rise of state-sponsored trolls, human operators tied and allegedly paid by information
operation agencies to spread propaganda and politically biased information. The
most remarkable example is represented by the “troll farms” associated with Russia’s
Internet Research Agency, which have been accused of interfering in the political
discussion during the 2016 US Presidential election [48]. The list of Russian troll
accounts involved in this operation have been released by the US Congress and have
permitted to study the malicious activity of such operators [21, 83].
As we described in Section 2.4, it has been shown that trolls’ strategies within a
campaign change over time and, thus, automatically detecting their activity is not a
simple task [244]. To address this challenge and respond to RQ 3.3, in this Section,
we propose an approach based on Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL). IRL is a
machine learning paradigm (detailed in Section 2.6.2.2) that has the goal of finding
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the rewards behind an agent’s observed behavior. In our scenario, we employ IRL
to infer the rewards that could have led trolls and non-troll accounts (from now on
simply called users) to perform their online activity. We then consider to exploit the
estimated rewards as features of a supervised learning algorithm aimed at classifying
such accounts.
In the next subsections, we describe the data employed in this study and the rationale
of our approach. Then, we detail the methodology employed to detect troll accounts
and corresponding results.
5.4.1 Data
To attain a set of trolls that serves as ground truth, we rely on the list of 2,752 Twitter
accounts identified as Russian trolls by the US Congress and publicly released6 during
the investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election. To recover
trolls’ tweets, we leverage the dataset collected by the research community [5, 19]. The
authors [5, 19] utilized Crimson Hexagon, a platform that provides paid datastream
access. This allowed the authors to obtain tweets generated by trolls and subsequently
deleted after their suspension from Twitter [5, 19]. The dataset presents 1,148 Russian
trolls, which generated 1,226,155 tweets.
Our dataset also includes non-troll users’ tweets, which have been collected by the
researchers [5, 19] by utilizing a set of keywords, listed in Section 5.2.1.1, related to
the 2016 US Presidential election event. Also, to capture users’ baseline behavior
(not strictly related to the political context), the authors gathered tweets from the
same users that do not include the political-based keywords. This collection yielded
12,361,285 tweets produced by 1,166,760 users.
We pre-processed this dataset to filter out accounts engaged with just a few tweets.
In particular, we consider only users and trolls that shared at least k = 10 posts and
were involved in at least k = 10 other accounts’ posts (retweet, reply, or mention). This
allowed us to build, for each account, a time-ordered sequence of tweets (of at least 20
elements) in which the account is involved both actively and passively. Such filtering
6Recode’s Twitter’s list of 2,752 Russian trolls. See: https://www.recode.net/2017/11/2/16598312/
russia-twitter-trump-twitter-deactivated-handle-list
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resulted in 342 trolls and 1,981 users. In the next subsections, we describe how we aim
to analyze the sequence of users’ online activity to characterize their behavior and
recognize troll accounts.
5.4.2 User Behavior Analysis
Several studies try to provide an understanding of human behavior through their
online activity [67, 151, 152, 235]. In [235], the analysis of users’ clickstream on social
media is used to identify common behaviors. The authors propose an unsupervised
method to categorize behavioral patterns and cluster users accordingly. The click-
stream clustering [235] is based on a hierarchical clustering approach and it has been
proven to outperform existing clustering methods (e.g., K-means) in user behavior
analysis. Also, it has shown that such a behavioral model can help service providers to
identify unexpected user behaviors as malicious accounts and hostile chatters.
Therefore, with the objective of characterizing and detecting malicious trolls’ activity,
we attempt to model the online behavior of social media accounts by leveraging the
clickstream clustering approach. The input of the clustering approach is represented
by the sequence of online actions performed by every account. We determine these
activities according to the sharing options available on Twitter, i.e., tweet, retweet,
reply, and mention. The output of this approach is a tree hierarchy of behavioral
clusters populated by the accounts under investigation.
In our scenario, the clickstream clustering [235] results in 5 disjointed clusters, which
can be appreciated in Fig. 5.12. It should be noticed that such clusters do not present
any hierarchical pattern among them, suggesting that such groups are strongly dis-
tinguished. Figure 5.12, which is generated with the visualization tool provided by
Wang et al. [235], also depicts information about every single cluster. For example,
information about cluster 4 (C4) is shown in the table superimposed in Fig. 5.12.
In particular, the column Action Pattern characterizes the online behavior of the ac-
counts in the cluster. Each row contains one Action Pattern. The Action Patterns are
ranked by their discriminating power in classifying the accounts in the cluster under
investigation. This means that an Action Pattern with a high rank is important in
classifying accounts in this cluster. In the example in Fig. 5.12, retweet (R) is the most
discriminating action, followed by mention (M), tweet (T), and reply (P). The column
Frequency Distribution shows how frequently the given Action Pattern appears in the
accounts in this cluster if compared to accounts outside the cluster. In other words, it
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Figure 5.12: Clickstream clustering [235] results
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shows how accounts in the cluster are different from accounts outside of the cluster
in a specific Action Pattern. The red bars show the pattern frequency distribution for
accounts within the selected cluster, while the green bars show the pattern frequency
outside the cluster. The more different the two distributions are, the more useful the
Action Pattern is to characterize accounts in the cluster. Finally, the column Score
shows the Chi-Square score of the Action Pattern. The clickstream model relies on
this score to rank Action Patterns and perform the clustering.
By further inspecting each cluster, we aim to understand whether and how trolls
can be distinguished from users. The 5 clusters (named C1, C2, C3, C4, and C5) and
corresponding Action Pattern differ from each other as follows:
C1: composed of 504 accounts (17.0% trolls). Accounts in this cluster perform reply
and retweet less frequently than the accounts outside the cluster.
C2: composed of 162 accounts (15.4% trolls). Accounts in this cluster tweet more
frequently and retweet less frequently than the accounts outside the cluster.
C3: composed of 261 accounts (13.8% trolls). Accounts in this cluster perform
mention more frequently than the accounts outside the cluster.
C4: composed of 1034 accounts (17.1% trolls). Accounts in this cluster retweet more
frequently than the accounts outside the cluster.
C5: composed of 362 accounts (5% trolls). Accounts in this cluster perform reply
more frequently than the accounts outside the cluster.
From the above clustering outcome, it appears that trolls behave similarly to other
users. In fact, troll accounts are embedded in every of the above clusters with a
comparable percentage (except from C5), which makes them indistinguishable from
users.
This finding motivates us to explore other approaches for unveiling such malicious
accounts. Although online activities represent users’ behavior in the OSN, their anal-
ysis takes only into account individual behavior. In such a way, we do not consider
whether and how users are influenced by the interaction with others [10, 165] and,
more specifically, by the feedback they receive from their peer [65, 67]. The effects
of social feedback on online activities have been studied in [67], where the authors
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argue how the potential endorsement from other users may trigger or retrain online
activities. For example, a user might be more motivated to share new content if she/he
receives positive feedback. In a similar way, we aim to understand the driving forces
behind the online activities of trolls and users with the purpose of discovering whether
behavioral differences can arise between these two classes of accounts. The objective
of inferring intent and motivation form observed behavior has been extensively stud-
ied under the framework of Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) [202]. Therefore,
in this study, we rely on the IRL paradigm, whose formulation is detailed in the next
subsection.
5.4.3 Methodology
In this subsection, we discuss how we leverage IRL to characterize the online activity
of OSN users. We first define the environment of the Markov Decision Process (MDP)
we aim to frame, i.e., Twitter. We then present the IRL formulation to estimate users’
and trolls’ motivation, which are subsequently used for the detection purpose.
5.4.3.1 Twitter MDP
We here propose to model the social media Twitter with a MDP. More specifically,
we represent Twitter as an environment constituted of multiple agents (i.e., Twitter
accounts) that interact with each other to achieve a certain goal (e.g., to spread content,
increase their popularity, or influence other people). The interaction between every
agent and the environment follows the RL schema displayed in Fig. 2.3 and described
in Section 2.6.2.2: The agent performs a certain action (e.g., share a content) and
receive a feedback from the environment (e.g., the content is re-shared by other
accounts). In the Twitter environment, we consider that the following four actions
can be performed by the agents:
• Generate original content. We refer to this action as active tweet (tw).
• Re-share content generated by others. We refer to this action as active retweet
(rt).
• Interact with other users by means of reply or mention. We refer to this action
as active reply (rp).
• Keep silent. We refer to this action as active nothing (nt).
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The Twitter environment, in turn, responds to such actions and presents to the agent
a new state. We represent the set of states with the three following feedback the
environment can provide to the agent:
• Re-share agent’s tweet. We refer to this state as passive retweet (RT).
• Interact with the agent by means of reply or mention. We refer to this state as
passive reply (RP).
• Do not engage with the agent. We refer to this state as passive nothing (NT).
We leverage the history of the accounts on Twitter to analyze their interaction with the
environment. To this aim, we sort in chronological order every online activity in which
the account is involved, either actively (actions) and passively (states). Therefore, at
each step (i.e., an element of the ordered sequence of the account’s online activities)
the agent can be in one of the above-mentioned states and perform only one action.
We consider the agent to execute action nt (active nothing) if it does not react to the
environment feedback, e.g., it does not perform tw, rt, and rp. Similarly, we represent
with NT the case in which the environment does not react to the agent’s action.
5.4.3.2 Users and Trolls IRL
As mentioned in Section 2.6.2.2, the state-action space is usually represented by a
set of features f . Similarly to [204], we build f by concatenating variables related to
the set of states and actions. Specifically, we define f as the possible combination of
the following variables: (RT, RP, tw, rt, rp), where the first two features represent the
state space, while the last three features indicate the action space. Each feature is a
binary variable, which assumes value 1 based on the state of the agent and the action
it performs (e.g., if the agent is in the state RT the first feature assumes value 1, while
the second feature equals to 0). The state NT is represented by setting the first two
features to zero, while the last three features equal to zero indicates the action nt. As
an example, the tuple (0,0,0,0,1) indicates that the agent performed an active reply
(rp) while it was in state N T . Given that at each step the agent can be in only one state
and performs only one action there exists the following 12 possible combinations of
state-action pairs:
• (NT,nt): the environment does not provide any feedback, and the agent does
not perform any action;
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• (NT,tw): the environment does not provide any feedback, and the agent gener-
ates a tweet;
• (NT,rt): the environment does not provide any feedback, and the agent gener-
ates a retweet;
• (NT,rp): the environment does not provide any feedback, and the agent gener-
ates a reply (or mention);
• (RT,nt): the environment returns a retweet, and the agent does not perform any
action;
• (RT,tw): the environment returns a retweet, and the agent generates a tweet;
• (RT,rt): the environment returns a retweet, and the agent generates a retweet;
• (RT,rp): the environment returns a retweet, and the agent generates a reply (or
mention);
• (RP,nt): the environment returns a reply (or mention), and the agent does not
perform any action;
• (RP,tw): the environment returns a reply (or mention), and the agent generates
a tweet;
• (RP,rt): the environment returns a reply (or mention), and the agent generates a
retweet;
• (RP,rp): the environment returns a reply (or mention), and the agent generates
a reply (or mention).
Therefore, f is a 5×12 matrix, where 5 is the number of features and 12 is the number
of state-action pair possible combinations. In turn, the reward function is a 1×12
vector, where each element represents the scalar reward of a certain state-action pair.
Based on the ordered list of states and actions, we build for each account a trajectory
ζ composed of the feature representation of state-action pairs, as discussed above.
Such a trajectory represents the observed behavior of the agent. We then utilize
IRL approaches to estimate the reward function that drove the agent’s behavior. The
rationale is to investigate whether users and trolls share the same rewards or are guided
by different incentives. For this purpose, we employ two IRL approaches introduced
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Figure 5.13: Example of estimated rewards for a given account
in Section 2.6.2.2. In particular, we employ the Maximum Entropy IRL [251] and its
non-linear variation proposed in [240]. It should be noticed that every account is
modeled independently from the others. This means that a unique IRL model has
been developed for each account. Each model takes as inputs the feature matrix f ,
the trajectory ζ, and the transition probabilities T . As discussed in Section 2.6.2.1,
the latter represents the probability of transition from state s ∈ S to state s′ ∈ S after
performing action a ∈ A. We compute T by observing the occurrences of (s, a, s′)
triplets in the account’s trajectory, where the triplet represents the transition from s
to s′ when a is performed. Both the IRL approaches use these inputs to compute the
reward function R, which determines the scalar reward for each state-action pair. In
the next subsection, we explain how we employ the estimated rewards for detecting
trolls activity.
5.4.3.3 Trolls Detection
For every account, IRL approaches output 12 scalar values related to the state-action
combination described above. As an example, Fig. 5.13 depicts the estimated rewards
related to the online activity of a generic user. Each value represents the reward
that could have led the account to perform a given action in a certain state. A high
reward in the generic state-action pair (s, a) indicates that the user is very motivated
to perform action a in state s. The opposite holds for low reward values.
Our approach aims to understand whether some differences can be noticed in the
motivation and incentives between trolls and users. We hypothesize that reward
values might highlight distinctive behavioral characteristics between troll and user
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Table 5.10: IRL approaches performance comparison in terms of AUC
Max. Entropy IRL [251] Max. Entropy Deep IRL [240]
K-Neighbors 83.2% 82.4%
SVC 74.2% 85.4 %
Gaussian Process 83.8% 85.6%
Decision Tree 82.7% 74.1%
MLP 84.4% 79.8%
AdaBoost 89.1% 83.3%
Random Forest 86.7% 81.3%
Naive Bayes 79.3% 78.7%
accounts. Therefore, we propose to utilize the 12 reward values to discriminate these
two classes of accounts. More specifically, we utilize the estimated rewards as features
of a supervised learning algorithm aimed at detecting troll accounts. We frame this
problem as a classification task, where the two classes are troll (positive class) and
user (negative class). We test several machine learning algorithms to perform such
classification, whose results are discussed in the next subsection.
5.4.4 Evaluation
In this subsection, we first discuss the results of the IRL-based classification approach
for detecting troll accounts on social media. Then, we analyze the incentives that
users and trolls respond to and we highlight the behavioral differences between these
two classes of accounts.
5.4.4.1 Account Classification
The dataset under investigation presents imbalanced classes, with the negative class
(more than) 5 times larger than the positive one (1,981 vs. 342 accounts). To solve
the data imbalanced issue, we employ the undersampling technique [74, 161], which
uses only a random set of the larger class in the classification task. Therefore, we split
the negative samples into five parts and we repeat our evaluation every time with a
different subset of negative samples. Then, to train and test our model, we utilize a
10-fold cross validation preserving the percentage of samples for each class.
We evaluate the classification (troll vs. user) results obtained by using the two different
IRL approaches to estimate the rewards. As mentioned in Section 5.4.3.2, we test the
Maximum Entropy IRL [251] and the Maximum Entropy Deep IRL [240]. We utilize
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Figure 5.14: Classification performance at varying k
the rewards inferred by each of these approaches to feed a supervised learning classi-
fication algorithm. In particular, we compare several machine learning approaches.
Performance, in terms of Area Under the Curve (AUC), of the different classifiers and
IRL approaches are depicted in Table 5.10. In most of the cases, the Maximum Entropy
IRL approach achieves better accuracy with respect to the Deep IRL solution. Thus, we
continue our analysis by leveraging the rewards estimated with Maximum Entropy IRL.
Also, we rely on AdaBoost as it outperforms the other supervised learning algorithms.
We tune the AdaBoost classifier by performing a grid search of its hyper-parameters,
whose best configuration involves 500 weak estimators and a learning rate of 0.05.
We further evaluate the performance of our approach by considering classification
metrics, other than AUC, such as accuracy, precision, recall, and F1. In Figure 5.14, we
display the results of the proposed solution at varying k. As mentioned in Section 5.4.1,
we filtered out accounts that were involved in less than k = 10 active and passive online
activities. Here, we aim to examine the impact of k on classification performance.
As we could expect, performance improves as k increases as the Maximum Entropy
IRL approach can rely on more information per each user. Overall, our detection
approach, even with a small amount of information, achieves prominent performance
in every classification metric. This validates our intuition of using IRL to analyze
online behavior and to identify malicious troll accounts accordingly.
To investigate the most distinguishing characteristics between trolls’ and users’ be-
havior, we observe the feature importance of the AdaBoost algorithm. In Fig. 5.15, the
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Figure 5.15: AdaBoost feature importance
relative importance of each feature (i.e., reward) is displayed. Interestingly, the most
important features are related to the case when the account is in the state RT (i.e., its
content has been re-shared by other accounts) or RP (i.e., it is engaged by other users).
5.4.5 Rewards Analysis
To better understand the difference in trolls’ and users’ intent, we compare their
estimated rewards. Figure 5.16 displays the distribution of the rewards assessed
with Maximum Entropy IRL and highlights some differences in the behavior of the
two classes of accounts7. This discrepancy is also demonstrated by a two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which in turn unveils significant differences (p < 0.01)
between every pair of distributions, except for the state-action pair (NT,nt), (NT,rt),
and (RP,rt). By looking at Fig. 5.15, we can notice how these three rewards are in the 5
least important features for the AdaBoost classifier. From Fig. 5.16, it is possible to
notice a flat distribution for the pair (NT,nt). This is due to the fact that we do not
observe any instance of such a scenario in users’ trajectory, given that we can only
leverage data that show users’ involvement (either active or passive) in the tweets.
Furthermore, in Fig. 5.16, it can be appreciated how, on average, trolls are more
motivated (i.e., higher reward) to share a new original tweet (action tw) with respect
to users regardless of their state, which suggests that trolls merely focus on spreading
7It should be noticed that the displayed rewards have been normalized by using the StandardScaler
technique (i.e., each feature is standardized by removing the mean and scaling to unit variance).
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Figure 5.16: Distribution of the estimated rewards by Maximum Entropy IRL.
Figure 5.17: Violin plot of the estimated rewards in the RP state.
their content, independently from others’ feedback. Also, the most noticeable discrep-
ancy can be observed in the actions performed when the account is in the RT state,
which is in line with the feature importance results displayed in Fig. 5.15.
The latter also showed that the RP state is relevant in the discrimination between trolls
and users. To take a closer look at the features related to this state, in Fig. 5.17, we
depict the violin plot distribution of the estimated rewards related to RP state. A violin
plot is a method to visualize the distribution of numerical data and its probability
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Figure 5.18: Distribution of weights θ for each feature in f
density. From Fig. 5.17, it can be observed how the reward distributions of troll and
user accounts particularly differ in the case of action nt and rp, which are the first and
forth most relevant features of the AdaBoost classifier.
Moreover, being a linear model, the Maximum entropy IRL approach allows to dis-
entangle the reward of each state-action pair. This is done by solving Eq. 2.3, given
that f is known and R has been estimated with Maximum entropy IRL. This operation
allows us to recover the weights θ that represent a measure of importance for each
feature in f . The weights distribution for each class of accounts is displayed in Fig.
5.18. Also in this scenario, we utilize a violin plot (defined in the description of Fig.
5.17), to visualize and compare the distribution of the weights for the two classes (i.e.,
trolls and users). The violin plot distribution further highlights behavioral differences
between trolls and users, which are proved to be significant for every feature (p < 0.01)
by means of a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Additionally, Fig. 5.18 confirms
the differences of behavior between trolls and users when they are in state RT and
RP, consistently with our previous findings. Also, the action that shows the most
noticeable difference between the two groups of accounts is related to the active tweet
(tw).
Finally, in Fig. 5.19, we depict the mean value of such distributions. The purpose is to
compare the relevance of each feature between troll and user accounts. On average,
trolls appear to be more motivated than users in generating new content (tw) and
re-sharing others’ post (rt). This finding is in line with trolls’ purpose of spreading
(false) pieces of information and harm the online conversation. On the other hand,
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Figure 5.19: Comparison of θ average values of trolls and users
users appear to be more rewarded than trolls when their content is re-shared by other
accounts (RT). This, representing a form of social endorsement [173, 220], might
suggest that users are more concerned about others’ esteem with respect to trolls.
5.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we examine the issue of OSN manipulation. We focus on the malicious
actors, e.g., trolls and bots, that embed themselves in online social systems to interact
with OSN users with the objective of deceiving them and manipulating the narratives
they are exposed to. Although OSN service providers put increasing efforts to protect
their platforms, malicious accounts keep acting in manipulation campaigns. While
bots continuously adapt their strategy to escape detection, the automated identifi-
cation of troll accounts has not found any established solution yet. In this Chapter,
we tackle these challenges to empower and enable countermeasures for fighting the
manipulation of OSNs.
To keep the pace of increasingly sophisticated bot accounts, we study how bots’ online
activity has changed over the last two US voting events, i.e., the 2016 Presidential
election and the 2018 Midterms. To answer RQ 3.1, we unveil bots’ strategy to avoid
detection and mimic human accounts. We show how bots tuned their sharing activity
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to emulate human timing and adopted a (more cautious) synergistic approach to
spread information, which allowed them to simultaneously avoid detection and create
an illusion of public consensus.
To address RQ 3.2, we analyze the collective behavior of bots based on their political
leaning. We observe that bots were embedded in each political wing and acted simi-
larly to the human counterpart. We uncover different bots’ strategies for engaging with
humans and recognize the most effective. Overall, these findings (especially those
concerning bots’ coordinated strategy to avoid detection and manipulate humans)
provide useful insights that can inform actionable policies to empower the detection
of manipulation campaigns. However, our results show the multifaceted behavior
of bots, their effectiveness, and mutable nature over time. These facts raise further
concerns and pose novel challenges in the fight against OSN manipulation.
This fight, however, does not only regards automated accounts (i.e., bots) but also in-
clude human users (i.e., trolls) often associated with and paid by government agencies
and/or foreign entities. As the detection of trolls is an open problem for the research
community, in this Chapter, to respond to RQ 3.3, we propose an approach based
on IRL that only relies on the flow of users’ online activity. Our approach accurately
(AUC=89.1%) separates trolls from other users by leveraging and exploiting the di-
verse motivations between the two classes of accounts. The IRL model also allows
us to recognize and unveil the most distinctive behaviors that differentiate troll from
non-troll accounts. For example, trolls and users differ in their behavior when they
are engaged by other users or their content is re-shared. Also, troll accounts appear to
perform their sharing activity irrespective of others’ feedback and simply focus on the
spread of the content they generate. This work represents a first step in the direction
of understanding, characterizing, and detecting trolls, which is a critical challenge in
the race towards healthy OSNs. In our future work, we aim to validate the proposed
approach with data from other known state-sponsored trolls. Also, we aspire to extend
the classification task to a diverse set of malicious accounts (e.g., bots).
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6
Awareness of OSN Perils
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we explored the perils of OSNs along the lines of privacy and
manipulation issues. We have demonstrated that such risks are concrete and take
advantage of human vulnerabilities and OSN functionalities. However, although these
problems can have significant consequences on people’s lives, the majority of OSN
users is still not conscious of (or underestimate) such pitfalls. Additionally, users have
also difficulty to react to such issues, as they need timely, clear, and easy to understand
information upon which to base their choices. Raising users’ awareness of the perils
of OSNs is, therefore, of pivotal importance. For this purpose, we appraise the idea
of building a service to provide OSN users with feedback about their current risks
in real-time. As smartphones represent the main means to utilize OSNs [128], we
envision this service to be offered via a mobile application. However, as described in
Chapters 1 and 2, guaranteeing this kind of service introduces additional challenges,
such as privacy and security risks. To tackle these challenges, in this Chapter, we aim
to answer the following RQ:
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RQ 4: Can we develop a secure and privacy-preserving service for assessing and com-
municating users’ their privacy and manipulation risks in OSNs?
To respond to RQ 4 and face the related challenges, we present a framework, called
VIVO, which allows us to collect data from mobile devices in a secure and privacy-
preserving way [166]. VIVO also enables real-time data gathering and direct commu-
nication with users via mobile applications. Although VIVO has been conceived to
support a broad range of applications, ranging from crowd-sensing data collection
to application development and testing, in this thesis, we exploit VIVO as it allows to
address RQ 4 for three main reasons:
• It provides a privacy-by-design facility for application developers who are willing
to collect data and/or test their applications. By using VIVO, developers do not
have to deal directly with such privacy and security aspects as both of them are
managed within the framework.
• It supplies an environment for developing an application that collects data
from smartphones in real-time. This also allows to enlarge the spectrum of
possible utilization, by considering not only OSNs as data source but any sensing
application running on a smartphone. As a result, we can validate and extend
the models based on information extracted from OSNs (e.g., the privacy model
based on Twitter data) to data collected by mobile devices. For instance, it is
possible to assess the accuracy of location inference attacks also when users do
not share their position in OSNs.
• It allows to directly communicate with the users, thus, enabling a mechanism of
direct feedback of the risks behind their online activity (e.g., privacy leakage in
an OSN) in real-time.
Moreover, in terms of privacy, VIVO addresses issues at two levels: The first one, with
VIVO architecture development, aims to build a privacy-preserving framework for
application developers, as we mentioned above. The second one is privacy at the
application level. We develop an application running onto VIVO that aims to collect
users’ data and return them feedback about their current risks. We envision this
application to be used for two main purposes: (i ) provide the users a measure of their
level of privacy (e.g., geo-location privacy), and (i i ) alert the users every time they
interact with malicious actors in OSNs.
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This chapter is organized as follows. We introduce VIVO in Section 6.2, while in
Section 6.3 we provide an overview of its architecture. Section 6.4 details the building
blocks of VIVO architecture. In Section 6.5, we describe the application that has been
developed through VIVO to raise users’ awareness of their OSN risks. Finally, Section
6.6 is devoted to an evaluation of the system performance in terms of functionality
and battery consumption.
6.2 VIVO
Smartphones represent the main source of human digital traces. However, as de-
scribed in Section 2.5.2, collecting crowd-sensed data is not a simple task as challenges
related to device heterogeneity, security, and privacy need to be addressed. To tackle
these challenges, we implemented VIVO, an open framework for crowd-sensed Big
Data gathering, where security and privacy are managed within the framework at
the client side. VIVO allows to test and validate any services that use social, physical,
and environmental information. Unlike previous efforts [25, 81, 221], VIVO allows the
deployment of multiple simultaneous experiments introducing an enrolled crowd-
sensing model. In such a model, VIVO experiment developers (i.e., application de-
velopers who need to collect data) are not limited to a fixed set of experiments but
they can build their own application without any constraint, in a more agnostic and
generic way.
The collected data can be accessed both at the end of the experiment, as in traditional
testbeds, and in real-time, as required by many big data applications. Yet, VIVO
differs from traditional testbeds as testing experiments can be scheduled and run
in real-time on the mobile phones of users, from now on referred to as volunteers.
In fact, VIVO allows an easy development and deployment of experimental software
on mobile devices. More precisely, experiment developers can dynamically deploy
their own application on each VIVO volunteer device, without any extra-hardware
requirements and pre-deployment testing as VIVO experimental applications run on
standard Android versions (without any extra OS requirements).
One of the key features of VIVO concerns the security and privacy of volunteer data.
As we leverage private smartphones, it becomes even more crucial to ensure that
any deployed applications do not compromise the private data of the users and the
regular behavior of their private applications. To address this challenge, VIVO manages
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Figure 6.1: VIVO architecture
security and privacy within the framework itself, at the client side. VIVO provides an
API with all the methods necessary to secure and privatize the collected data before
they leave the smartphone. Clearly, we cannot prevent malicious behaviors, but these
are legally prosecutable as a contract violation.
Finally, VIVO allows a paradigm shift from (i ) taking care of the whole experiment
cycle, i.e., from the experiment design up to the data provision, to (i i ) managing only
the experiment application, with built-in security and privacy capabilities. In fact, it
provides to experiment developers a compact unified framework to collect data, from
the architecture (e.g., server, data management, and security) to the mobile sensing
nodes, i.e., volunteer smartphones.
6.3 Architecture
VIVO architecture is displayed in Fig. 6.1. At the top level, the VIVO experiment de-
velopers, i.e., individuals (e.g., researchers), employ VIVO to run an experiment for
collecting a dataset or testing an application. VIVO experiment developers (from now
on simply referred to as developers) constitute the target group for whom VIVO has
been conceived. They exploit VIVO data storage and data collection capabilities as
well as VIVO volunteers and their mobile devices to deploy their applications. Volun-
teers are people equipped with personal smartphones who accept to participate in
VIVO experiments. For each experiment, volunteers can choose whether to participate
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or not using the VIVO Client application. By means of a Web Interface1, developers
have the possibility to define new experiments, upload the source code of the corre-
sponding applications, and download the collected data. Experiments uploaded to
the VIVO testbed are checked and validated with regard to respecting privacy and trust
issues. Only accepted experiments can be deployed on volunteer devices. The alpha
testing is performed during the pre-deployment phase and it checks the impact of the
experiment on the overall system performance and on the user’s privacy. We utilize
Portable Opensource Energy Monitors (POEM) [88] to measure the energy overhead
of the application and an extension of the Mockingbird platform [89] to monitor the
information leakage. Mockingbird performs an on-device evaluation to retrieve the
information accessible from the experiment application, e.g., when and how many
times it access the file systems, the sensors, the contacts, etc. This platform produces
an access-report that is compared with the experiment description in order to detect
access patterns not compliant with the application task.
VIVO consists of three main components, which will be discussed in turn, namely
VIVO Server, VIVO Client, and VIVO Client API.
1. The VIVO Server is the main back-end platform of the architecture. It con-
trols the creation of new experiments, the notification to volunteers, and the
experiments data upload. The VIVO Server uses Google Firebase2 to push notifi-
cations to the volunteer devices to notify the availability of new experiments.
The data collected from the volunteers are periodically sent to the VIVO Server,
which handles the data upload from the devices and their storage on the VIVO
Database (VIVO DB). Once an experiment is terminated, the VIVO Server allows
the developer to download the collected data through the web page. As men-
tioned in Section 2.5.2, VIVO Server is enhanced by the functionalities of the
Syndesi IoT testbed. The integration between VIVO and Syndesi is performed
at the web service level. In particular, after terminating an experiment, the
developer can download the data collected by the experiment as well as the
data collected by Syndesi environmental sensors, within the experiment time
window.
2. The VIVO Client enables the communication between volunteers and the VIVO
Server. Volunteers contributing to the VIVO testbed are required to install
1The VIVO Web Interface is reachable at http://vivo.dti.supsi.ch:3000/
2https://firebase.google.com/
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.2: VIVO Client (a) and VIVO Client API (b)
and run the VIVO Client application on their devices. In particular, by means
of the VIVO Client application, each volunteer can register in VIVO and run
several experiments on their smartphones. The Client application displays
the list of available experiments updated in real-time and allows volunteers to
manage the experiment life-cycle in a very straightforward and user-friendly
manner (one-click operation). As depicted in Fig. 6.2a, the VIVO Client acts as a
middle layer between VIVO experiments and the VIVO Server. It gathers data
collected by all the experiments running on the volunteer devices and manages
their forwarding to the VIVO Server. All the data handled by the VIVO Client
application are compressed and encrypted, as explained in Section 6.4.
3. The VIVO Client API is a fundamental component of VIVO and enables the key
features of the proposed architecture, such as security, privacy, and real-time
data collection. Developers are requested to use the VIVO Client API in their
application as a requirement to use VIVO and its features. The API is represented
in Fig. 6.2b. In the Processing Layer, it provides all the tools necessary to
compress (Compression Tool), encrypt (Encryption Tool), and privatize (Privacy
Module) the collected data before the transmission from the volunteer device.
As depicted in Fig. 6.2a, each experiment exploits the Transmission Layer of the
VIVO Client API to forward the collected data to (i ) the VIVO Server via the VIVO
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Client Interface, or to (i i ) a Custom Server (configured by the developer) through
the Real-Time Interface. The VIVO Client Interface is destined for offline data
collection, while the Real-Time Interface, and in turn the Custom Server, enables
real-time applications. In both cases, the VIVO API provides the underlying
tools to encrypt, compress, and privatize the data.
6.4 Implementation
This Section provides a detailed description of each VIVO component, providing
details on the functionalities, implementation choices, and technologies utilized in
the system design. Section 6.4.1 describes the VIVO Client component, while Section
6.4.2 depicts the features of the VIVO Client API. Finally, in Section 6.4.3, we detail the
VIVO Server.
6.4.1 VIVO Client
The VIVO Client is an Android application (compatible with OS version 4.2 or above)
for volunteers to interact with the VIVO platform. The VIVO Client also provides
synchronization of the collected data with the VIVO Server.
6.4.1.1 User Interface (UI)
The VIVO Client UI is the interaction point between the VIVO Server and the volunteers.
The UI allows them to monitor the experiments available and running on VIVO, as
well as managing their participation in each experiment.
Fig. 6.3 shows three screen shots related to the main foreground components of the
UI. After installing the VIVO Client application, volunteers are asked to register or
log-in through the Login page (Fig. 6.3a). Once logged in, volunteers can explore
all the available experiments from the Experiment List page (Fig. 6.3b). Each entry
in this list includes the identification parameters of the corresponding experiment
(e.g., name and author), and the experiment status on the volunteer smartphone.
An experiment can be: (i) available for download and installation on the volunteer
devices; (ii) installed and ready for launch; (iii) running on the volunteer smartphone.
Additional information along with a detailed description of each experiment are
available on the Experiment Details page (Fig. 6.3c). Through this page volunteers
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Figure 6.3: VIVO Client activities: (a) login, (b) experiment list, (c) experiment details
can manage the experiment life-cycle, starting, stopping, and un-installing it any time
they want to. The VIVO Client continuously monitors the status of the experiments
and displays notifications every time an experiment is created or terminated.
6.4.1.2 VIVO Client Data Collection
The UI has a key function in the interaction between volunteers and VIVO, nonetheless
the VIVO Client performs several fundamental tasks in the background. These tasks
are related to the data collection process. The VIVO Client is in charge of all the
processing necessary for sending the experiment data from volunteer smartphone
to the VIVO Server. Experiment data are sent to the VIVO Client through the VIVO
Client API in the format of data blocks. A data block is a structure of data containing
three fields: data, timestamp, and type. The field data contains an encrypted and
compressed version of the data (details on data preprocessing will be given in Section
6.4.2.3). The timestamp is the time at which the data was collected, while the type field
is used for differentiating the types of data and is defined by the developer during the
experiment development phase. There are no restrictions on the type of data that
can be collected (i.e., string, number, custom structure). To receive data from the
running experiments, the VIVO Client instantiates a Service component named Data
Receiver. This represents the VIVO Client connection with the VIVO Client API. Every
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time this component receives a data block from the VIVO Client API, it (i ) verifies
whether the data sender is an authorized application by checking its package name,
(i i ) extends the data block by adding a field named experiment ID, which identifies
the experiment that generated the data, and (i i i ) temporarily stores the data block
into the local database until the synchronization with the VIVO Server is performed.
To perform the synchronization VIVO utilizeS the Android Sync Adapter component,
which provides a smart way to manage data synchronization and battery consumption.
Each time a synchronization is performed, a batch of data is sent to the VIVO Server.
In this phase, a field named device ID is added to the data block to identify the device
that collected the data. Every time the VIVO Server receives the data, it returns an
acknowledgement and the data is deleted from the local database of the VIVO Client.
6.4.2 VIVO Client API
The VIVO Client API is a software component needed for a VIVO experiment in order
to interact with the VIVO Client. An Experiment Development Tutorial is available on
the VIVO website: it guides developers throughout the integration of existing or new
Android applications with the VIVO Client API. The API is the core enabler of the VIVO
architecture. Besides the interaction with the VIVO Client for forwarding the collected
data, the API provides these additional features: (i) an interface for storing data on
the VIVO Server; (ii) an interface for sending data to a custom server in real-time; (iii)
tools for data compression and encryption; (iv) a privacy module to privatize the data.
The VIVO Client API is an Android Library and has the same minimum OS require-
ments as the VIVO Client. The API does not interact with mobile sensors and does not
require any permission, thus, device heterogeneity does not affect its functionality.
Thereby, developers should handle experiment dependencies by ensuring in their
code whether volunteer devices meet the given requirements.
6.4.2.1 VIVO API Data Collection
The VIVO API Data Collection is the main function of the API, providing an interface to
the VIVO Client for secure data transactions. In fact, this feature benefits from one of
the main tools embedded into the API: a module for data compression and encryption.
In our context, encryption is necessary because the collected data is exposed to
security risks during both the API-Client and the Client-Server transmission. We
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Figure 6.4: Sequence diagram of the VIVO API (offline) data collection
address this issue by encrypting the data block locally (within the application), before
sending it to the VIVO Client. To accomplish this task, the API makes use of asymmetric
cryptography. As this technique can encrypt a limited block of data each time, the API
compresses the data before encryption. In such a way, a larger amount of data can be
encrypted in a single block. Experiment developers have to create a public-private
key pair and configure the API for the usage of the public key.
Fig. 6.4 shows a diagram representing the sequence of actions performed by each
component of the system in a data collection scenario, where (i) the collected data
is compressed and encrypted by means of the Processing Layer of the VIVO Client
API, (ii) the data is encapsulated in a data block in the Transmission Layer and then
forwarded to the VIVO Client application, which (iii) accumulates data blocks in a
batch of data until the synchronization with the VIVO Server is accomplished.
6.4.2.2 Real-Time Data Collection
Data collected in the VIVO DB is suitable for offline data post-processing and analysis.
However, this solution does not fit real-time data processing and applications with
low latency requirements. As the Sync Adapter framework of the VIVO Client does
not assure real-time synchronization, it is not guaranteed that the collected data
reaches the VIVO Server with a short delay. To enable real-time data collection and
low-latency applications, we propose a simple interface, named Real-Time Interface,
for integrating a Custom Server endpoint into the architecture. The developer should
only set the Custom Server address in the VIVO API settings to perform HTTP requests
with the Real-Time Interface, without configuring any server-side API. Different levels
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Figure 6.5: Sequence diagram of the VIVO API (real-time) data collection
of request customization are available, ranging from a simple request with only raw
data to a highly customized HTTP request. Parameters available for customization
are: request body, headers, path, and callback on response.
Fig. 6.5 shows a sequence diagram representing a real-time data collection scenario.
In this figure, we depict the optional sequence of actions required to perform data
anonymization, which can be implemented also in the offline scenario. The Pro-
cessing Layer of the VIVO Client API is in charge of anonymizing, compressing, and
encrypting data before the transmission to the Custom Server. Differently from the
offline scenario - where a data block is buffered in a batch of data and then transmitted
according to the Sync Adapter policy - in the real-time scenario each data block is sent
to the Custom Server without any buffering and additional delay.
6.4.2.3 Compression and Encryption Tools
Compression and encryption are fundamental tools in the proposed architecture.
These features are bundled in a utility Class and use only Java standard libraries.
To compress data we use the Deflate algorithm, while for the encryption we adopt
asymmetric encryption implemented by the RSA algorithm. Developers can freely
decide the key size for the RSA algorithm3. This encryption technique is highly secure
if a large key size is selected but it supports a limited data block size at each encryption,
which in turn depends on the key size. Thus, developers should take into account the
3We strongly suggest to use a key size of at least a 3072-bit as recommended by NSA: https://
cryptome.org/2016/01/CNSA-Suite-and-Quantum-Computing-FAQ.pdf
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size of the data before using the API. The maximum block size b can be computed as:
b = k−p, where k is the key size (in byte) and p is the padding size (currently fixed at
11 byte).
6.4.2.4 Privacy Module
One of the key points of the proposed architecture is to ensure security and privacy at
the client side. The privacy module provides routines to anonymize data by removing
any personal information from identifiers collected during an experiment. First, we
created a simple tool, which consists of an Anonymous ID Generator. Given a set
of IDs that can potentially be used to identify a user, it produces a new set of IDs
using the SHA-256 algorithm [183]. This simple anonymization is, however, generally
insufficient to preserve privacy, as any personal information can be used to identify
a user. For this reason, in collaboration with our partners of the SwissSenseSinergy
Project4, we have implemented an interface to support differential privacy.
Differential privacy [76] is a property that provides an upper bound on the information
a third party can obtain from the data after the release. Consider the experiment
example of a simple survey composed of some yes-or-no questions. If we use a
differentially private method to collect and analyze volunteer answers, then any
third person that sees a statistical result over the answers (e.g., the proportion of
participants saying yes) would not be able to identify the answers of individuals up
to a certain specified privacy parameter called the privacy loss. The simplest method
available is the Laplace Mechanism [77], which can be used when the statistic of
interest is a real number. Within VIVO, it has also been implemented the Hybrid
Mechanism [54], which can be seen as an extension of the Laplace Mechanism for
streaming computations, and the Randomized Response [77] mechanism, which is
applicable to any type of multiple-choice question.
The differential private methods available in the API are usable - both for offline and
real-time settings - for experiments that can be reduced to a survey. Any experiment
can be reduced to a survey, when the collected data belongs to a bounded set of
numbers that correspond to possible answers. As an example, we consider a crowd-
sensing application that collects the heart rate of volunteers. This experiment can
be viewed as a multiple choice survey where the sensors act as participants and the
sensor measurements represent votes.
4http://www.swiss-sense-synergy.ch
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6.4.3 VIVO Server
The VIVO Server is a Node.js web application based on the KeystoneJS Framework. It
is backed by the VIVO DB, which is a MongoDB database. This architecture provides a
versatile and flexible No-SQL backend solution suitable for the scale of this project.
The VIVO Server supports the overall architecture handling the experiments, the
notification mechanism, the data collection engine, and the integration with the
Syndesi IoT testbed.
6.4.3.1 Experiment Management
A VIVO experiment is an instance of an Android application that is built considering
the guidelines in the development tutorial. In particular, the developer needs only to
(i ) integrate and configure the VIVO Client API as a library in the application project,
and (i i ) name the application package with a fixed string. An experiment can be
deployed only once. If developers want to run an experiment multiple times, they
have to create new experiments based on the same application. Once a developer
has been approved by the administrator, she/he can upload applications and manage
experiments from the experiment page. Every time the developer instantiates an
experiment, a dedicated page is created on the web interface for experiment man-
agement. From this page the developer can request the administrator approval, start,
and stop the experiment. Once the approval is granted, the experiment will be made
available to all the volunteers through the VIVO Client application. Finally, when
developers stop the experiment they can download (from the experiment page) all the
data collected from the experiment instances installed on volunteer devices.
6.4.3.2 Notifications
The VIVO Server makes use of Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM)5 to manage noti-
fications. FCM is a cross-platform messaging solution for delivering notification
messages at a very reduced cost to drive user re-engagement. By means of FCM,
the VIVO Server sends notifications to the VIVO Client applications about new and
finished experiments. FCM is also integrated with the VIVO Client. Each time an FCM
message arrives at the VIVO Client, a system notification is issued and displayed on
the notification bar.
5https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/
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6.4.3.3 VIVO Server Data Collection
The data collection system manages the collected data in the VIVO Server, which
periodically receives data blocks from volunteer devices. As described in Section 6.4.1,
a single data block is composed of: data, type, timestamp, experiment ID, and device
ID. Every time a device is synchronized with the VIVO Server, a batch of data blocks are
sent in a JSON structure. A batch may contain data from different experiments. The
VIVO Server dispatches each block to the correct database based on the experiment
ID. Every time an experiment finishes, the VIVO Server creates a JSON structure
that combines the experiment data, which the developers can download from the
experiment page.
6.5 VIVO Human Behavior Application
Through the VIVO testbed, some real-world applications have been successfully im-
plemented (e.g., indoor localization [248] and NoiseBay, an app to collect noise lev-
els [45, 46]). In this Section, we present VIVO Human Behavior (VHB), an application
we launched, through the VIVO framework, with the objective of raising users’ aware-
ness of OSN perils. We aim to achieve this objective by analyzing users’ activities in
OSNs and communicating them with their current risks in real-time. For this purpose,
we rely on VIVO and its features. In particular, we develop VHB as an Android applica-
tion that exploits VIVO functionalities through the VIVO Client API. The latter, which
is embedded in the application as an external library, handles the anonymization
and encryption procedures of the collected data. This level of protection allows us to
preserve privacy and manage security issues before the data reach the VIVO Client
and, in turn, the VIVO Server. Therefore, by running this application through the VIVO
framework we can benefit from VIVO provisioning towards privacy and security, other
than its real-time data collection feature.
To increase users’ awareness of OSN perils, in particular of the privacy and manipu-
lation issues, the VHB experiment needs to collect users’ data. Thereby, we envision
this application as a service to first collect data in a privacy-preserving way, and to
successively communicate to OSN users: (i ) an assessment of their geo-location pri-
vacy (see Chapter 3), (i i ) a measure of the predictability of their actions through the
lens of our social influence model (see Chapter 4), and (i i i ) an alert every time they
interact with malicious actors in OSNs (see Chapter 5). It should be noticed that VHB
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relies on the analysis of OSN risks presented in the previous chapters of this thesis
(Chapters 3, 4, and 5) to evaluate users’ perils, while exploits VIVO functionalities for a
real-time, secure, and privacy-preserving data collection and communication with
users. As explained in detail in Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2, users are only required to
provide a small set of information at the beginning of the experiment as most of the
data collection is performed in the background.
VHB also aims to demonstrate the flexibility of VIVO in collecting heterogeneous (type
of) data. In fact, for VHB, we propose to develop an experiment that collects from
volunteer smartphones physical (e.g., user’s location and activity), social (e.g., OSN
connections, call logs, and contacts), and environmental (e.g., weather) information.
The rationale is to extend the analysis presented in previous chapters by leveraging
different sources of information. For instance, we can rely on weather or activity
information to enhance the inference of users’ location, or we can use smartphone
contacts and call logs to extract social relationships and enrich our social influence
model with new social connections. Overall, we categorize the collected data into
static and dynamic information according to their sampling frequency. In the next
subsections, we detail the information collected in both categories.
6.5.1 Static Data Collection
Static data are collected once at the beginning of the experiment. In this phase,
volunteers are requested to participate in a survey and log-in to their OSN accounts.
The survey aims to collect volunteers’ personal information, which can be used for
further studies. Each volunteer is asked to provide information about her/his age
(range), gender, nationality, job field (academy, company, or unemployed), phone
number, home, and work location. As an example, Fig. 6.6a shows an instance of the
survey. Volunteers can deliberately decide to provide the information in the survey
(only age and gender are mandatory requested to provide some statistics about the
sampled population). However, as mentioned in Section 6.4.2.4, we stress that VIVO
privacy module allows us to both anonymize and utilize differential privacy methods
for preserving volunteers privacy.
Volunteers are then requested to log-in to OSN platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter,
Google+. This phase is not mandatory and volunteers can log-in or log-out whenever
they prefer. Each OSN requires a specific access implementation and allows to collect
a given subset of data. For Google+ and Facebook, we gather only the friends list of
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.6: VIVO Human Behavior application: (a) shows an instance of the survey,
while (b) shows the log-in page to OSN platforms.
the volunteer. For Twitter, we collect only the user identifier, which we successively
use to gather publicly-available information (tweets, list of followers/followee, etc.)
via the Twitter API. Figure 6.6b display the OSNs log-in page of the VHB application.
6.5.2 Dynamic Data Collection
Dynamic data are continuously collected by the VHB application since the first boot.
Through a persistent background service, VHB gathers information about volunteers’:
• activity (walking, biking, running, etc.)
• contacts
• call logs
• location and corresponding weather
• phone state (i.e., connected cell ID information)
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Activity is detected and collected every minute, along with the location information.
Contacts (resp. call logs) are collected at the log-in time and then updated at each
change (resp. call), whereas weather conditions are gathered every 30 minutes. Finally,
phone state information is collected every time the cell status changes. The back-
ground collector service manages and launches specific sub-services for gathering
these data. The only sub-service that does not rely on Android integrated services
is related to the collection of the weather condition, for which we leverage the web
service provided by OpenWeather6.
6.5.3 VHB: Reliability and Challenges
To test the VHB application, we distributed the experiment to the volunteers through
the VIVO Web Interface, as described in Section 6.3. Initially, we relied only on a
small set of three volunteers to assess the functionality and potential bugs in the
implementation of the application. This phase proved both (i ) VIVO flexibility to
collect heterogeneous data, and (i i ) the integrity and correctness of the collected data
during the whole experiment. Although the data collection did not present any issue,
two challenges arose in the successive phase.
The first challenge involves the recruitment of a larger basis of volunteers, which is
a typical issue in crowd-sensing platforms [56, 123, 203]. To motivate volunteers in
the participation of the awareness campaign, we plan to develop a reward-based
mechanism that will allow the participants to receive an economical reward according
to their involvement in the campaign. The second challenge concerns the commu-
nication with volunteers about their privacy and manipulation risks (notice that the
assessment of such issues follows the analysis detailed in the previous chapters of
this thesis). While VIVO allows direct and real-time communication with volunteers,
the presentation of the risks to the users still needs further investigation and is an
open research problem [156]. The feedback should be easy to understand and provide
useful recommendations to change users’ behavior and avoid further misuse [18].
In [72], Dolan et al. delineated the psychological factors that can impact humans in
changing their behavior. These mechanisms can affect users’ motivation to actually
adopt the knowledge offered by our awareness service and, therefore, we plan to
consider these guidelines in our future works.
6openweathermap.org
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6.6 System Performance
To validate the functionality and to evaluate the performance of the VIVO architecture,
we developed different test-applications. In Section 6.6.1, we examine the scalability
of VIVO by distributing an experiment to a group of volunteers scattered over the
whole Switzerland. In Section 6.6.2, we present a comparison of the performance of
the VIVO Client API with legacy solutions through a large suite of benchmarks. Finally,
in Section 6.6.3 we compare the battery consumption of real-time upload with offline
data collection.
6.6.1 Scalability Test
In this test, we examine the functionality and the scalability of VIVO by distributing
an experiment to a group of forty volunteers scattered over the whole Switzerland.
Further, this test allowed us to evaluate the robustness of VIVO by analyzing the
integrity and the correctness of the collected data during the whole life-cycle, and the
presence of anomalies or bugs in the implementation.
In the experiment, we gather accelerometer measurements from volunteer smart-
phones every minute in both offline and real-time settings. Volunteers installed the
experiment from the VIVO Client, which worked without any issue. The VIVO Server
handled well both the experiments and the volunteers, without any loss of data and
any performance degradation. In the current version of the architecture, the VIVO
Server is designed to run on a single node as a monolithic web application and, thus, it
does not scale automatically on a cluster of multiple nodes. The VIVO Server instance
runs on a machine with a CPU Intel(R) Pentium(R) D, dual core at 3.00GHz, 8GB DDR3
RAM, and 200GB HDD disk. To properly evaluate VIVO scalability, we should consider
that the VIVO Server is a Node.js web application. Node.js operates on a single thread
using non-blocking I/O calls. Thereby, it supports much more concurrent connections
with respect to traditional web-serving techniques. Node architecture works well for
tasks with non-intensive CPU computation, as for the VIVO Server, which performs
light tasks at each synchronization. Concurrent connections capability can be com-
puted taking into account the amount of RAM [2]. As an example, a traditional web
server with 8GB of RAM can support at most few thousands of concurrent connections,
while Node architecture can handle tens of thousands of simultaneous connections
with the same amount of memory.
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Figure 6.7: Data processing time vs. key size
6.6.2 VIVO Client API Performance
To guarantee security in the data transaction, the VIVO Client API performs data
compression and encryption. It is crucial to ensure that this data processing does
not affect the performance and the proper operation of VIVO, both in the real-time
and in the offline settings. Low latency in the data processing is mandatory for real-
time applications, while a moderate battery consumption is fundamental to support
volunteer involvement.
To this end, we developed two classes of experiments. First, we evaluate the delay
introduced by compression and encryption at varying key size. As VIVO developers
decide the size of the RSA key during the API configuration, we aim to quantify the
impact of this choice in terms of additional delay. To perform these measurements,
we used a Nexus 5X running OS version 8.1.0. We compare our proposed solution,
i.e., compression and encryption, with a standard security solution based only on
encryption. Fig. 6.7 represents the time measured on the VIVO Client API to perform
(i) only encryption and (ii) both compression and encryption on packages of 100 byte
at varying encryption key size (2048, 3072, 4096, and 8192 bits). Our proposed solution
closely approaches the processing time required by the standard security solution.
Data compression allows encoding information using fewer bits than the original
representation, while requiring, on average, only 5% of additional time if compared to
the standard security solution.
Second, we created a suite of benchmarks to measure both latency and battery con-
sumption, comparing three processing scenarios: (i ) raw data (does not perform
any data processing), (i i ) compression, and (i i i ) compression and encryption (VIVO
Client API). We performed a set of 27 benchmarks varying the three processing sce-
narios, the block size (50, 500, and 5000 byte), and the frequency (1, 10, and 50 Hz).
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(a) Raw Data (b) Compression (c) VIVO Client API
Figure 6.8: Latency of the three processing scenarios
Each benchmark performs, for a given amount of time (fixed to 30 minutes), multiple
data processing operations based on the frequency, which in turn determines the
number of data processing operation performed in a second. We empirically choose
the values of the parameters to exploit as much as possible the hardware resources at
our disposal.
Fig. 6.8 compares the average latency over the processing instances of the three sce-
narios as a function of block size and frequency. As it can be observed in these figures,
and contrarily from what we expected, for every data processing scenario, the higher
the frequency the lower is the latency. Our hypothesis is that an optimization system
dynamically adapts the resource allocation according to the throughput of the bench-
mark. We strongly believe that this optimization is performed by a Kernel component
of the OS: the CPU Governor, which controls the CPU frequency in response to the
demands of the running processes. Thereby, when the data processing frequency is
low, the Governor maintains a lower CPU frequency - taking more time to process the
data - with respect to the case of a higher data processing frequency. While the block
size does not affect the raw data processing, in the other two scenarios we observe
that the larger the block size the higher is the latency. An interesting behavior can be
noticed in the VIVO Client API scenario, where encryption limits the data block size.
In this experiment, we used a key size of 8192 bits, which allows to encrypt up to 1013
byte of data. Thereby, in case of larger blocks (e.g., 5000B), the API splits the data in
smaller blocks introducing a computational overhead, as it can be appreciated in Fig.
6.8c. Finally, we observe that every parameter combination produces an acceptable
delay in every processing scenario.
The battery consumption as a function of the benchmark parameters can be seen in
Fig. 6.9. As we expected, for every data processing scenario, the battery consumption
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Figure 6.9: Battery consumption of the three processing scenarios
increases with the benchmark frequency. Note in particular that in a real experiment
the frequency is set by the developer and depends on the purpose and on the require-
ments of the experiment itself. Further, block size does not significantly affect battery
consumption in every scenario.
Overall, through these two classes of experiments, we proved that the VIVO API
introduces a large suite of tools at the cost of a slightly larger latency and a moderate
battery consumption if compared to legacy solutions.
6.6.3 Battery Consumption in Data Synchronization
In this subsection, we compare the offline data collection with the real-time upload
in terms of battery consumption. In the former scenario, a batch of data is sent
at irregular intervals based on the Sync Adapter policy, whereas in the latter, data
is forwarded without any buffering. The Sync Adapter aims to transfer data while
limiting the battery consumption according to the current network usage and the
device sleep state. As the synchronization mechanism is strongly affected by the usage
of the device, which in turn is a stochastic process, we forced the transmission every
time a batch of fixed size, referred to as queue, is filled. In such a way the resulting
consumption will be an upper bound of the real battery consumption, as the Sync
Adapter manages the transmission more efficiently. In this test, we evaluate queue
sizes ranging from 1 (real-time scenario) to 1000 elements. For each queue size, we
performed a benchmark of 90 minutes sending data block of 50 byte at a frequency of
1, 10, and 50Hz.
Fig. 6.10 shows the battery consumption as a function of queue size and frequency. As
it was expected, short queues consume more energy than longer ones as the system
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Figure 6.10: Battery consumption as a function of queue size and frequency
requires more frequently network infrastructure and communication. In particular,
the battery consumption in the case of long queues achieves almost the same value.
Our hypothesis is that, in such scenarios, the battery consumption converges to a
lower bound, which does not depend on the frequency and on the queue size of the
data upload.
6.7 Conclusions
In this Chapter, we aim to propose a service to raise users’ awareness of OSN perils. To
tackle the challenges of guaranteeing such a service and address RQ 4, we presented
VIVO, a framework for collecting human behavioral data in a privacy-preserving
way. Although VIVO has a broader objective of collecting crowd-sensed data and
supporting application development, its provisioning of trust and privacy makes VIVO
suitable for the objectives of this thesis. On one side, VIVO architecture provides
experiment developers a secure and privacy-by-design facility for collecting data.
On the other side, it allows us to develop a mobile application to collect data in
real-time and directly communicate with the users through mobile applications.
Towards the objective of increasing users’ awareness of OSN perils, we develop a
mobile application for collecting (in a privacy-preserving way) human behavioral
data from volunteers’ smartphone and to successively provide them feedback about
their privacy and manipulation risks. We tested the functionality of the application
and the integrity of the collected data by distributing the application to a small set of
volunteers. In future works, we aim to develop a mechanism to reward and enlarge the
group of volunteers. Also, we plan to research the most efficient and comprehensible
way to provide users useful recommendations to restrain and mitigate their OSN risks.
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Conclusions
The advent of OSNs have drastically changed our culture, society, and everyday life.
The combination of OSN technological and social features, however, hides pitfalls
still largely unknown to their users. Among all the perils presented in the literature,
personal data privacy and the manipulation of public opinion have recently gathered
concern for the individual users and the entire society, respectively.
For this reason, in this thesis, we have explored the nature of the privacy and manipu-
lation perils with the final objective of raising users’ awareness of these risks. More
specifically, we have investigated how the networks structure of OSNs enables these
perils, showing how social relationships and interactions play a significant role in
fostering and exacerbating both issues. Interestingly, although the two perils appear
disjointed and affect users at different granularity, we have shown that both of them
are not under the single individual control and the whole society is involved.
In the next Sections, we detail our contributions and propose future directions.
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7.1 Main Contributions
In this thesis, we have explored to what extent a generic user’s privacy can be violated
by leveraging information provided by other users in the OSN. In particular, we have
examined the privacy issue by analyzing the problem of geo-location privacy on
Twitter. In Chapter 3, we have provided users with means to measure and control the
public exposure of their personal information. The first contribution of this thesis is
related to the methodologies proposed to accomplish such purposes. In particular,
to answer RQ 1.1, we have introduced a deep learning approach to assess the ability
of an attacker to infer the location of a user given the locations of other OSN users.
The results confirmed the concern about privacy leakage in OSNs and motivated us to
investigate the usage of countermeasures to improve users’ privacy. For this purpose,
and to face RQ 1.2, we have explored the usage of two data perturbation strategies
that users can apply to tune their desired level of privacy. Finally, to address RQ 1.3,
we have proposed an interpretable model that provides users with a measure of their
privacy and an understanding of the factors that impact it.
To further explore the idea of inferring personal information by leveraging other users’
publicly available data, we have explored the social influence phenomenon. More
specifically, we have investigated whether social influence modeling (i.e., to learn
influence strength among users) can be used to predict and, in turn, violate users’
personal information. In Chapter 4, we have examined how to model social influence
among subjects to measure to what extent they are affected by others and, accordingly,
infer their future real-life activity. Therefore, the second contribution of this thesis
consists in the proposed approaches to model social influence and predict users’
behavior. To overcome the limitations of existing solutions in the literature, and to
address RQ 2.1, we have presented a novel approach based on deep learning, which
outperforms existing solutions. Moreover, to respond to RQ 2.2, we have examined
other factors that might impact social influence, other than direct social connections
(e.g., friendships). For this purpose, we have provided an approach based on the
collective influence of communities based on geographical location, homophily, and
social ties. Our results validate our intuition and present further privacy concerns
that involve our society as a whole. In fact, once again, we have shown that users’
information domain is not only confined to what they deliberately share and, thus,
the secrecy of their data depends on and is affected by others’ decision to share
information in OSNs.
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Social influence has also been proven as an effective tool to affect and manipulate
individuals’ opinions in OSNs. In the political context, since the 2016 US Presidential
election, there has been a big spotlight on the risks of mass manipulation of public
opinion in OSNs. Although the attempt of OSN providers to purge their platforms,
malicious actors (e.g., bots and trolls) persist in OSNs and still play a pivotal role in
these manipulation campaigns. The detection of coordinated campaigns remains an
open challenge for the research community: While bots have become increasingly
sophisticated to mimic human behavior in order to escape detection, the automated
detection of trolls has not found any established solution yet. In Chapter 5, to tackle
these challenges, we have provided the following contributions. To answer RQ 3.1, we
have performed an in-depth analysis of the evolution of bots during the last two US
voting events. We have shown how such fake accounts have evolved to emulate human
behavior and avoid detection. To respond to RQ 3.2, we have uncovered the strategy
employed by bot accounts to manipulate human users and involve them in their
conversation. Our findings revealed the mutable nature of bots, their effectiveness
in engaging with humans, and posed new challenges in the detection of coordinated
campaigns. However, our insights can inform actionable policies to empower bots
detection and fight online abuse. Finally, to address RQ 3.3, we have proposed an
approach to automatically detect trolls’ activity in OSNs. Such an approach, based on
IRL, accurately identifies such malicious actors and permits to unveil their distinctive
behavior with respect to non-troll accounts.
In the final contribution of this thesis, we aim to raise users’ awareness of OSN perils.
For this purpose, we have proposed to implement a mobile application for commu-
nicating OSN users their current risks in real-time. However, this kind of service
introduces further privacy and security risks. To face these challenges and address
RQ 4, we have developed a framework, called VIVO, that allows to collect data in a
secure and privacy-preserving way. In Chapter 6, we have presented VIVO and we
have shown how this framework is beneficial for the purpose of this thesis. In fact,
VIVO provides a privacy-by-design facility that allows us to deploy an application,
which securely collects data in real-time and permits to directly communicate with
the users. This, in turn, enables a mechanism of direct feedback through which it is
possible to increase users’ awareness of the risks behind their activity in OSNs.
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7.2 Future Directions
In this thesis, we have examined the perils related to data privacy and manipulation of
the public opinion in OSNs. Our investigation is not exhaustive and presents several
open points and future directions.
As far as privacy is concerned, a possible extension of our work can be directed
towards a more extended campaign to study users’ awareness of, and reaction to,
privacy risks when they utilize smartphones and OSNs. The rationale would be to
investigate users’ behavior before and after they become aware of privacy risks (e.g.,
if they reduce the amount of shared information). However, as we have described
in Chapter 6, an open problem is to identify an understandable and effective way to
communicate information about their current risks to the users. This, and a reward-
based mechanism to recruit volunteers, represent the main challenges to propose an
awareness service.
The major challenge for the manipulation risk is represented by the mutable nature
of social bots. Their continuous presence in OSNs, coupled with their increasingly
sophisticated strategy to escape detection and interact with humans, is cause of
concern for the integrity of the online discussion and of global voting events. This
set of open problems poses numerous challenges in the fight against OSN abuse and
motivates further research for keeping the pace of malicious automated accounts.
Along this research direction, a relevant peril is represented by the recent rise of a new
form of spam, referred to as spamming with AI [85], which relies on AI to conduct
spam operations of different sorts. Examples of spamming with AI are related to the
alteration of video content by superimposing others’ face and/or voice [224], which
result indistinguishable to the human eye. These fake videos have been also diffused in
the political context raising further concerns on the diffusion of misinformation [140].
While this thesis explores the privacy and manipulation risks in OSNs, other perils
need to be investigated to prevent the abuse of OSNs (as we have detailed in Chap-
ter 1). For example, cognitive absorption, addiction, and cyberbullying are relevant
alarming problems related to the misuse of OSNs. Numerous studies analyzed cases
of harassment in online platforms [129, 137] showing that an analysis of social in-
teractions can lead to an automated detection of bullying episodes. However, the
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detection task is a difficult problem as cyberbullying manifests in different ways and,
thus, remains an open challenge. Additionally, mechanisms to avoid health issues
(e.g., addiction, depression, etc.) still need to be investigated and developed.
Finally, as we have shown throughout this thesis, each of these potential and effective
perils exploit users’ vulnerability. Human effort is a necessary ingredient to fight the
harmful attempts to undermine the single individual and our entire society. Therefore,
our future undertaking will be focused on proposing users a set of instruments to
defend themselves from OSN perils.
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